mobile-webview
Exploit insecure mobile WebViews — JS-bridge abuse, file access, and XSS→native. Load when an app renders web content in a WebView/WKWebView, exposes a JS bridge, or loads attacker-influenced URLs. Signals: addJavascriptInterface, WKScriptMessageHandler, loadUrl, file:// access, deep-link → WebView.
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago
Install
No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/mobile-webviewWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Package35bbe833…7fe79f4d
35bbe833653a…586f7fe79f4d1 file · 1.3 KBScanLowno findings
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/mobile/mobile-webview@ee0e0c5
On this page
When it applies
The app shows web content in a WebView (Android WebView / iOS WKWebView) and either exposes a
native JS bridge or loads URLs/content an attacker can influence (deep link, param, MITM'd http).
Why it works
WebViews blur the web/native boundary. A JS bridge (addJavascriptInterface /
WKScriptMessageHandler) lets page JavaScript call native code — so XSS or a malicious loaded page
can invoke native functionality. Misconfig (setAllowFileAccess, setJavaScriptEnabled, mixed
content) widens it to local file theft.
Method
- Find the WebView config in
jadx/class-dump:setJavaScriptEnabled(true),addJavascriptInterface(obj,"name")(Android <17 = any method exposed),setAllowFileAccess,setAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs, and what URLs it loads. - Reach the WebView with your content: via a deep link that passes a URL param into
loadUrl, a param reflected into the page (XSS), or MITM if it loadshttp://(ATS/cleartext). - Abuse the bridge: from injected JS call the exposed native methods
(
window.name.method(...)) — read files, get device data, trigger actions the bridge exposes. - File/scheme access:
file://loads + universal file access → read app-private files;content://tricks.
Gotchas
addJavascriptInterfaceon old targetSdk exposes reflection → RCE-ish; on modern it's limited to@JavascriptInterfacemethods — enumerate those.- Impact = what the bridge exposes + whether you can get JS to run; prove both.
- iOS
WKWebViewmessage handlers are the equivalent bridge — checkuserContentController.
Verify success
Injected JavaScript invokes native functionality via the bridge (data read, action performed), or local files are exfiltrated through the WebView.
References
OWASP MASTG (platform/WebView); Android WebView security docs; "WebView bridge abuse" write-ups.
Files in this version
- SKILL.md2.4 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | No | No |
| Writes files | No | No |
| Runs shell commands | No | No |
| Uses the network | Yes | Yes |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | Nov 13, 2026 | ee0e0c5 | 35bbe833 | Signed | – |
More from NoorQureshi
All from this publisherMore in Mobile, firmware and hardware
See the categoryAsk anything your scope allows.
Create an account, add credits and ask the first question in the chat or the terminal.
- 1/3
Create the account
Individual or company. You can switch to a company later without losing balance or keys.
IndividualCompany - 2/3
Add credits
By card. Pay per token, no subscription.
$5.00minimum deposit - 3/3
Ask
In the chat, or install the CLI and run notholy login in your terminal.
$ notholy login