detecting-rootkit-activity
Detects rootkit presence on compromised systems by identifying hidden
v1.0.03 instalações+3 em 7 dias36,3 mil EstrelasApache-2.0sincronizado há 13 horas
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AssinaturaAssinado, ed25519
Pacoteda5560db…c2be2b88
da5560db3b9a…63c4c2be2b884 arquivos · 10.8 KBVarreduraMédio2 achados
- Script executável junto com a skillscripts/agent.py
- Links para domínios externos
Fontegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/detecting-rootkit-activity@54a7988
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When to Use
- System shows signs of compromise but standard tools (Task Manager, netstat) show nothing abnormal
- Antivirus/EDR detects rootkit signatures but cannot identify the specific hiding mechanism
- Memory forensics reveals discrepancies between kernel data structures and user-mode tool output
- Investigating a persistent threat that survives remediation attempts and system reboots
- Validating system integrity after a suspected kernel-level compromise
Do not use as a first-line detection method; start with standard malware triage and escalate to rootkit analysis when hiding behavior is suspected.
Prerequisites
- Volatility 3 for memory forensics and kernel structure analysis
- GMER or Rootkit Revealer (Windows) for live system scanning
- rkhunter and chkrootkit (Linux) for filesystem and process integrity checks
- Sysinternals tools (Process Explorer, Autoruns, RootkitRevealer) for Windows analysis
- Memory dump from the suspected system (WinPmem, LiME)
- Clean baseline of the OS for comparison (known-good kernel module hashes)
Workflow
Step 1: Cross-View Detection for Hidden Processes
Compare process lists from different data sources to find discrepancies:
# Volatility: Compare process enumeration methods
# pslist - walks ActiveProcessLinks (EPROCESS linked list - what rootkits manipulate)
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.pslist > pslist_output.txt
# psscan - scans physical memory for EPROCESS pool tags (rootkit-resistant)
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.psscan > psscan_output.txt
# Compare outputs to find hidden processes
python3 << 'PYEOF'
pslist_pids = set()
psscan_pids = set()
with open("pslist_output.txt") as f:
for line in f:
parts = line.split()
if len(parts) > 1 and parts[1].isdigit():
pslist_pids.add(int(parts[1]))
with open("psscan_output.txt") as f:
for line in f:
parts = line.split()
if len(parts) > 1 and parts[1].isdigit():
psscan_pids.add(int(parts[1]))
hidden = psscan_pids - pslist_pids
if hidden:
print(f"[!] HIDDEN PROCESSES DETECTED (in psscan but not pslist):")
for pid in hidden:
print(f" PID: {pid}")
else:
print("[*] No hidden processes detected via cross-view analysis")
PYEOFStep 2: Detect System Call Hooking
Identify hooks in the System Service Descriptor Table (SSDT) and Import Address Tables:
# Check SSDT for hooked system calls
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.ssdt
# Identify hooks pointing outside ntoskrnl.exe or win32k.sys
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.ssdt | grep -v "ntoskrnl\|win32k"
# Check for Inline hooks (detour patching)
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.apihooks --pid 4 # System process
# IDT (Interrupt Descriptor Table) analysis
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.idt
# Check for IRP (I/O Request Packet) hooking on drivers
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.driverscan
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.driverirpTypes of Rootkit Hooks:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
SSDT Hook: Modifies System Service Descriptor Table entries to redirect
system calls through rootkit code (filters process/file listings)
IAT Hook: Patches Import Address Table of a process to intercept API calls
before they reach the kernel
Inline Hook: Overwrites the first bytes of a function with a JMP to rootkit code
(detour/trampoline technique)
IRP Hook: Intercepts I/O Request Packets to filter disk/network operations
at the driver level
DKOM: Direct Kernel Object Manipulation - unlinking structures like
EPROCESS from the ActiveProcessLinks list without hookingStep 3: Analyze Kernel Modules and Drivers
Identify unauthorized kernel drivers that may be rootkit components:
# List all loaded kernel modules
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.modules
# Scan for drivers in memory (including hidden/unlinked)
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.driverscan
# Compare module lists to find hidden drivers
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.modscan > modscan.txt
