code-review-dotnet
Security review of .NET / C# code — dangerous sinks and ASP.NET pitfalls. Load when reviewing a C#/.NET codebase/PR, on .cs source in scope, or "review this .NET app". Signals: .csproj/.sln, ASP.NET (Core/MVC/WebForms), BinaryFormatter, SqlCommand, Razor Html.Raw, XmlDocument.
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 23 hours ago
Install
No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/code-review-dotnetWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Package4f1e163e…63672a2d
4f1e163e08f2…b1a663672a2d1 file · 1.7 KBScanLowno findings
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/code-review/code-review-dotnet@ee0e0c5
On this page
When it applies
Reviewing C#/.NET source (ASP.NET Core, MVC, or legacy WebForms). The headline risks are unsafe deserialization, string-built SQL, XXE, and Razor's raw-output escape hatch.
Why it works
.NET ships powerful-but-dangerous serializers (BinaryFormatter, Json.NET with
TypeNameHandling, LosFormatter/ViewState) that instantiate arbitrary types, and several XML APIs
resolve DTDs by default on older frameworks. Reviews find where these meet untrusted input.
Sinks & patterns (grep, then trace to user input)
- Deserialization:
BinaryFormatter,LosFormatter,SoapFormatter,NetDataContractSerializer,JsonConvertwithTypeNameHandling != None,Js.NET/fastJSONpolymorphic types → RCE gadgets. - SQLi: string-concatenated
SqlCommand/ExecuteReader/FromSqlRaw(EF Core) vs parameters. - Command exec:
Process.Startwith concatenated arguments /UseShellExecute. - XXE:
XmlDocument/XmlReader/XmlTextReaderwithoutDtdProcessing=Prohibit(legacy default resolves entities);XmlSerializerwith a user-controlled type. - XSS: Razor
@Html.Raw(...),MvcHtmlString, WebForms<%= %>with unencoded input;Response.Write. - Other: path traversal via
Path.Combine(root, input),LdapConnectionfilter injection, reflection (Type.GetType/Activator.CreateInstance) on input, insecure ViewState (no MAC).
Framework specifics
- ASP.NET Core: model binding over-posting/mass assignment (bind whole entity),
[AllowAnonymous]on sensitive actions, disabled antiforgery on POST APIs, exposed dev endpoints, open redirect viaRedirect(returnUrl)withoutUrl.IsLocalUrl. - WebForms: ViewState deserialization (machineKey), event-validation off.
Method
- Run
security-code-scan/CodeQL; treat as leads. rg 'BinaryFormatter|TypeNameHandling|FromSqlRaw|Html\.Raw|XmlDocument|Process\.Start'→ trace to input.- Check controller
[Authorize]/antiforgery coverage and model-binding scope. - Confirm with
web-deserialization,web-sqli,web-xxe,web-command-injection.
Gotchas
Json.NETis safe by default — the bug is an explicitTypeNameHandling.All/Auto.- EF Core parameterises LINQ;
FromSqlRaw/ExecuteSqlRawwith interpolation is where SQLi returns. - ViewState RCE needs the
machineKey(leaked/weak) — note the precondition.
References
OWASP .NET security cheat sheet; ysoserial.net gadget research; Microsoft secure-coding guidance.
Files in this version
- SKILL.md3.0 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | No | No |
| Writes files | No | No |
| Runs shell commands | No | No |
| Uses the network | No | No |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | Nov 13, 2026 | ee0e0c5 | 4f1e163e | Signed | – |
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