code-review-java
Security review of Java code — dangerous sinks and Spring pitfalls. Load when reviewing a Java/ Spring codebase/PR, on .java source in scope, or "review this Java". Signals: pom.xml/build.gradle, Spring/Spring Boot, ObjectInputStream, XML parsers, Runtime.exec, JNDI/lookups.
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 23 hours ago
Install
No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/code-review-javaWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Package83c4cbec…e02a3fe1
83c4cbec4dd7…6628e02a3fe11 file · 1.7 KBScanLowno findings
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/code-review/code-review-java@ee0e0c5
On this page
When it applies
Reviewing Java source, most often a Spring/Spring Boot service. Java's biggest hitters are deserialization, XXE-by-default, and expression-language injection — all high impact and all grep-able.
Why it works
Several Java APIs are unsafe by default (XML parsers resolve external entities; ObjectInputStream
instantiates arbitrary classes) and frameworks expose powerful expression languages (SpEL/OGNL) that
turn a string into code. Tracing the source to a request parameter or message body confirms reach.
Sinks & patterns (grep, then trace to user input)
- Deserialization:
ObjectInputStream.readObject, JacksonenableDefaultTyping/polymorphic types, XMLDecoder, SnakeYAMLnew Yaml().load, unsafereadValuewith type info → RCE gadgets. - XXE:
DocumentBuilderFactory,SAXParser,XMLInputFactory,TransformerFactorywithoutsetFeature(disallow-doctype)/secure-processing. - Command exec:
Runtime.getRuntime().exec,ProcessBuilderwith concatenated input. - Expression injection: SpEL (
SpelExpressionParser,@Value("#{...}")on input), OGNL (Struts), MVEL; template engines with unescaped output. - SQL/HQL:
Statement/string-built queries,createQuerywith concatenation. - SSRF:
URL.openConnection,RestTemplate,HttpClient,WebClienton user URLs. - JNDI:
InitialContext.lookup, log4j-style${jndi:...}(Log4Shell) reachable from input.
Framework specifics
- Spring: mass assignment via
@ModelAttribute/DataBinder(missingsetAllowedFields), exposed/unsecured Actuator endpoints,@RequestMappingpath traversal, permit-all misconfig inSecurityFilterChain, SpEL in@PreAuthorize. - Struts/older MVC: OGNL injection (S2-* CVEs).
Method
rgfor the sinks; trace to controller params, headers, or message consumers.- Check XML parser factory configuration everywhere XML is read.
- Review the Spring Security config for accidental
permitAll()/disabled CSRF on state-changing routes. - Confirm with
web-deserialization,web-xxe,web-ssrf, orweb-command-injection.
Gotchas
- Jackson is safe unless default/polymorphic typing is enabled — check for it specifically.
find-sec-bugs/CodeQL surface candidates; you still must prove input reaches the sink.- Log4Shell-style lookups can fire from headers (User-Agent, X-Forwarded-For), not just body.
References
OWASP Deserialization & XXE cheat sheets; SpEL/OGNL injection research; find-sec-bugs rules.
Files in this version
- SKILL.md3.0 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | No | No |
| Writes files | No | No |
| Runs shell commands | No | No |
| Uses the network | No | No |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | Nov 13, 2026 | ee0e0c5 | 83c4cbec | Signed | – |
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