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mukul975/performing-active-directory-vulnerability-assessmentEngenharia reversa e fuzzing

performing-active-directory-vulnerability-assessment

⁨Assess Active Directory security posture using PingCastle, BloodHound,⁩

v1.03 instalações+3 em 7 dias36,3 mil EstrelasApache-2.0sincronizado há 12 horas

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$ notholy skills install mukul975/performing-active-directory-vulnerability-assessment

Grava em ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ depois de conferir a assinatura e o SHA-256.

AssinaturaAssinado, ed25519
JPYOt2XOq6…HZL1IzBg==A CLI confere o SHA-256 e a assinatura antes de gravar qualquer arquivo.
Pacote6ef1e028…2182b48a
6ef1e028b386…3f1c2182b48a8 arquivos · ⁦14.0 KB⁩
VarreduraMédio3 achados
  • Script executável junto com a skillscripts/agent.py
  • Script executável junto com a skillscripts/process.py
  • Links para domínios externos
Ver a varredura completa
Fontegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/performing-active-directory-vulnerability-assessment@54a7988

Este item ainda não foi escrito no seu idioma, então aparece em English.

Overview

Active Directory (AD) is the primary identity and access management system in most enterprise environments, making it a critical attack target. This skill covers comprehensive AD security assessment using PingCastle for health checks, BloodHound for attack path analysis, and Purple Knight for security posture scoring. These tools identify misconfigurations, excessive privileges, Kerberos weaknesses, and lateral movement opportunities.

When to Use

  • When conducting security assessments that involve performing active directory vulnerability assessment
  • When following incident response procedures for related security events
  • When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
  • When validating security controls through hands-on testing

Prerequisites

  • Domain-joined workstation or domain admin access for scanning
  • PingCastle (https://github.com/netwrix/pingcastle)
  • BloodHound Community Edition with SharpHound collector
  • Purple Knight from Semperis (free community tool)
  • Python 3.9+ for analysis scripts
  • .NET Framework 4.7+ for PingCastle on Windows

Tool 1: PingCastle Health Check

Installation and Execution

powershell
# Download PingCastle
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://github.com/netwrix/pingcastle/releases/latest/download/PingCastle.zip" `
  -OutFile "PingCastle.zip"
Expand-Archive PingCastle.zip -DestinationPath C:\Tools\PingCastle

# Run health check against current domain
cd C:\Tools\PingCastle
.\PingCastle.exe --healthcheck

# Run health check against specific domain
.\PingCastle.exe --healthcheck --server dc01.corp.local --user CORP\scanner_account --password P@ssw0rd

# Run in scanner mode for multiple domains
.\PingCastle.exe --scanner --scannerlp

# Generate consolidated report
.\PingCastle.exe --healthcheck --level Full

PingCastle Scoring Categories

Category Description Risk Areas
Stale Objects Inactive accounts, old passwords, obsolete OS Ghost accounts, expired credentials
Privileged Accounts Excessive admin rights, nested groups Domain Admin sprawl, SID history
Trusts Forest and domain trust configurations Transitive trust abuse, SID filtering
Anomalies Security setting deviations GPO misconfigurations, schema issues

Key PingCastle Checks

text
# Critical items to review in PingCastle report:
- Accounts with "Password Never Expires" flag
- Accounts with Kerberos pre-authentication disabled (AS-REP roastable)
- Accounts with Kerberos delegation (unconstrained/constrained)
- Domain Controllers running unsupported OS versions
- AdminSDHolder permission modifications
- Accounts in privileged groups (Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins)
- Trust relationships with SID filtering disabled
- GPO vulnerabilities allowing privilege escalation

Tool 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis

SharpHound Data Collection

powershell
# Download SharpHound collector
# https://github.com/SpecterOps/BloodHound/tree/main/packages/csharp/SharpHound

# Run SharpHound collection (all methods)
.\SharpHound.exe --collectionmethods All --domain corp.local --zipfilename bloodhound_data.zip

# Stealthy collection (minimal noise)
.\SharpHound.exe --collectionmethods Session,LoggedOn --domain corp.local --stealth

# Collection with specific domain controller
.\SharpHound.exe --collectionmethods All --domain corp.local --domaincontroller dc01.corp.local

# Run via PowerShell
Import-Module .\SharpHound.ps1
Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All -Domain corp.local -OutputDirectory C:\BH_Data

BloodHound CE Setup

bash
# Deploy BloodHound Community Edition with Docker
curl -L https://ghst.ly/getbhce -o docker-compose.yml
docker compose up -d

