web-open-graph-ssrf
SSRF through link-preview / URL-unfurl / oEmbed features. Load when the app generates a preview card for a user-supplied URL: chat/forum/comment link unfurling, "add a link" in posts or profiles, oEmbed endpoints, rich-text editors that auto-embed, bookmark/save-for-later tools, or any UI that shows
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 instalações+3 em 7 dias27 EstrelasMITsincronizado há 22 horas
Instalar
Ainda não tem a CLI da NotHoly? Instale primeiro.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/web-open-graph-ssrfGrava em ~/.notholy/skills depois de conferir a assinatura e o SHA-256.
AssinaturaAssinado, ed25519
Pacotef8a2063c…c999b281
f8a2063ce320…542bc999b2811 arquivo · 2.6 KBVarreduraMédio3 achados
- Link para um IP diretoSKILL.md:47
- Link para um IP diretoSKILL.md:80
- Links para domínios externos
Fontegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/web/web-open-graph-ssrf@ee0e0c5
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When it applies
The app unfurls user-supplied URLs — chat messages, comments, profile links, oEmbed consumers, "import bookmark", RSS/save-for-later. The dedicated fetch this triggers is an SSRF primitive, often with weaker filtering than the main app because previews must work for arbitrary third-party sites. Also applies when the preview is rendered by a headless browser (adds XSS-in-preview and local-file angles).
Why it works
Unfurlers are built to fetch anything, so allowlists are rare or trivially bypassed. The fetch frequently runs in a separate worker/microservice with its own network position — internal dashboards, metadata IPs, and queues may be reachable from there even when the web tier is locked down. The fetcher also parses the response (HTML, images, sometimes JS), which adds parser-differential bypasses the main app's URL validator doesn't share.
Method
- Find the unfurl path. Paste a URL to your
interactsh/Collaborator host into every link-accepting field. Watch for the OOB hit and fingerprint the fetcher: User-Agent, source IP (different ASN than the app = separate worker = different trust zone), and whether DNS and HTTP come from different IPs (DNS-rebinding candidate). - Probe internal reach with the standard SSRF matrix from
web-ssrf—127.0.0.1,169.254.169.254, RFC1918 ranges, common internal ports — but expect different results than app-tier SSRF: test the worker's neighbours, not the web server's. - Exploit the fetch-and-parse contract:
- Redirect chains — your URL 302s to
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/. Validators that check only the submitted URL pass; the worker follows. - OG-tag pivot — serve a page whose
og:image/og:urlpoints internal. Some fetchers re-fetch OG sub-resources with a second, unvalidated request. - Parser differentials —
http://allowed.com@internal/,http://internal#@allowed.com, scheme-relative and backslash variants (http:\\internal), IDN homographs. The validator and the worker's HTTP client often tokenize URLs differently. - DNS rebinding — validator resolves to a public IP, worker resolves again to
127.0.0.1. Reliable when the OOB hit showed separate DNS/HTTP sources.
- Redirect chains — your URL 302s to
- If the preview renders (headless browser): try
file:///etc/passwd,file:///paths to app config, and a page that fires JS to exfiltrate rendered internal content via OOB — renderer workers frequently run with broad network access. - Cache angle: previews are cached by URL. Check whether a poisoned preview (internal content, attacker HTML) is then served to other users who paste the same URL — stored impact without any victim-side script.
Gotchas
- Async unfurling — the fetch may happen seconds/minutes after submission, from a queue. Correlate by unique canary tokens per URL, not by timing.
- Image-proxy only — some apps only proxy
og:image, not the page fetch. A proxy that returns the fetched body is still full read-SSRF; one that re-encodes images is limited to port/host oracle via error vs. success vs. timing. - Allowlists exist where previews must look right —
oembedconsumers may restrict to known providers. Provider-side open-redirects and user-content subdomains (allowed.com.evil.comwon't fly;evil.com's redirect from an allowed provider URL will) are the way through. - Timeouts lie — internal closed ports often fail faster than filtered ones; a fast "no preview" vs slow "no preview" distinction maps internal services without any body.
- Rate limits on unfurl endpoints are usually tuned for UX, not scanning — slow down rather than trip the WAF and lose the worker's egress IP to a blocklist.
Verify success
OOB hit from an infrastructure IP you don't otherwise reach; a preview card whose title/image
came from an internal-only address (http://127.0.0.1:8080/ rendering an internal admin
title); metadata JSON in a preview; or a cached poisoned preview served to a second account.
References
PortSwigger SSRF research; bug-bounty writeups on chat-unfurler SSRF (Slack/Discord-style previews); Orange Tsai, "A New Era of SSRF" (parser differentials).
Arquivos desta versão
- SKILL.md5.0 KB
Permissões
| Permissão | Declarada | Encontrada na varredura |
|---|---|---|
| Lê arquivos | Não | Não |
| Grava arquivos | Não | Não |
| Roda comandos no shell | Não | Não |
| Usa a rede | Sim | Sim |
| Usa conectores | Não | Não |
| Controla um navegador | Sim | Sim |
Achados da varredura
Revisado em 13 de nov. de 2026
- MédiaLink · Link para um IP diretoSKILL.md:47
- MédiaLink · Link para um IP diretoSKILL.md:80
- InfoLink · Links para domínios externos
Uma varredura limpa reduz o risco, mas não prova que o pacote é seguro. Leia o que você instala.
| Versão | Publicada em | Commit | SHA-256 | Assinatura | Mudança de permissão |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | 13 de nov. de 2026 | ee0e0c5 | f8a2063c | Assinada | – |
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