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How it works
noorqureshi/defense-detection-sigmaMalware and ransomware analysis

defense-detection-sigma

⁨Write portable detections as Sigma rules and map them to MITRE ATT&CK, then convert to your SIEM. Load for blue-team/detection-engineering tasks: "write a detection", "sigma rule", "alert on", turning an offensive technique or an incident into a repeatable detection.⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/defense-detection-sigma

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
3DJ0JvPhoS…JuSL4nCQ==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Package2ffd7501…5369012d
2ffd75017a2f…6ed55369012d1 file · ⁦1.4 KB⁩
ScanLowno findings
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/defense/defense-detection-sigma@ee0e0c5

When it applies

You need a detection that survives a SIEM change: express the logic once in Sigma (a generic YAML rule format), then compile to Splunk/Elastic/Sentinel/etc. Pairs with offensive skills — every technique you learn to run, you can learn to catch.

Why it works

Sigma abstracts log-source + condition from backend query syntax, so one rule ports across SIEMs and reviews cleanly. Mapping to ATT&CK gives coverage you can measure and gaps you can see.

Method

  1. Pick the behaviour, not the artifact: detect the technique (e.g. suspicious child of w3wp.exe, certutil download, new service creation), not a single hash/IP that rotates.
  2. Identify the log source & fields: e.g. Windows Security 4688 / Sysmon 1 (process create), or web/proxy logs — Sigma's logsource block (product, category).
  3. Write the rule: detection: with a selection: map (field → value/wildcards) and a condition:; add falsepositives:, level:, and tags: [attack.tXXXX].
  4. Tune for FPs: add filter: blocks for known-good (admin tools, scanners) and set a sane level; validate against real logs (chainsaw hunt/sigmac to your backend).
  5. Version & map: store in git, tag ATT&CK IDs, track coverage across the matrix.

Gotchas

  • Detecting the tool name (mimikatz.exe) is brittle — detect the behaviour (LSASS access).
  • No falsepositives/tuning = an alert nobody trusts; noisy rules get muted and miss real hits.
  • Confirm the field names match your actual log schema (EDR vs Sysmon vs raw ETW differ).

Verify success

The rule fires on a controlled reproduction of the technique and stays quiet on benign baseline activity, and it compiles cleanly to your SIEM query.

References

SigmaHQ spec & rule repo; MITRE ATT&CK; Florian Roth detection-engineering guidance.

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesNoNo
Runs shell commandsNoNo
Uses the networkNoNo
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

The scan found nothing to flag in this version.

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5Nov 13, 2026ee0e0c52ffd7501Signed–

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