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How it works
noorqureshi/code-review-cicdWeb and bug bounty

code-review-cicd

⁨Review CI/CD pipelines for security flaws — poisoned workflows, secret leakage, and injection. Load on GitHub Actions / GitLab CI / Jenkins config, ".github/workflows", pull_request_target, self-hosted runners, or "pipeline security". Signals: workflow YAML, secrets in CI, third-party actions.⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 23 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/code-review-cicd

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
R46tw52vTv…ICHVPaBQ==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Package5fa743f1…d80f089b
5fa743f192bc…1049d80f089b1 file · ⁦1.5 KB⁩
ScanLowno findings
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/code-review/code-review-cicd@ee0e0c5

When it applies

You can read a repo's CI config (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkinsfile, CircleCI). Pipelines run with secrets and often on attacker-influenced input (PRs), making them a high-value, under-reviewed target.

Why it works

CI runs code with privileged tokens/secrets. Misconfigurations let a fork PR run in a trusted context, inject commands via untrusted inputs, or exfiltrate secrets — a supply-chain foothold. On public repos this can be exploitable by anyone who opens a PR.

Method

  1. Dangerous triggers: pull_request_target / workflow_run that check out and run PR code with secrets in scope → fork PRs can steal secrets or run arbitrary code (the classic GitHub Actions bug).
  2. Script injection: untrusted data (github.event.issue.title, PR body, branch name) used directly in run: shells → command injection. Look for ${{ github.event.* }} in run blocks.
  3. Secret handling: secrets echoed/logged, passed to third-party actions, or available to fork PRs; overly broad permissions: (default write), long-lived GITHUB_TOKEN.
  4. Untrusted dependencies: third-party actions pinned to a mutable tag/branch (not a SHA), curl-pipe-to-shell steps, unpinned package installs → supply-chain.
  5. Self-hosted runners on public repos: fork PRs executing on your infra → RCE on the runner.

Gotchas

  • pull_request (safe-ish) vs pull_request_target (dangerous) — the trigger name is the crux.
  • An action pinned to @v3 (tag) can be moved; require a full commit SHA for third-party actions.
  • Secret leakage often happens via a step passing ${{ secrets.X }} to an untrusted action.

Verify success

A concrete path where an outsider (fork PR / issue) can execute code with pipeline privileges or exfiltrate a secret, or a clear secret-leak/injection in the workflow.

References

GitHub Actions security hardening docs; "GitHub Actions pwn requests" (Nathan Davison); semgrep CI rules.

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesNoNo
Runs shell commandsNoNo
Uses the networkYesYes
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

The scan found nothing to flag in this version.

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5Nov 13, 2026ee0e0c55fa743f1Signed–

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