competition-mailbox-abuse
Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for enterprise mail abuse, OAuth consent, inbox or forwarding rules, transport rules, shared mailbox access, phishing chains, and token-to-mailbox side effects. Use when the user asks to trace mailbox rules, OAuth consent g
v2026.9.22-cab634b3 installs+3 in 7 days44.8K StarsMITsynced 2 hours ago
Install
No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install zhaoxuya520/competition-mailbox-abuseWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Packagec05120a0…cc03968d
c05120a0736f…1b2ccc03968d3 files · 2.0 KBScanMedium1 finding
- injection.no_confirmationreferences/mailbox-abuse.md:20
Sourcegithub.com/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill/tree/main/CTF-Sandbox-Orchestrator/competition-mailbox-abuse@cab634b
On this page
Use this skill only as a downstream specialization after $ctf-sandbox-orchestrator is already active and has established sandbox assumptions, node ownership, and evidence priorities. If that has not happened yet, return to $ctf-sandbox-orchestrator first.
Use this skill when the decisive path runs through mailbox behavior, consent flow, or message-routing effects rather than generic AD evidence alone.
Reply in Simplified Chinese unless the user explicitly requests English.
Quick Start
- Decide whether the active path is phishing-to-consent, token-to-mailbox, rule-based persistence, or transport-level mail rerouting.
- Keep mailbox evidence, identity evidence, and message-trace evidence tied to the same user, mailbox, token, or message ID.
- Separate possession of a token or delegate edge from the actual mailbox effect it enables.
- Record forwarding targets, rule predicates, consent scopes, shared mailbox edges, and resulting mail flow in compact blocks.
- Reproduce the smallest mail effect that proves persistence, exfiltration, or privilege.
Workflow
1. Map The Mail Trust Path
- Identify the principal, mailbox, token or session, consent grant, delegate edge, shared mailbox relationship, or app registration involved.
- Record consent scopes, mailbox permissions, rule ownership, transport actions, and message-trace identifiers.
- Distinguish client-visible symptoms from server-side mailbox or transport state.
2. Prove The Mailbox Effect
- Correlate consent logs, sign-ins, message traces, inbox rules, transport rules, forwarding settings, and mailbox audit events.
- Show which rule or token produces which concrete effect: silent forwarding, marking read, deletion, delegate access, or message rerouting.
- Keep message IDs, sender or recipient pairs, and timestamps aligned across logs.
3. Reduce To The Decisive Abuse Chain
- Compress the path to the smallest sequence: lure or grant -> token or delegate edge -> mailbox or transport mutation -> resulting mail effect.
- State clearly whether persistence lives in consent, mailbox rules, transport config, or shared mailbox permissions.
- If the task broadens into host pivots or Kerberos acceptance, switch back to the broader identity skill.
Read This Reference
- Load
references/mailbox-abuse.mdfor the consent checklist, rule checklist, and evidence packaging.
What To Preserve
- Consent scopes, token claims, mailbox permissions, rule definitions, forwarding targets, and message IDs
- Message-trace lines, audit events, and mailbox effects tied to the same mail path
- The smallest replayable sequence that proves persistence, exfiltration, or delegate access
Files in this version
agents/1386 B
- openai.yaml386 B
references/11.1 KB
- mailbox-abuse.md1.1 KB
- SKILL.md3.3 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | No | No |
| Writes files | No | No |
| Runs shell commands | No | No |
| Uses the network | No | No |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
- MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationreferences/mailbox-abuse.md:20
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.9.22-cab634b | Nov 13, 2026 | cab634b | c05120a0 | Signed | – |
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