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trailofbits/supply-chain-risk-auditorReporting and compliance

supply-chain-risk-auditor

⁨Audits a project's dependencies for supply-chain risk: version-matched advisories for direct dependencies and the full lockfile tree, abandoned or archived upstreams, npm publisher concentration, and install-time script execution. Use when asked to audit dependencies, assess supply-chain or third-pa⁩

v2026.11.12-149d7b23 installs+3 in 7 days8.2K StarsCC-BY-SA-4.0synced 22 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install trailofbits/supply-chain-risk-auditor

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
0i57rKXrFU…IgBoIiDw==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Packagee2509fde…05f8ec68
e2509fde06ec…3c0305f8ec6813 files · ⁦66.1 KB⁩
ScanMedium21 findings
  • injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:40
  • Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/collect.py
  • injection.no_confirmationscripts/collect.py:282
See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/trailofbits/skills/tree/main/plugins/supply-chain-risk-auditor/skills/supply-chain-risk-auditor@149d7b2

Generates a supply-chain risk report for a project's direct dependencies (npm, PyPI, Go), plus an advisory sweep of everything its lockfile resolves. Two deterministic scripts do the measuring; your job is the judgment they refuse to automate.

Why the scripts do the measuring, not you

Every figure in this report is a claim about somebody else's project, and hand-collected figures were measured wrong before this skill was rebuilt around scripts: GitHub contributor counts said five-plus people maintain lodash where npm's ACL says one, and gh saw zero downloads for a package that moves 164 million a week. Do not estimate maintainer counts, downloads, staleness, or CVE history from gh, web search, or memory — run the collector, and quote what it measured.

The scripts enforce two rules worth knowing before you read their output:

  • Unavailable data is never evidence of risk. Every criterion resolves to assessed-clean, assessed-flagged, or unassessable-with-a-reason.
  • An absent measurement is never a clean verdict. A run that measured nothing exits non-zero instead of printing a report that finds nothing.

Workflow

  1. Confirm the target directory has manifests: package.json, pyproject.toml, requirements*.txt, or go.mod. If none exist, say so and stop — do not audit an ecosystem this collector does not parse by hand. Lockfiles read for exact versions and the transitive sweep: package-lock.json/npm-shrinkwrap.json, uv.lock, and a go 1.17+ go.mod. yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, and poetry.lock are not read — the report says so when they are present, and versions fall back to pins or the latest release.

  2. Check gh auth status. Unauthenticated GitHub allows 60 requests/hour against 5,000, and the collector makes several per dependency; expect repository criteria to come back unassessable without it. Say so rather than fixing it silently.

  3. Collect, then render. Put outputs somewhere outside the audited repository unless asked otherwise:

    sh
    uv run {baseDir}/scripts/collect.py <project-dir> --json <out-dir>/findings.json
    uv run {baseDir}/scripts/render.py <out-dir>/findings.json --out <out-dir>/report.md

    Expect a few minutes for ~50 dependencies — several HTTP requests per dependency, more with many Go modules, and slower without authenticated gh. If collect.py exits non-zero, it is refusing to report — relay its message verbatim instead of retrying or working around it.

  4. Read report.md and findings.json. The report is the deliverable; the JSON carries the datum behind every verdict when you need to cite one.

  5. Add what the collector cannot, clearly separated from what it measured:

    • A short narrative for this reader: what to act on first, and why.
    • Upgrade paths for advisory findings — check whether the fix is a patch or a major version away.
    • Replacement candidates for abandoned or archived dependencies. Verify a candidate exists in the registry before naming it, and label these as judgment, not measurement.
    • For flagged install scripts: whether npm ci --ignore-scripts is viable for this project's build.

Style for what you add

Write added prose the way a security report reads, and apply the same register to the report addendum and the final reply alike — replies get pasted into tickets and reports verbatim. State the finding, the datum behind it, and the action.

  • Impersonal and declarative: no first or second person ("I ran the collector", "you should upgrade"), no contractions, no exclamation points.
  • Active voice, with the subject matter as the actor: "upgrading to 1.19.0 clears all 25 advisories", not "it is recommended that axios be upgraded".
  • Objective: no intensifiers or subjective framing ("very", "significant", "fortunately"), and no guesses about why the project chose what it chose.
  • Tense: past for what the audit did, present for the state of the dependencies, future for the consequences of acting or not.
  • Constructive: a recommendation names the action and its cost, never a culprit.

If the report-writing:writing-style skill is available in the session, follow it — it is the full version of this register.

The rendered report carries facts only. The interpretive rules below are instructions to you, not content for the reader — do not copy them into the deliverable as caveats or framing.

Reading the report

  • Unassessable is not risk. PyPI publishes no maintainer ACL and Go has no registry; those rows say what could not be known, not what is wrong.
  • The coverage table bounds every claim. "No advisories" means "none among what was assessed" — check the assessed count before repeating a clean verdict.
  • Quote figures verbatim. Do not re-derive, round, or embellish the report's numbers; every one is reproducible from the artifact.
  • Absence from the findings is not endorsement. A dependency with no findings was measured against these criteria only.

Rationalizations to reject

  • "gh can give me maintainer counts faster than the collector." Measured wrong — repo contributors and registry publish rights are different populations.
  • "No findings, so the dependencies are safe." Read the coverage table; on PyPI and Go, half the criteria are structurally unassessable.
  • "The unassessable rows would just confuse the reader; I'll drop them." They are the boundary of every claim in the report. Dropping them turns partial coverage into a clean bill of health, which is the failure this skill was rebuilt to prevent.
  • "The version is probably close enough." A range checked at latest-release and a lockfile-resolved version are different claims; the report labels which one it makes. Keep the label.

When not to use

  • License compliance auditing.
  • Scanning the target's own source for vulnerabilities or secrets — this skill never reads dependency source, only registry, advisory, and repository metadata.
  • Judging whether the project installs or builds. The audit is designed to work from nothing more than the dependency list — manifests and lockfiles — and never installs, builds, or executes anything. Broken installs and import-time breakage are out of scope, and worth saying so if the user seems to expect them.
  • Ecosystems other than npm, PyPI, and Go; say the ecosystem is unsupported rather than improvising an audit for it.

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesYesYes
Writes filesYesYes
Runs shell commandsYesYes
Uses the networkYesYes
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

  1. MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:40
  2. MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/collect.py
  3. MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationscripts/collect.py:282
  4. MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationscripts/collect.py:1103
  5. MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/model.py
  6. MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationscripts/model.py:325
  7. MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/render.py
  8. MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationscripts/render.py:116
  9. MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationscripts/render.py:179
  10. MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationscripts/render.py:512
  11. MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationscripts/render.py:608
  12. MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/sources.py
  13. MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationscripts/sources.py:115
  14. MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationscripts/sources.py:287
  15. MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/test_collect.py
  16. MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationscripts/test_collect.py:681
  17. MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/test_model.py
  18. MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/test_render.py
  19. MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/test_sources.py
  20. MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationscripts/test_sources.py:177
  21. InfoLink · Links to outside domains

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v2026.11.12-149d7b2Nov 13, 2026149d7b2e2509fdeSigned–

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