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.modules > modules.txt
# Check driver signatures and verify against known-good baselines
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.verinfo
# Dump suspicious driver for static analysis
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.moddump --base 0xFFFFF80012340000 --dumpStep 4: Detect File and Registry Hiding
Identify files and registry keys hidden by the rootkit:
# Linux rootkit detection with rkhunter
rkhunter --check --skip-keypress --report-warnings-only
# chkrootkit scanning
chkrootkit -q
# Windows: Compare filesystem views
# Live system file listing vs Volatility filescan
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.filescan > mem_files.txt
# Check for hidden registry keys
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.registry.hivelist
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.registry.printkey --key "SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services"
# Look for hidden services (loaded but not in service registry)
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.svcscan | grep -i "kernel"Step 5: Network Connection Analysis
Find hidden network connections and backdoors:
# Memory-based network connection enumeration
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.netscan
# Compare with live netstat (if available) to find hidden connections
# Hidden connections: present in memory but not shown by netstat
# Look for raw sockets (often used by rootkits for covert communication)
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.netscan | grep RAW
# Check for network filter drivers (NDIS hooks)
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.driverscan | grep -i "ndis\|tcpip\|afd"
# Analyze callback routines registered by drivers
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.callbacksStep 6: Integrity Verification
Verify system file and kernel integrity:
# Check kernel code integrity (compare in-memory kernel to on-disk copy)
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.moddump --base 0xFFFFF80070000000 --dump
# Compare SHA-256 of dumped ntoskrnl.exe with known-good copy
# Windows: System File Checker (on live system)
sfc /scannow
# Linux: Package integrity verification
rpm -Va # RPM-based systems
debsums -c # Debian-based systems
# Compare critical system binaries
find /bin /sbin /usr/bin /usr/sbin -type f -exec sha256sum {} \; > current_hashes.txt
# Compare against baseline: diff baseline_hashes.txt current_hashes.txt
# YARA scan for known rootkit signatures
vol3 -f memory.dmp yarascan.YaraScan --yara-file rootkit_rules.yarKey Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Rootkit | Malware designed to maintain persistent, privileged access while hiding its presence from system administrators and security tools |
| DKOM | Direct Kernel Object Manipulation; technique of modifying kernel data structures (e.g., unlinking EPROCESS) to hide objects without hooking |
| SSDT Hooking | Replacing entries in the System Service Descriptor Table to intercept and filter system call results (hide processes, files, connections) |
| Inline Hooking | Patching the first instructions of a function with a jump to rootkit code; the rootkit can filter the function output before returning |
| Cross-View Detection | Comparing results from multiple enumeration methods (linked list walk vs memory scan) to identify discrepancies caused by hiding |
| Kernel Driver | Code running in kernel mode (Ring 0) with full system access; rootkits use malicious drivers to gain kernel-level control |
| Bootkits | Rootkits that infect the boot process (MBR, VBR, or UEFI firmware) to load before the operating system and security tools |
Tools & Systems
- Volatility: Memory forensics framework providing cross-view detection, SSDT analysis, and kernel structure inspection for rootkit detection
- GMER: Free Windows rootkit detection tool scanning for SSDT hooks, IDT hooks, IRP hooks, and hidden processes/files/registry
- rkhunter: Linux rootkit detection tool checking for known rootkit signatures, suspicious files, and system binary modifications
- chkrootkit: Linux tool for detecting rootkit presence through signature-based and anomaly-based checks
- Sysinternals RootkitRevealer: Microsoft tool comparing Windows API results with raw filesystem/registry scans to find discrepancies
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Investigating a System Where Standard Tools Show No Compromise
Context: An endpoint shows network beaconing to a known C2 IP in firewall logs, but the local EDR, Task Manager, and netstat show no suspicious processes or connections. A memory dump has been acquired for analysis.