# Access BloodHound CE at http://localhost:8080
# Default credentials shown in docker compose logs

# Upload SharpHound data through web UI or API
curl -X POST "http://localhost:8080/api/v2/file-upload/start" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $BH_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"fileName": "bloodhound_data.zip"}'

Critical BloodHound Queries

cypher
# Find shortest path to Domain Admin
MATCH p=shortestPath((u:User)-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:"DOMAIN [email protected]"}))
WHERE u.name <> "[email protected]"
RETURN p

# Find Kerberoastable accounts with admin privileges
MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true})-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group)
WHERE g.name CONTAINS "ADMIN"
RETURN u.name, u.serviceprincipalnames

# Find computers where Domain Admins are logged in
MATCH (c:Computer)-[:HasSession]->(u:User)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group {name:"DOMAIN [email protected]"})
RETURN c.name, u.name

# Find AS-REP roastable accounts
MATCH (u:User {dontreqpreauth:true})
RETURN u.name, u.description

# Find unconstrained delegation hosts
MATCH (c:Computer {unconstraineddelegation:true})
WHERE NOT c.name CONTAINS "DC"
RETURN c.name

# Find GPO abuse paths
MATCH p=(u:User)-[:GenericAll|GenericWrite|WriteOwner|WriteDacl]->(g:GPO)
RETURN p

Tool 3: Purple Knight Assessment

powershell
# Download Purple Knight from https://www.purple-knight.com/
# Run as domain admin or with appropriate read permissions

.\PurpleKnight.exe

# Purple Knight checks 130+ security indicators across:
# - Account Security (password policies, privileged accounts)
# - AD Infrastructure (replication, DNS, LDAP signing)
# - Group Policy (GPO permissions, security settings)
# - Kerberos Security (delegation, encryption types, SPN)
# - AD Delegation (AdminSDHolder, OU permissions)

Purple Knight Score Categories

Score Range Rating Action Required
90-100 Excellent Maintain current posture
75-89 Good Address high-risk findings
60-74 Fair Prioritize remediation plan
40-59 Poor Immediate remediation required
0-39 Critical Emergency response needed

Common AD Vulnerabilities

1. Kerberoasting Exposure

powershell
# Find SPNs assigned to user accounts (Kerberoasting targets)
Get-ADUser -Filter {ServicePrincipalName -ne "$null"} -Properties ServicePrincipalName |
  Select-Object Name, ServicePrincipalName, PasswordLastSet, Enabled

2. AS-REP Roasting Exposure

powershell
# Find accounts with pre-auth disabled
Get-ADUser -Filter {DoesNotRequirePreAuth -eq $true} -Properties DoesNotRequirePreAuth |
  Select-Object Name, DoesNotRequirePreAuth, Enabled

3. LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning Risk

powershell
# Check if LLMNR is disabled via GPO
Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\DNSClient" -Name EnableMulticast -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

4. Excessive Privileged Group Membership

powershell
# Count members in critical groups
$groups = @("Domain Admins", "Enterprise Admins", "Schema Admins", "Account Operators", "Backup Operators")
foreach ($group in $groups) {
    $count = (Get-ADGroupMember -Identity $group -Recursive).Count
    Write-Output "$group : $count members"
}

Remediation Priorities

Finding Risk Remediation
Kerberoastable admin accounts Critical Remove SPNs or use MSA/gMSA
Unconstrained delegation on non-DCs Critical Switch to constrained/RBCD
Password Never Expires on admins High Enable password rotation policy
AS-REP roastable accounts High Enable Kerberos pre-authentication
AdminSDHolder modification High Audit and restore default ACLs
Stale computer accounts (90+ days) Medium Disable and move to quarantine OU
LDAP signing not enforced Medium Enable via GPO on all DCs

References

Arquivos desta versão

Permissões

PermissãoDeclaradaEncontrada na varredura
Lê arquivosSimSim
Grava arquivosSimSim
Roda comandos no shellSimSim
Usa a redeSimSim
Usa conectoresNãoNão
Controla um navegadorNãoNão

Achados da varredura

Revisado em 13 de nov. de 2026

  1. MédiaArquivo · Script executável junto com a skillscripts/agent.py
  2. MédiaArquivo · Script executável junto com a skillscripts/process.py
  3. InfoLink · Links para domínios externos

Uma varredura limpa reduz o risco, mas não prova que o pacote é seguro. Leia o que você instala.

VersãoPublicada emCommitSHA-256AssinaturaMudança de permissão
v1.013 de nov. de 202654a79886ef1e028Assinada–

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