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How it works
noorqureshi/web-auth-session-handlingWeb and bug bounty

web-auth-session-handling

⁨Legitimately acquire and KEEP an authenticated session (through MFA/OTP) so you can test the post-auth attack surface, and hand that session to your tools without leaking secrets. Load when the high-value classes (IDOR/BOLA, mass assignment, injection on real data APIs) are blocked behind login/SMS-⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/web-auth-session-handling

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
iR24nLSfm/…NvaC0/AA==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Package0772ad3c…be24f81d
0772ad3c0fec…4b52be24f81d1 file · ⁦2.4 KB⁩
ScanMedium2 findings
  • injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:30
  • injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:67
See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/web/web-auth-session-handling@ee0e0c5

When it applies

The interesting bugs live after login — cross-tenant IDOR/BOLA, mass assignment, injection on the real data APIs — but the run keeps collapsing to pre-auth findings because login is gated by MFA/OTP, or the token expires and every automated request 401s halfway through. This skill is the setup step that makes authenticated testing actually work. It does not attack the auth mechanism (web-oauth, web-auth-jwt, api-auth-attacks do that) — it obtains one legitimate session and keeps it usable.

Why it works

Post-auth coverage silently disappears when tooling can't hold a session: the scanner logs out, the token lapses, or MFA can't be satisfied autonomously. Capturing the session as a reusable artifact — the cookie/localStorage state for browser-driven testing and the raw bearer token for direct API replay — decouples "log in once" from "test a thousand requests," so the whole authenticated surface stays reachable for the life of the token.

Method

  1. Get a real test account, in writing. For a pentest, the client provides it; for bounty, use an account you own (register two: attacker + victim, for IDOR diffing). Record it by reference in scope.txt — never paste live credentials into notes or a prompt.
  2. Handle the MFA/OTP gate by the least-privileged means available:
    • TOTP seed shared → generate the current code from the Base32 seed (oathtool --totp -b <SEED>) and submit it. Fully repeatable.
    • Operator-relayed OTP → drive login to the OTP prompt, a human supplies the code once, continue.
    • Out-of-band / human-in-the-loop → persist the pre-OTP browser context, pause, let the operator complete the challenge, then resume and capture state.
  3. Capture the session as artifacts:
    • Browser state — Playwright storageState.json (context.storage_state(path=...)) holds cookies + localStorage.
    • API replay — the raw access/ID token plus its expires_at.
  4. Feed it to your tools:
    • Burp/Caido — a session-handling rule + macro that re-auths on a logged-out signature (a redirect to /login, a 401, a specific body), so long scans don't drop the session.
    • Playwright — launch with storage_state="storageState.json".
    • API fuzzers (ffuf, api-fuzzing) — inject the bearer as a header.
  5. Refresh, don't re-login. Record expires_at; when a refresh token exists, refresh; only re-run the full login when it doesn't. A wave of sudden 401s means the token lapsed — refresh before you trust "not vulnerable."
  6. Diff two sessions for access control. Hold A's and B's artifacts side by side and replay each other's object references (web-idor, api-bola) — the core authenticated test.

Gotchas

  • Present creds ≠ working creds. Before spawning a big authenticated scan, verify the session actually reaches a known post-auth endpoint (200 with your data) — otherwise you "test" a logged-out surface and report false negatives.
  • Never inline the token. Pass sessions by file reference; keep secrets out of prompts, notes, and any committed file. The engagements/ tree is git-ignored — keep them there.
  • If a realm truly can't be authenticated (no test account, no OTP relay), say so honestly — record the post-auth surface as deferred/untested, don't fake an N/A or silently skip it.
  • Scope the session's blast radius — a test account with real admin rights can do real damage; prefer least-privilege test roles, and treat destructive actions per RoE.

Verify success

A request built entirely from your captured artifact (no live browser) returns a known post-auth response with your account's data — and a two-session IDOR probe runs cleanly against it.

References

Playwright authentication/storageState docs; Burp/Caido session-handling rules; RFC 6238 (TOTP).

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesNoNo
Runs shell commandsNoNo
Uses the networkNoNo
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserYesYes

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

  1. MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:30
  2. MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:67

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5Nov 13, 2026ee0e0c50772ad3cSigned–

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