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How it works
noorqureshi/web-samlAPIs, SaaS and identity

web-saml

⁨Attack SAML SSO — signature exclusion/wrapping (XSW), unsigned assertions, and comment/XXE tricks to forge authentication. Load on SAML SSO (SAMLResponse, ACS URL, IdP/SP), enterprise login, or "SAML". Signals: SAMLResponse base64 in POST, /saml/acs, <saml:Assertion>, Shibboleth/ADFS/Okta SSO.⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c54 installs+4 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/web-saml

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
Frgj1mp9NU…U/jGJXDQ==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Package95ec3501…c5e6e0e3
95ec35012d2a…0dfec5e6e0e31 file · ⁦1.4 KB⁩
ScanLowno findings
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/web/web-saml@ee0e0c5

When it applies

The app authenticates via SAML SSO — the browser POSTs a base64 SAMLResponse (an XML assertion signed by the IdP) to the SP's ACS endpoint. Break the signature validation and you forge login as anyone.

Why it works

SAML security rests entirely on the SP correctly validating the XML signature over the assertion. XML signature validation is notoriously error-prone: SPs accept unsigned assertions, validate the wrong element, or can be tricked by XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) — where a signed element is kept for validation but an injected unsigned assertion is what the app actually reads.

Method

  1. Capture & decode the SAMLResponse (Burp + SAML Raider extension). Identify what's signed (Response vs Assertion) and the NameID/attributes that set the user.
  2. Signature exclusion: strip the <ds:Signature> and send — some SPs accept unsigned assertions.
  3. XSW: wrap/inject a second assertion (or move the signature) so the validator checks the original signed blob but the app consumes your forged assertion with NameID=admin (SAML Raider automates the XSW variants).
  4. Comment injection: [email protected]<!---->.evil in NameID — some parsers read it as [email protected] post-canonicalization → login as admin.
  5. Other: key confusion (SP trusts attacker cert), XXE in the SAML parser (→ web-xxe), replay if no NotOnOrAfter/InResponseTo checks, Recipient/Audience not validated.

Gotchas

  • Identify the exact signed element first — XSW works by satisfying the validator while changing what's used.
  • If signatures are properly validated over the assertion with no wrapping bug, pivot to replay/audience/comment issues.
  • Prove with two accounts you own: forge from a low-priv login into a privileged NameID.

Verify success

Authentication as a different/privileged user via a forged or manipulated SAMLResponse the SP accepts.

References

PortSwigger SAML; SAML Raider; "On Breaking SAML" (XSW, Somorovsky et al.).

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesNoNo
Runs shell commandsNoNo
Uses the networkNoNo
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

The scan found nothing to flag in this version.

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5Nov 13, 2026ee0e0c595ec3501Signed–

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