web-saml
Attack SAML SSO — signature exclusion/wrapping (XSW), unsigned assertions, and comment/XXE tricks to forge authentication. Load on SAML SSO (SAMLResponse, ACS URL, IdP/SP), enterprise login, or "SAML". Signals: SAMLResponse base64 in POST, /saml/acs, <saml:Assertion>, Shibboleth/ADFS/Okta SSO.
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c54 installs+4 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago
Install
No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/web-samlWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Package95ec3501…c5e6e0e3
95ec35012d2a…0dfec5e6e0e31 file · 1.4 KBScanLowno findings
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/web/web-saml@ee0e0c5
On this page
When it applies
The app authenticates via SAML SSO — the browser POSTs a base64 SAMLResponse (an XML assertion
signed by the IdP) to the SP's ACS endpoint. Break the signature validation and you forge login as anyone.
Why it works
SAML security rests entirely on the SP correctly validating the XML signature over the assertion. XML signature validation is notoriously error-prone: SPs accept unsigned assertions, validate the wrong element, or can be tricked by XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) — where a signed element is kept for validation but an injected unsigned assertion is what the app actually reads.
Method
- Capture & decode the
SAMLResponse(Burp + SAML Raider extension). Identify what's signed (Response vs Assertion) and theNameID/attributes that set the user. - Signature exclusion: strip the
<ds:Signature>and send — some SPs accept unsigned assertions. - XSW: wrap/inject a second assertion (or move the signature) so the validator checks the
original signed blob but the app consumes your forged assertion with
NameID=admin(SAML Raider automates the XSW variants). - Comment injection:
[email protected]<!---->.evilinNameID— some parsers read it as[email protected]post-canonicalization → login as admin. - Other: key confusion (SP trusts attacker cert), XXE in the SAML parser (→
web-xxe), replay if noNotOnOrAfter/InResponseTochecks,Recipient/Audiencenot validated.
Gotchas
- Identify the exact signed element first — XSW works by satisfying the validator while changing what's used.
- If signatures are properly validated over the assertion with no wrapping bug, pivot to replay/audience/comment issues.
- Prove with two accounts you own: forge from a low-priv login into a privileged
NameID.
Verify success
Authentication as a different/privileged user via a forged or manipulated SAMLResponse the SP accepts.
References
PortSwigger SAML; SAML Raider; "On Breaking SAML" (XSW, Somorovsky et al.).
Files in this version
- SKILL.md2.5 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | No | No |
| Writes files | No | No |
| Runs shell commands | No | No |
| Uses the network | No | No |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | Nov 13, 2026 | ee0e0c5 | 95ec3501 | Signed | – |
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