web-csrf
Cross-Site Request Forgery — force a victim's browser to perform state-changing actions. Load on state-changing requests (POST/PUT/DELETE) that rely only on cookies, missing/weak CSRF tokens, `SameSite=None`, or forms/JSON without anti-CSRF. Signals: cookie-only auth, no token, token not validated.
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c54 installs+4 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago
Install
No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/web-csrfWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Package790e660e…1f741206
790e660eac21…55f51f7412062 files · 2.5 KBScanLowno findings
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/web/web-csrf@ee0e0c5
On this page
When it applies
A state-changing action authenticated purely by an ambiently-sent credential (cookie) with no unpredictable token the attacker's site can't know/replay.
Why it works
Browsers attach cookies to cross-site requests automatically. If the server accepts the action
on cookie alone, an attacker page can submit it on the victim's behalf. Anti-CSRF tokens /
SameSite cookies break this by requiring something cross-site JS can't supply.
Method
- Find a candidate: a sensitive action (change email/password, transfer, role) that changes state.
- Check the defenses: is there a CSRF token? Is it validated (remove it / reuse another
user's / swap value)? Is the cookie
SameSite=Lax/Strict? Is it a simple request (no preflight)? - Build the PoC: auto-submitting HTML form (or
fetchfor simple requests) that fires the action; host it and load it as the victim. - Bypass weak tokens: token not tied to session, predictable, accepted when blank, only checked if present, or leaked via GET/referer.
- JSON endpoints: try
Content-Type: text/plain/form-encoding to avoid preflight; if the API accepts it, CSRF applies.
Gotchas
SameSite=Lax(now default in Chrome) blocks most cross-site POST CSRF — look forNone, GET-based actions, or method override.- Token present ≠ safe — always test that it's actually validated and bound to the session.
- Login CSRF and CSRF chained with self-XSS are often the real impact.
Verify success
Loading your PoC while authenticated as the victim performs the action (email changed, etc.) with no interaction beyond visiting the page.
References
PortSwigger CSRF labs; OWASP CSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet.
Files in this version
- detection.md2.8 KB
- SKILL.md2.2 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | No | No |
| Writes files | No | No |
| Runs shell commands | No | No |
| Uses the network | No | No |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | Nov 13, 2026 | ee0e0c5 | 790e660e | Signed | – |
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