supply-chain-risk-auditor
Audits a project's dependencies for supply-chain risk: version-matched advisories for direct dependencies and the full lockfile tree, abandoned or archived upstreams, npm publisher concentration, and install-time script execution. Use when asked to audit dependencies, assess supply-chain or third-pa
v2026.11.12-149d7b23 installs+3 in 7 days8.2K StarsCC-BY-SA-4.0synced 22 hours ago
Install
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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install trailofbits/supply-chain-risk-auditorWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Packagee2509fde…05f8ec68
e2509fde06ec…3c0305f8ec6813 files · 66.1 KBScanMedium21 findings
- injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:40
- Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/collect.py
- injection.no_confirmationscripts/collect.py:282
Sourcegithub.com/trailofbits/skills/tree/main/plugins/supply-chain-risk-auditor/skills/supply-chain-risk-auditor@149d7b2
On this page
Generates a supply-chain risk report for a project's direct dependencies (npm, PyPI, Go), plus an advisory sweep of everything its lockfile resolves. Two deterministic scripts do the measuring; your job is the judgment they refuse to automate.
Why the scripts do the measuring, not you
Every figure in this report is a claim about somebody else's project, and hand-collected
figures were measured wrong before this skill was rebuilt around scripts: GitHub
contributor counts said five-plus people maintain lodash where npm's ACL says one, and
gh saw zero downloads for a package that moves 164 million a week. Do not estimate
maintainer counts, downloads, staleness, or CVE history from gh, web search, or
memory — run the collector, and quote what it measured.
The scripts enforce two rules worth knowing before you read their output:
- Unavailable data is never evidence of risk. Every criterion resolves to assessed-clean, assessed-flagged, or unassessable-with-a-reason.
- An absent measurement is never a clean verdict. A run that measured nothing exits non-zero instead of printing a report that finds nothing.
Workflow
Confirm the target directory has manifests:
package.json,pyproject.toml,requirements*.txt, orgo.mod. If none exist, say so and stop — do not audit an ecosystem this collector does not parse by hand. Lockfiles read for exact versions and the transitive sweep:package-lock.json/npm-shrinkwrap.json,uv.lock, and a go 1.17+go.mod.yarn.lock,pnpm-lock.yaml, andpoetry.lockare not read — the report says so when they are present, and versions fall back to pins or the latest release.Check
gh auth status. Unauthenticated GitHub allows 60 requests/hour against 5,000, and the collector makes several per dependency; expect repository criteria to come back unassessable without it. Say so rather than fixing it silently.Collect, then render. Put outputs somewhere outside the audited repository unless asked otherwise:
sh uv run {baseDir}/scripts/collect.py <project-dir> --json <out-dir>/findings.json uv run {baseDir}/scripts/render.py <out-dir>/findings.json --out <out-dir>/report.mdExpect a few minutes for ~50 dependencies — several HTTP requests per dependency, more with many Go modules, and slower without authenticated
gh. Ifcollect.pyexits non-zero, it is refusing to report — relay its message verbatim instead of retrying or working around it.Read
report.mdandfindings.json. The report is the deliverable; the JSON carries the datum behind every verdict when you need to cite one.Add what the collector cannot, clearly separated from what it measured:
- A short narrative for this reader: what to act on first, and why.
- Upgrade paths for advisory findings — check whether the fix is a patch or a major version away.
- Replacement candidates for abandoned or archived dependencies. Verify a candidate exists in the registry before naming it, and label these as judgment, not measurement.
- For flagged install scripts: whether
npm ci --ignore-scriptsis viable for this project's build.
Style for what you add
Write added prose the way a security report reads, and apply the same register to the report addendum and the final reply alike — replies get pasted into tickets and reports verbatim. State the finding, the datum behind it, and the action.
- Impersonal and declarative: no first or second person ("I ran the collector", "you should upgrade"), no contractions, no exclamation points.
- Active voice, with the subject matter as the actor: "upgrading to 1.19.0 clears all 25 advisories", not "it is recommended that axios be upgraded".
- Objective: no intensifiers or subjective framing ("very", "significant", "fortunately"), and no guesses about why the project chose what it chose.
- Tense: past for what the audit did, present for the state of the dependencies, future for the consequences of acting or not.
- Constructive: a recommendation names the action and its cost, never a culprit.
If the report-writing:writing-style skill is available in the session, follow it —
it is the full version of this register.
The rendered report carries facts only. The interpretive rules below are instructions to you, not content for the reader — do not copy them into the deliverable as caveats or framing.
Reading the report
- Unassessable is not risk. PyPI publishes no maintainer ACL and Go has no registry; those rows say what could not be known, not what is wrong.
- The coverage table bounds every claim. "No advisories" means "none among what was assessed" — check the assessed count before repeating a clean verdict.
- Quote figures verbatim. Do not re-derive, round, or embellish the report's numbers; every one is reproducible from the artifact.
- Absence from the findings is not endorsement. A dependency with no findings was measured against these criteria only.
Rationalizations to reject
- "
ghcan give me maintainer counts faster than the collector." Measured wrong — repo contributors and registry publish rights are different populations. - "No findings, so the dependencies are safe." Read the coverage table; on PyPI and Go, half the criteria are structurally unassessable.
- "The unassessable rows would just confuse the reader; I'll drop them." They are the boundary of every claim in the report. Dropping them turns partial coverage into a clean bill of health, which is the failure this skill was rebuilt to prevent.
- "The version is probably close enough." A range checked at latest-release and a lockfile-resolved version are different claims; the report labels which one it makes. Keep the label.
When not to use
- License compliance auditing.
- Scanning the target's own source for vulnerabilities or secrets — this skill never reads dependency source, only registry, advisory, and repository metadata.
- Judging whether the project installs or builds. The audit is designed to work from nothing more than the dependency list — manifests and lockfiles — and never installs, builds, or executes anything. Broken installs and import-time breakage are out of scope, and worth saying so if the user seems to expect them.
- Ecosystems other than npm, PyPI, and Go; say the ecosystem is unsupported rather than improvising an audit for it.
Files in this version
agents/1252 B
- openai.yaml252 B
assets/13.0 KB
- trail-of-bits-mark.svg3.0 KB
scripts/10214.4 KB
- collect.py64.2 KB
- model.py17.2 KB
- pyproject.toml683 B
- render.py34.4 KB
- sources.py28.5 KB
- test_collect.py37.2 KB
- test_model.py7.7 KB
- test_render.py14.0 KB
- test_sources.py10.3 KB
- uv.lock337 B
- SKILL.md6.8 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | Yes | Yes |
| Writes files | Yes | Yes |
| Runs shell commands | Yes | Yes |
| Uses the network | Yes | Yes |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
- MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:40
- MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/collect.py
- MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationscripts/collect.py:282
- MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationscripts/collect.py:1103
- MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/model.py
- MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationscripts/model.py:325
- MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/render.py
- MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationscripts/render.py:116
- MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationscripts/render.py:179
- MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationscripts/render.py:512
- MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationscripts/render.py:608
- MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/sources.py
- MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationscripts/sources.py:115
- MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationscripts/sources.py:287
- MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/test_collect.py
- MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationscripts/test_collect.py:681
- MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/test_model.py
- MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/test_render.py
- MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/test_sources.py
- MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationscripts/test_sources.py:177
- InfoLink · Links to outside domains
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.11.12-149d7b2 | Nov 13, 2026 | 149d7b2 | e2509fde | Signed | – |
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