hunting-for-dcsync-attacks
Detect DCSync attacks (MITRE ATT&CK T1003.006) by analyzing Windows Event ID 4662 (AccessMask 0x100) for DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All requests issued by non-domain-controller accounts. Use when hunting for DCSync credential theft, after detecting Mimikatz-class tooli
v1.03 instalações+3 em 7 dias36,3 mil EstrelasApache-2.0sincronizado há 12 horas
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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install mukul975/hunting-for-dcsync-attacksGrava em ~/.notholy/skills depois de conferir a assinatura e o SHA-256.
AssinaturaAssinado, ed25519
Pacote0e7405a0…95c64356
0e7405a0b5ba…6de195c643564 arquivos · 9.4 KBVarreduraMédio2 achados
- Script executável junto com a skillscripts/agent.py
- Links para domínios externos
Fontegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/hunting-for-dcsync-attacks@54a7988
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When to Use
- When hunting for DCSync credential theft (MITRE ATT&CK T1003.006)
- After detecting Mimikatz or similar tools in the environment
- During incident response involving Active Directory compromise
- When monitoring for unauthorized domain replication requests
- During purple team exercises testing AD attack detection
Prerequisites
- Windows Security Event Log forwarding enabled (Event ID 4662)
- Audit Directory Service Access enabled via Group Policy
- Domain Computers SACL configured on Domain Object for machine account detection
- SIEM with Windows event data ingested (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)
- Knowledge of legitimate domain controller accounts and replication partners
Workflow
- Enable Auditing: Ensure Audit Directory Service Access is enabled on domain controllers.
- Collect Events: Gather Windows Event ID 4662 with AccessMask 0x100 (Control Access).
- Filter Replication GUIDs: Search for DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All.
- Identify Non-DC Sources: Flag events where SubjectUserName is not a domain controller machine account.
- Correlate with Network: Cross-reference source IPs against known DC addresses.
- Validate Findings: Exclude legitimate replication tools (Azure AD Connect, SCCM).
- Respond: Disable compromised accounts, reset krbtgt, investigate lateral movement.
Key Concepts
| Concept | Description |
|---|---|
| DCSync | Technique abusing AD replication protocol to extract password hashes |
| Event ID 4662 | Directory Service Access audit event |
| DS-Replication-Get-Changes | GUID 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 |
| DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All | GUID 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 |
| AccessMask 0x100 | Control Access right indicating extended rights verification |
| T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: DCSync |
Tools & Systems
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Windows Event Viewer | Direct event log analysis |
| Splunk | SIEM correlation of Event 4662 |
| Elastic Security | Detection rules for DCSync patterns |
| Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync | Attack tool used to perform DCSync |
| Impacket secretsdump.py | Python-based DCSync implementation |
| BloodHound | Identify accounts with replication rights |
Output Format
Hunt ID: TH-DCSYNC-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Technique: T1003.006
Domain Controller: [DC hostname]
Subject Account: [Account performing replication]
Source IP: [Non-DC IP address]
GUID Accessed: [Replication GUID]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
Recommended Action: [Disable account, reset krbtgt, investigate]Arquivos desta versão
references/13.4 KB
- api-reference.md3.4 KB
scripts/19.7 KB
- agent.py9.7 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md3.5 KB
Permissões
| Permissão | Declarada | Encontrada na varredura |
|---|---|---|
| Lê arquivos | Não | Não |
| Grava arquivos | Não | Não |
| Roda comandos no shell | Sim | Sim |
| Usa a rede | Sim | Sim |
| Usa conectores | Não | Não |
| Controla um navegador | Não | Não |
Achados da varredura
Revisado em 13 de nov. de 2026
- MédiaArquivo · Script executável junto com a skillscripts/agent.py
- InfoLink · Links para domínios externos
Uma varredura limpa reduz o risco, mas não prova que o pacote é seguro. Leia o que você instala.
| Versão | Publicada em | Commit | SHA-256 | Assinatura | Mudança de permissão |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0 | 13 de nov. de 2026 | 54a7988 | 0e7405a0 | Assinada | – |
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