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How it works
noorqureshi/defense-threat-modelingReporting and compliance

defense-threat-modeling

⁨Threat-model a system or feature (STRIDE + attack trees) to find design-level risk before code. Load on "threat model", a new design/architecture review, security design questions, or planning controls. Signals: architecture diagram, data-flow, "what could go wrong", pre-build security.⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/defense-threat-modeling

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
8ELTMLBb18…ZpfNLkCA==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Package0d340958…88104bc4
0d3409584a83…cbba88104bc41 file · ⁦1.3 KB⁩
ScanLowno findings
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/defense/defense-threat-modeling@ee0e0c5

When it applies

Before or during design — a new feature, service, or architecture — to find what can go wrong at the design level, where fixes are cheapest. Pairs offense knowledge with a structured method.

Why it works

Most breaches exploit design gaps, not just code bugs. Systematically walking each component and data flow against a threat taxonomy surfaces missing controls (authz, validation, isolation) that ad-hoc review misses, and produces a prioritized list of controls and tests.

Method

  1. Model the system: draw the data-flow diagram — external entities, processes, data stores, and trust boundaries (where data crosses privilege levels). The boundaries are where threats concentrate.
  2. Enumerate threats per element with STRIDE:
    • Spoofing (authn), Tampering (integrity), Repudiation (logging), Information disclosure (confidentiality), Denial of service (availability), Elevation of privilege (authz).
  3. Attack trees for high-value targets: root = attacker goal, branches = paths; map each to a real technique (link the relevant Security Skills offensive skill).
  4. Rate & prioritize: likelihood × impact (or DREAD); focus on trust-boundary crossings.
  5. Define controls & tests: for each accepted threat, a mitigation and a test/detection (→ defense-hardening-baseline, defense-detection-sigma).

Anti-patterns

  • Modeling implementation detail instead of trust boundaries — boundaries are where risk lives.
  • A threat list with no owner, control, or test — it must produce actionable, tracked mitigations.
  • One-and-done — re-model when the design changes.

Verify

A DFD with trust boundaries, a STRIDE-derived threat list, and for each significant threat a mitigation + a validation test/detection.

References

Shostack "Threat Modeling"; Microsoft STRIDE; OWASP Threat Modeling Cheat Sheet.

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesNoNo
Runs shell commandsNoNo
Uses the networkNoNo
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

The scan found nothing to flag in this version.

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5Nov 13, 2026ee0e0c50d340958Signed–

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