Approach:
- Run Volatility
psscanand compare withpslistto identify processes hidden via DKOM - Run
windows.ssdtto check for system call hooks that filter process and network listings - Run
windows.malfindto detect injected code in legitimate processes - Run
windows.netscanto find network connections hidden from user-mode tools - Run
windows.driverscanto identify malicious kernel drivers enabling the hiding - Dump the rootkit driver and analyze with Ghidra to understand its hooking mechanism
- Check for boot persistence (MBR/VBR modifications, UEFI firmware implants)
Pitfalls:
- Running detection tools on the live compromised system (rootkit may hide from or subvert them)
- Assuming kernel integrity because no SSDT hooks are found (rootkit may use DKOM or inline hooks instead)
- Not checking for both user-mode and kernel-mode rootkit components (many rootkits have both)
- Trusting the rootkit scanner results on a live system; always verify with offline memory forensics
Output Format
ROOTKIT DETECTION ANALYSIS REPORT
====================================
Dump File: memory.dmp
System: Windows 10 21H2 x64
Analysis Tool: Volatility 3.2
CROSS-VIEW DETECTION
Process List Comparison:
pslist processes: 127
psscan processes: 129
[!] HIDDEN PROCESSES: 2
PID 6784: sysmon64.exe (hidden rootkit component)
PID 6812: netfilter.exe (hidden network filter)
SSDT HOOK ANALYSIS
[!] Entry 0x004A (NtQuerySystemInformation) hooked -> driver.sys+0x1200
[!] Entry 0x0055 (NtQueryDirectoryFile) hooked -> driver.sys+0x1400
[!] Entry 0x0119 (NtDeviceIoControlFile) hooked -> driver.sys+0x1600
Hook Target: driver.sys at 0xFFFFF800ABCD0000 (unsigned, suspicious)
KERNEL DRIVER ANALYSIS
[!] driver.sys - No digital signature, loaded at 0xFFFFF800ABCD0000
Size: 45,056 bytes
SHA-256: abc123def456...
IRP Hooks: IRP_MJ_CREATE, IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL
Registry: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MalDriver
HIDDEN NETWORK CONNECTIONS
PID 6812: 10.1.5.42:49152 -> 185.220.101.42:443 (ESTABLISHED)
- Not visible via netstat or user-mode tools
- Filtered by NtDeviceIoControlFile SSDT hook
ROOTKIT CAPABILITIES
- Process hiding (DKOM + SSDT)
- File hiding (NtQueryDirectoryFile hook)
- Network connection hiding (NtDeviceIoControlFile hook)
- Kernel-mode persistence (driver service)
REMEDIATION
- Boot from clean media for offline remediation
- Remove malicious driver from offline registry
- Verify MBR/VBR/UEFI integrity for boot persistence
- Full system rebuild recommended for kernel-level compromiseArquivos desta versão
references/12.3 KB
- api-reference.md2.3 KB
scripts/18.0 KB
- agent.py8.0 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md11.7 KB
Permissões
| Permissão | Declarada | Encontrada na varredura |
|---|---|---|
| Lê arquivos | Não | Não |
| Grava arquivos | Sim | Sim |
| Roda comandos no shell | Sim | Sim |
| Usa a rede | Sim | Sim |
| Usa conectores | Não | Não |
| Controla um navegador | Não | Não |
Achados da varredura
Revisado em 13 de nov. de 2026
- MédiaArquivo · Script executável junto com a skillscripts/agent.py
- InfoLink · Links para domínios externos
Uma varredura limpa reduz o risco, mas não prova que o pacote é seguro. Leia o que você instala.
| Versão | Publicada em | Commit | SHA-256 | Assinatura | Mudança de permissão |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0.0 | 13 de nov. de 2026 | 54a7988 | da5560db | Assinada | – |
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