web-account-takeover
Systematic account-takeover hunting — password reset, email change, session, and linking flaws that seize another user's account. Load on "ATO", password-reset/forgot flows, email-change, OTP/2FA, "login as", session handling. Signals: reset tokens, email-change without re-auth, OTP, magic links.
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago
Install
No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/web-account-takeoverWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Packagefe9e0e7e…401e81aa
fe9e0e7e49cb…f9a8401e81aa1 file · 1.3 KBScanLowno findings
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/web/web-account-takeover@ee0e0c5
On this page
When it applies
Any flow that can grant control of another user's account: password reset, email change, session issuance, social/SSO linking, OTP/2FA. ATO is the highest-value web finding — hunt it deliberately.
Why it works
Auth flows have many moving parts (tokens, emails, sessions, second factors); a single weak link — a predictable reset token, a host-header-controlled reset link, an email change without re-auth, an OTP with no rate limit — hands over the account.
Method
- Password reset: token predictability/entropy, token not invalidated after use/expiry,
Host/X-Forwarded-Hostpoisoning the reset link (→ leak token to your domain), reset for another user by changing theemail/idparam, response leaking the token. - Email change: change to attacker email without password re-auth or without confirming the old address → then reset.
- OTP/2FA: no rate limit (brute — see
web-race-conditions), OTP reuse, response leaks the code, 2FA skippable by hitting the post-2FA endpoint directly, backup-code weaknesses. - Session: fixation, tokens not rotated on login/priv-change, JWT flaws (→
web-auth-jwt), long-lived "remember me" tokens. - SSO/linking: pre-account-takeover and
redirect_uritheft (→web-oauth).
Gotchas
- Use two accounts you own; prove takeover end-to-end (log in as the "victim" account you control).
- Host-header reset-poisoning needs the app to build the link from the header — test it explicitly.
- Chain small pieces (info leak → reset param) rather than expecting one silver bullet.
Verify success
You authenticate as another account without its legitimate credentials, demonstrated across two accounts you own.
References
PortSwigger auth labs; "Account takeover methodology" write-ups; OWASP WSTG (authentication).
Files in this version
- SKILL.md2.4 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | No | No |
| Writes files | No | No |
| Runs shell commands | No | No |
| Uses the network | No | No |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | Nov 13, 2026 | ee0e0c5 | fe9e0e7e | Signed | – |
More from NoorQureshi
All from this publisherMore in Web and bug bounty
See the category- src-hunterzhaoxuya520/src-hunter5
- owasp-top10-analysissecurityskills/owasp-top10-analysis5
- testing-for-xml-injection-vulnerabilitiesmukul975/testing-for-xml-injection-vulnerabilities5
- offensive-xsssnailsploit/offensive-xss5
- offensive-rcesnailsploit/offensive-rce5
- source-review-techniqueaeondave/source-review-technique5
Ask anything your scope allows.
Create an account, add credits and ask the first question in the chat or the terminal.
- 1/3
Create the account
Individual or company. You can switch to a company later without losing balance or keys.
IndividualCompany - 2/3
Add credits
By card. Pay per token, no subscription.
$5.00minimum deposit - 3/3
Ask
In the chat, or install the CLI and run notholy login in your terminal.
$ notholy login