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How it works
noorqureshi/web-race-conditionsWeb and bug bounty

web-race-conditions

⁨Exploit race conditions / TOCTOU — fire concurrent requests to break single-use limits. Load on "limit-once" actions: coupon/gift-card redemption, withdrawals, votes, invites, MFA/OTP attempts, balance changes. Signals: check-then-act on shared state, per-user quotas, "already used".⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/web-race-conditions

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
bsTJ5p0Qca…zhRjWFAg==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Package567c6bb1…eed97b13
567c6bb177ea…7faeeed97b131 file · ⁦1.2 KB⁩
ScanLowno findings
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/web/web-race-conditions@ee0e0c5

When it applies

An action is meant to happen once (or N times) and the server checks a condition, then acts, on shared state — without atomicity. Concurrent requests slip between check and update.

Why it works

Between "check if allowed" and "record that it happened" there's a window. Fire many requests in that window and several pass the check before any updates the state — so a one-time coupon redeems 10×, a balance is spent twice, a limit is overrun.

Method

  1. Pick a limited action with observable state (balance, redeemed flag, count).
  2. Send a burst in parallel aligned to hit the window together: Burp Turbo Intruder (single-packet attack for HTTP/2, or last-byte sync for HTTP/1) — the point is simultaneity, not volume.
  3. Measure the overrun: did the action succeed more times than allowed (2 redemptions, double credit)?
  4. Variants: multi-endpoint races (state set by A, consumed by B), and MFA/OTP brute windows.

Gotchas

  • Sequential fast requests aren't a race — you need true concurrency (single-packet / synced send).
  • Effect can be small (2× not ∞) but still valid; quantify the actual overrun.
  • Idempotency keys / DB locks defeat it — a single success may just be correct behaviour.

Verify success

The limited action occurs more times than the rules allow (e.g. one coupon applied twice, balance double-spent), reproduced with the concurrent PoC.

References

PortSwigger race-condition labs; James Kettle "Smashing the state machine"; Turbo Intruder.

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesNoNo
Runs shell commandsNoNo
Uses the networkNoNo
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

The scan found nothing to flag in this version.

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5Nov 13, 2026ee0e0c5567c6bb1Signed–

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