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How it works
noorqureshi/web-open-redirectWeb and bug bounty

web-open-redirect

⁨Open redirect — abuse a redirect param to send users to attacker sites, and chain it (OAuth token theft, SSRF filter bypass, phishing). Load on params like redirect=, next=, url=, return=, callback=, dest=, or a 30x Location built from input. Signals: `?returnUrl=`, login redirects, OAuth `redirect_⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/web-open-redirect

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
hKapuKnRTN…4nGcjIBw==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Package87beae6d…0c962d23
87beae6db096…1d2b0c962d231 file · ⁦1.2 KB⁩
ScanLow1 finding
  • Links to outside domains
See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/web/web-open-redirect@ee0e0c5

When it applies

The app redirects to a location derived from user input without validating it stays on-site. Low severity alone — but a powerful chain link.

Why it works

The redirect target is attacker-controlled and trusted. On its own it's phishing; chained, it turns other flows malicious (OAuth codes/tokens sent to your host, SSRF allowlist bypass via a redirect to an internal URL).

Method

  1. Find the param (redirect/next/url/return/dest/callback) and set it to an external URL; follow the response — a 30x Location: https://evil.com (or JS/meta redirect) confirms.
  2. Bypass naive validation: //evil.com, https:evil.com, https://[email protected], https://target.com.evil.com, /\evil.com, whitelisted-prefix tricks, double-encoding, CRLF.
  3. Chain for impact:
    • OAuth: if it's the redirect_uri/return in an auth flow → steal the code/token (→ web-oauth, ATO).
    • SSRF allowlist: allowed host that open-redirects to an internal target bypasses the filter.
    • XSS: javascript: scheme in the redirect where the sink allows it.

Gotchas

  • Standalone open redirect is often low/informational — lead with the chain (OAuth/SSRF) for real severity.
  • Test both server 30x and client-side (JS location, meta refresh) redirects.
  • Path-relative allowlists frequently miss // and \ — try them.

Verify success

The app redirects the user to an attacker-controlled origin, or (chained) a token/code is delivered to your host / an SSRF filter is bypassed.

References

PortSwigger OAuth+redirect labs; OWASP Unvalidated Redirects Cheat Sheet.

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesNoNo
Runs shell commandsNoNo
Uses the networkYesYes
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

  1. InfoLink · Links to outside domains

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5Nov 13, 2026ee0e0c587beae6dSigned–

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