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How it works
noorqureshi/code-review-rustWeb and bug bounty

code-review-rust

⁨Security review of Rust code — where a memory-safe language still has real bugs: `unsafe`, FFI, panics, and the usual injection/logic sinks. Load when reviewing Rust source/PR, on .rs / Cargo.toml in scope, or "review this Rust". Signals: Cargo.toml, unsafe blocks, extern "C", unwrap/expect, actix/a⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 23 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/code-review-rust

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
Hdz+VCY8tv…VTNf7yCg==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Packaged6db3498…84e8534a
d6db34984f71…fbc584e8534a1 file · ⁦1.8 KB⁩
ScanMedium1 finding
  • injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:55
See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/code-review/code-review-rust@ee0e0c5

When it applies

Reviewing Rust (a service, a CLI, a library). Safe Rust removes most memory bugs, so the review focuses on the places safety is opted out of, the ways Rust code still panics or mis-handles input, and ordinary injection/logic in web handlers.

Why it works

Rust's guarantees hold only outside unsafe and only for memory safety — they don't stop SQL built by string, a command run via a shell, a .unwrap() that panics on attacker input (DoS), or a logic error. Concentrating on those boundaries finds the real bugs efficiently.

Sinks & patterns (grep, then reason about the boundary)

  • unsafe blocks: every one is a manual proof obligation — raw pointer deref, get_unchecked, slice::from_raw_parts, mem::transmute, uninitialised memory. Check the invariant it assumes.
  • FFI: extern "C"/bindgen boundaries — lengths, lifetimes, and NUL handling across the C edge (the C side has none of Rust's guarantees; pair with code-review-cpp).
  • Panics as DoS: unwrap/expect/panic!/indexing v[i]/unreachable! on attacker-controlled input; integer as casts that truncate; arithmetic overflow (panics in debug, wraps in release — both can be bugs). Prefer ?/checked ops.
  • Injection: SQL via format! into a query instead of parameter binding (sqlx/diesel); std::process::Command with sh -c and concatenated input; Command arg vs shell form.
  • Path / SSRF: user paths joined without canonicalisation + prefix check; HTTP clients (reqwest) fetching user URLs.
  • Deserialization / web: serde into types from untrusted data (resource exhaustion, unexpected variants); actix/axum/rocket extractors bound to over-broad structs (mass assignment); missing auth middleware on state-changing routes.

Method

  1. Run cargo audit (known-vuln deps), cargo clippy, and semgrep; miri for unsafe UB where feasible.
  2. rg 'unsafe|unwrap\(\)|expect\(|transmute|Command::new|format!\(.*(SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE)' → review each.
  3. Justify every unsafe block's invariant; if you can't, that's a finding.
  4. Confirm exploitable injection/logic with the matching runtime skill.

Gotchas

  • Idiomatic Rust is genuinely safe — don't invent memory bugs in safe code; spend effort on unsafe, FFI, panics, deps, and logic.
  • Release-mode integer overflow wraps silently — a checked_*/saturating_* audit matters for size/index math.
  • cargo audit flags vulnerable crates you'd never see by reading — always run it.

References

Rustonomicon (unsafe); RustSec advisory DB / cargo-audit; Clippy lint set; Secure Rust Guidelines (ANSSI).

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesNoNo
Runs shell commandsNoNo
Uses the networkNoNo
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

  1. MediumPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:55

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5Nov 13, 2026ee0e0c5d6db3498Signed–

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