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How it works
noorqureshi/mobile-deeplink-abuseMobile, firmware and hardware

mobile-deeplink-abuse

⁨Abuse deep links / custom URL schemes / intents for redirect, token theft, and reaching internal screens. Load on custom schemes (myapp://), App Links/Universal Links, exported activities, or "open in app". Signals: intent-filters in the manifest, WebView loading deep-link params, OAuth redirect via⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/mobile-deeplink-abuse

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
EkGY0ROdCg…AL5UuBBQ==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Package1faca169…43021f72
1faca1691549…eafe43021f721 file · ⁦1.4 KB⁩
ScanLowno findings
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/mobile/mobile-deeplink-abuse@ee0e0c5

When it applies

The app registers custom URL schemes or App/Universal Links, or exports activities that accept data. A malicious link (in a web page, another app, or a QR) can then drive the app.

Why it works

Deep-link handlers receive attacker-controlled data and often trust it: they redirect, load it into a WebView, pass it to auth flows, or open privileged screens without re-checking who sent the intent. Custom schemes aren't verified for ownership (unlike App Links), so any app can claim them.

Method

  1. Map handlers: from the manifest, list intent-filter schemes/hosts and exported activities; read jadx for how each parameter is used.
  2. Test open redirect / token theft: if a deep link takes a redirect/return_url or the OAuth callback is a custom scheme, point it at attacker-controlled to steal codes/tokens.
  3. WebView injection: if the deep link's data reaches loadUrl()/evaluateJavascript, try XSS/JS-bridge abuse (android-webview in mobile-android-assessment).
  4. Reach internal screens: adb shell am start -a android.intent.action.VIEW -d "myapp://internal/admin?..." to invoke functionality meant to be gated.
  5. Intent redirection: a component that forwards an attacker-supplied nested intent can be used to launch non-exported components.

Gotchas

  • Custom-scheme OAuth is inherently interceptable — that's the classic account-takeover chain.
  • App Links (verified domains) resist scheme-hijacking; custom schemes don't.
  • Test both from a web page (<a href="myapp://...">) and from adb — behaviour can differ.

Verify success

A crafted link causes token/code disclosure to you, XSS in the app's WebView, or reaches a screen/action that should require prior auth.

References

OWASP MASTG (platform interaction); Android App Links docs; deep-link ATO write-ups.

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesNoNo
Runs shell commandsNoNo
Uses the networkNoNo
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

The scan found nothing to flag in this version.

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5Nov 13, 2026ee0e0c51faca169Signed–

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