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How it works
noorqureshi/web-account-takeoverWeb and bug bounty

web-account-takeover

⁨Systematic account-takeover hunting — password reset, email change, session, and linking flaws that seize another user's account. Load on "ATO", password-reset/forgot flows, email-change, OTP/2FA, "login as", session handling. Signals: reset tokens, email-change without re-auth, OTP, magic links.⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/web-account-takeover

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
R2SzPH1txz…LrLy0HCw==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Packagefe9e0e7e…401e81aa
fe9e0e7e49cb…f9a8401e81aa1 file · ⁦1.3 KB⁩
ScanLowno findings
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/web/web-account-takeover@ee0e0c5

When it applies

Any flow that can grant control of another user's account: password reset, email change, session issuance, social/SSO linking, OTP/2FA. ATO is the highest-value web finding — hunt it deliberately.

Why it works

Auth flows have many moving parts (tokens, emails, sessions, second factors); a single weak link — a predictable reset token, a host-header-controlled reset link, an email change without re-auth, an OTP with no rate limit — hands over the account.

Method

  1. Password reset: token predictability/entropy, token not invalidated after use/expiry, Host/X-Forwarded-Host poisoning the reset link (→ leak token to your domain), reset for another user by changing the email/id param, response leaking the token.
  2. Email change: change to attacker email without password re-auth or without confirming the old address → then reset.
  3. OTP/2FA: no rate limit (brute — see web-race-conditions), OTP reuse, response leaks the code, 2FA skippable by hitting the post-2FA endpoint directly, backup-code weaknesses.
  4. Session: fixation, tokens not rotated on login/priv-change, JWT flaws (→ web-auth-jwt), long-lived "remember me" tokens.
  5. SSO/linking: pre-account-takeover and redirect_uri theft (→ web-oauth).

Gotchas

  • Use two accounts you own; prove takeover end-to-end (log in as the "victim" account you control).
  • Host-header reset-poisoning needs the app to build the link from the header — test it explicitly.
  • Chain small pieces (info leak → reset param) rather than expecting one silver bullet.

Verify success

You authenticate as another account without its legitimate credentials, demonstrated across two accounts you own.

References

PortSwigger auth labs; "Account takeover methodology" write-ups; OWASP WSTG (authentication).

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesNoNo
Runs shell commandsNoNo
Uses the networkNoNo
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

The scan found nothing to flag in this version.

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5Nov 13, 2026ee0e0c5fe9e0e7eSigned–

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