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How it works
noorqureshi/web-idorWeb and bug bounty

web-idor

⁨Insecure Direct Object Reference / broken access control on web objects. Load when a request references an object by id you can change: /account/1234, ?invoice=987, UUIDs in URLs/bodies, "download", "view", "edit" endpoints, numeric or guessable identifiers, or multi-tenant apps. Signals: sequential⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/web-idor

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
Qzb2Ze7VbC…fxWlzpCA==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Package84b142ee…364e10a0
84b142eef152…9bca364e10a02 files · ⁦2.7 KB⁩
ScanLowno findings
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/web/web-idor@ee0e0c5

When it applies

The app trusts a client-supplied identifier to decide which object to return or mutate, and authorization is checked at the route ("is logged in?") but not at the object ("does THIS user own THIS object?").

Why it works

Access control is missing at the data layer. The server maps id → row and returns it without asking whether the current session is allowed that row. Sequential/predictable ids make enumeration trivial; even UUIDs leak (in listings, referrers, other endpoints).

Method

  1. Get two accounts (A = attacker, B = victim). Do an action as B, capture the request, note the object id.
  2. Replay as A: swap in B's id (or A's session + B's id). Returned/changed = IDOR.
  3. Cover all verbs & spots: id in path, query, body, JSON, cookie, and X-* headers; test GET/POST/PUT/DELETE — read-only checks often miss write IDOR.
  4. Automate the two-session diff with Burp Autorize/AutoRepeater: it re-sends every request with A's cookies and flags responses that shouldn't succeed.
  5. Enumerate where ids are sequential to size impact (count of exposed records), without hoarding real PII.

Gotchas

  • "UUID so it's safe" is false — UUIDs appear in other responses, emails, and referers.
  • Sometimes the id is hashed/encoded (base64, md5(id)) — decode, tamper, re-encode.
  • Mass-assignment overlaps: changing an owner_id/user_id in the body can grant access.
  • Blind write-IDOR: no response body, but the victim object changed — verify from B's view.

Verify success

You read or modify an object belonging to another tenant/user using your own session. Screenshot both: your session token + the victim's data/changed state.

References

PortSwigger access-control labs; OWASP API Security Top 10 (BOLA).

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesNoNo
Runs shell commandsNoNo
Uses the networkNoNo
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

The scan found nothing to flag in this version.

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5Nov 13, 2026ee0e0c584b142eeSigned–

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