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theqmaks/analyze-apkMobile, firmware e hardware

analyze-apk

⁨Full security analysis of an Android application — from APK to report⁩

v2026.7.31-4eb5d2f4 instalações+4 em 7 dias76 EstrelasMITsincronizado há 12 horas

Instalar

Ainda não tem a CLI da NotHoly? Instale primeiro.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install theqmaks/analyze-apk

Grava em ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ depois de conferir a assinatura e o SHA-256.

AssinaturaAssinado, ed25519
lGYlUBOJjI…KQ3YQEDw==A CLI confere o SHA-256 e a assinatura antes de gravar qualquer arquivo.
Pacote85ed26de…9b394839
85ed26debe97…55809b3948391 arquivo · ⁦2.5 KB⁩
VarreduraAlto1 achado
  • injection.system_promptSKILL.md:91
Ver a varredura completa
Fontegithub.com/TheQmaks/areclaw/tree/main/.claude/skills/analyze-apk@4eb5d2f

Este item ainda não foi escrito no seu idioma, então aparece em English.

You are performing a comprehensive security analysis. Think, don't checklist.

Input

  • $ARGUMENTS — either a package name (com.example.app) or path to APK file

Phase 1: Acquisition

If given a package name (not a file path):

bash
# Option A: Pull from device (if connected)
adb shell pm path $ARGUMENTS
adb pull <path> workspace/samples/

# Option B: Download from store (no device needed)
justapk download $ARGUMENTS -o workspace/samples/

If given a file path, use directly.

Set $APK = path to the APK file, $PKG = package name.

Phase 2: Reconnaissance — DETERMINE WHAT YOU'RE DEALING WITH

This phase determines your entire strategy. Do not skip.

bash
# 1. Protection detection
apkid $APK

# 2. Check native libraries
unzip -l $APK | grep '\.so' | head -20

# 3. Check assets for framework indicators
unzip -l $APK | grep -E 'flutter|react|index\.android\.bundle|il2cpp|global-metadata'

# 4. Quick manifest check
java -jar tools/apktool/apktool.jar d -s -f -o /tmp/apk_quick $APK
# Read AndroidManifest.xml

DECIDE based on findings:

  • Flutter → Focus on network interception, limited static analysis of Dart
  • React Native → Extract and analyze JS bundle, check for Hermes bytecode
  • Unity/IL2CPP → tools/il2cppdumper/Il2CppDumper.exe libil2cpp.so global-metadata.dat output/ + Ghidra with recovered symbols
  • Packed → Use clsdumper to dump DEX first, then proceed
  • Native Java/Kotlin → Full static + dynamic analysis
  • Heavy obfuscation → Identify obfuscator, try simplify first (java -jar tools/simplify/simplify.jar -i app.apk -o clean.apk), then java-deobfuscator/threadtear

Phase 3: Static Analysis

3a. Decompilation

bash
# Primary: jadx
jadx -d workspace/output/$PKG --deobf --show-bad-code $APK

# Resources + smali: apktool
java -jar tools/apktool/apktool.jar d -o workspace/output/$PKG-smali $APK

If packed and clsdumper was used, decompile the dumped DEX instead.

3b. Manifest Analysis

Read AndroidManifest.xml and analyze:

  • Permissions: List all, flag dangerous ones, check for custom permissions
  • Exported components: Activities, Services, Receivers, Providers with exported="true" or intent-filters (implicit export)
  • Flags: debuggable, allowBackup, usesCleartextTraffic, networkSecurityConfig
  • Deep links: <intent-filter> with android.intent.action.VIEW + <data> elements
  • Target/Min SDK: Security implications of SDK versions

3c. Secret Scanning

bash
# Step 1: apkleaks — fast APK-level scan
apkleaks -f $APK --json -o workspace/reports/$PKG-secrets.json

# Step 2: trufflehog — deep scan on decompiled source (800+ secret types, validates if live!)
tools/trufflehog/trufflehog.exe filesystem workspace/output/$PKG/ --json

Then search decompiled source using expert patterns from the agent reference. Focus on: API keys, hardcoded credentials, Firebase configs, cloud service keys.

For every secret found: determine scope and impact. trufflehog validates automatically — check its output for verified credentials.

3d. API Mapping

Find all network endpoints:

  • Retrofit interfaces (annotations)
  • OkHttp interceptors (base URL)
  • URL constants in strings/resources
  • WebSocket endpoints

Build endpoint table: Method | Path | Auth Required | Request Model | Response Model

3e. Security Audit

Walk through patterns:

  • Cryptography: weak algorithms, hardcoded keys, predictable IVs
  • WebView: JavaScript enabled + interface exposure
  • Data storage: SharedPrefs, SQLite, files — what's sensitive?
  • IPC: Exported components without permissions
  • Logging: Sensitive data in Log calls

Phase 4: Dynamic Analysis (if device connected)

Only if device is available (adb devices shows device):

bash
# If app detects Frida (crashes on attach), use phantom-frida:
# Read tools/phantom-frida/build-info.json for <NAME> and <PORT>
# adb push tools/phantom-frida/<NAME>-server /data/local/tmp/<NAME>-server
# adb shell chmod 755 /data/local/tmp/<NAME>-server && adb shell /data/local/tmp/<NAME>-server -D &
# adb forward tcp:<PORT> tcp:<PORT>
# Then use: frida -H 127.0.0.1:<PORT> instead of frida -U

# Check root detection
frida -U -f $PKG -l workspace/frida-scripts/root-bypass.js

# Monitor crypto (reveals actual keys/algorithms in use)
frida -U -f $PKG -l workspace/frida-scripts/crypto-tracer.js

# Monitor SharedPrefs (reveals actual stored data)
frida -U -f $PKG -l workspace/frida-scripts/shared-prefs-monitor.js

# Check actual stored data on device
adb shell run-as $PKG ls shared_prefs/
adb shell run-as $PKG ls databases/

Phase 5: Report

Generate report at workspace/reports/$PKG-$(date +%Y-%m-%d).md following the report format in the agent reference.

Critical: The report must show chain of reasoning, not just findings. Each finding should explain WHY it matters and WHAT an attacker could do with it.

Arquivos desta versão

Permissões

PermissãoDeclaradaEncontrada na varredura
Lê arquivosSimSim
Grava arquivosNãoNão
Roda comandos no shellSimSim
Usa a redeNãoNão
Usa conectoresNãoNão
Controla um navegadorNãoNão

Achados da varredura

Revisado em 13 de nov. de 2026

  1. AltaPrompt injection · injection.system_promptSKILL.md:91

Uma varredura limpa reduz o risco, mas não prova que o pacote é seguro. Leia o que você instala.

VersãoPublicada emCommitSHA-256AssinaturaMudança de permissão
v2026.7.31-4eb5d2f13 de nov. de 20264eb5d2f85ed26deAssinada–

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