social-eng-phishing
Run an authorized phishing / spear-phishing assessment that measures human-factor risk — pretext, delivery, landing page, and tracking — without harming staff or hoarding real data. Load after social-eng-methodology when the objective is email-based (click, credential submission, or report rate). Si
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago
Install
No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/social-eng-phishingWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Package7310aef2…5cb5f057
7310aef2266a…f2a05cb5f0571 file · 1.9 KBScanLowno findings
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/social-eng/social-eng-phishing@ee0e0c5
On this page
When it applies
The engagement authorizes an email human-factor test and you've cleared social-eng-methodology
(authorization, allowed pretext themes, target boundaries, no-harm line). The goal is a
measurement — click rate, credential-submission rate, and, most importantly, the report rate
— not to embarrass anyone.
Why it works
Phishing exploits trust and context, not a software bug: a message that looks like it comes from a trusted source, with a plausible reason to act now, gets clicks even from trained users. Measuring that safely tells the client where awareness and technical controls (MFA, mail filtering, reporting tooling) need to improve.
Method
- Pick the objective and metric. Awareness baseline (did they click?), credential resilience (did they submit?), or reporting culture (did they report it, and how fast?). The metric shapes the whole campaign.
- Scope the target list to authorized recipients only; segment (department/role) so results are actionable. Never add anyone outside the agreed boundaries.
- Design a proportionate pretext within the allowed themes (e.g. an internal IT/HR notice, a shared-document notification). Keep it believable but avoid excluded/harmful themes and real named individuals.
- Stand up tracked infrastructure. A dedicated sender domain and a landing page, every recipient carrying a unique token so clicks/submissions are attributable to the test. Use a framework built for this (e.g. GoPhish) so tracking and teardown are clean.
- Land safely. The page measures the action and then discloses it's an authorized assessment with a short awareness message. A credential form records "a credential was submitted" for the metric — it does not store, display, or reuse the real password.
- Deliver and measure over the agreed window; capture click/submit/report rates and time-to- report per segment.
- Tear down and clean up. Disable the infra, purge any captured data beyond the metric, and confirm nothing is left reachable.
Gotchas
- Never keep real credentials. Record the event, not the secret; a test that stockpiles staff passwords has itself become the risk.
- Report rate is the win metric — a high report rate is a healthy result; frame it that way, don't optimize purely for clicks.
- Coordinate with the blue team/help desk per RoE so a real incident response isn't triggered (or, if testing detection, so it's an intended part of the exercise).
- Aggregate results. The report improves controls and training; it does not name and shame individuals.
- Excluded themes stay excluded — no fake emergencies, layoffs, or bonuses; proportionality is
a hard limit from
social-eng-methodology.
Verify success
A clean metric set (click / submission / report rates, time-to-report) attributable to the test,
with all pretext infrastructure torn down and no real personal data retained — feeding an
awareness-focused writeup (reporting-pentest-report).
References
MITRE ATT&CK T1566.001/.002, T1598.003; GoPhish documentation; awareness-program metrics guidance.
Files in this version
- SKILL.md3.7 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | No | No |
| Writes files | No | No |
| Runs shell commands | No | No |
| Uses the network | No | No |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | Nov 13, 2026 | ee0e0c5 | 7310aef2 | Signed | – |
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