competition-windows-pivot
Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for Kerberos, WinRM, SMB, RDP, Windows credential material, replayable tickets, delegation edges, and host-to-host pivot chains. Use when the user asks to replay Kerberos material, trace a WinRM, SMB, or RDP pivot, understa
v2026.9.22-cab634b3 instalações+3 em 7 dias44,8 mil EstrelasMITsincronizado há 2 horas
Instalar
Ainda não tem a CLI da NotHoly? Instale primeiro.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install zhaoxuya520/competition-windows-pivotGrava em ~/.notholy/skills depois de conferir a assinatura e o SHA-256.
AssinaturaAssinado, ed25519
Pacoteee26b4b2…ad41e120
ee26b4b2fe66…aafcad41e1203 arquivos · 2.1 KBVarreduraBaixonenhum achado
Fontegithub.com/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill/tree/main/CTF-Sandbox-Orchestrator/competition-windows-pivot@cab634b
Este item ainda não foi escrito no seu idioma, então aparece em English.
Nesta página
Use this skill only as a downstream specialization after $ctf-sandbox-orchestrator is already active and has established sandbox assumptions, node ownership, and evidence priorities. If that has not happened yet, return to $ctf-sandbox-orchestrator first.
Use this skill when the challenge path is dominated by host-to-host movement, replayable ticket material, or Windows privilege edges.
Reply in Simplified Chinese unless the user explicitly requests English.
Quick Start
- Compress the pivot into a concrete chain: foothold -> recovered artifact -> replay path -> pivot host -> resulting capability.
- Separate stored credential material from usable privilege.
- Keep host evidence, ticket evidence, and privilege effect on one timeline.
- Record the exact accepting service or host for every replayed artifact.
- Reproduce the smallest pivot that still proves the privilege edge.
Workflow
1. Recover The Replay Material
- Inspect SAM, SECURITY, SYSTEM, NTDS, DPAPI, LSA secrets, browser stores, PowerShell history, ETW, Sysmon, and event logs in the active path.
- Distinguish password, hash, ticket, cookie, vault blob, or gMSA material by where it can actually be used.
2. Trace The Pivot Chain
- Map the protocol actually used: WinRM, SMB, RDP, WMI, admin shares, remote registry, or service control.
- When Kerberos matters, record SPN, delegation, PAC or group data, encryption type, and the accepting service.
- When AD edges matter, inspect ACLs, GPO links, SIDHistory, delegation, certificate templates, and replication rights.
3. Report The Edge
- Keep the pivot path concrete and replayable.
- State what artifact crossed which boundary and what capability appeared on the destination host.
Read This Reference
- Load
references/windows-pivot.mdfor the pivot checklist, Kerberos evidence block, and common replay mistakes. - If the task is specifically about DPAPI masterkeys, browser or vault stores, protected blobs, or proving where a recovered DPAPI secret is accepted, prefer
$competition-dpapi-credential-chain. - If the task is specifically about LSASS memory, ticket caches, replayable session material, or host-resident credential extraction, prefer
$competition-lsass-ticket-material. - If the task is specifically about delegation edges, SPN trust, S4U flow, or which service accepts the delegated ticket, prefer
$competition-kerberos-delegation. - If the hard part is forced authentication, coercion primitives, relay targets, or the service that accepts relayed auth, prefer
$competition-relay-coercion-chain.
What To Preserve
- Host names, logon IDs, SIDs, SPNs, ticket fields, service names, and event IDs
- Exact replay point and resulting logon session, token, or group change
- Raw host artifacts and derived timeline separately
Arquivos desta versão
agents/1386 B
- openai.yaml386 B
references/1791 B
- windows-pivot.md791 B
- SKILL.md3.3 KB
Permissões
| Permissão | Declarada | Encontrada na varredura |
|---|---|---|
| Lê arquivos | Não | Não |
| Grava arquivos | Não | Não |
| Roda comandos no shell | Não | Não |
| Usa a rede | Não | Não |
| Usa conectores | Não | Não |
| Controla um navegador | Não | Não |
Achados da varredura
Revisado em 13 de nov. de 2026
A varredura não encontrou nada para apontar nesta versão.
Uma varredura limpa reduz o risco, mas não prova que o pacote é seguro. Leia o que você instala.
| Versão | Publicada em | Commit | SHA-256 | Assinatura | Mudança de permissão |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.9.22-cab634b | 13 de nov. de 2026 | cab634b | ee26b4b2 | Assinada | – |
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