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How it works
noorqureshi/ai-model-extractionAI, agents and MCP

ai-model-extraction

⁨Extract or steal an ML/LLM model's parameters, training data, or system prompt via query access — model stealing, membership inference, training-data extraction. Load when testing an ML API/endpoint, "model extraction/inversion", data-leakage or IP-theft concerns, exposed inference endpoints. Signal⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/ai-model-extraction

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
fD+s7L2zJC…TMG3noAA==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Package546da050…452f9189
546da050a8b2…c0ab452f91891 file · ⁦1.4 KB⁩
ScanLowno findings
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/ai-ml/ai-model-extraction@ee0e0c5

When it applies

You have query access to an ML/LLM endpoint and want to show it leaks the model itself, its training data, or confidential context — IP theft or privacy impact, not just a bad answer.

Why it works

Query access is more powerful than it looks. Outputs (labels, probabilities, embeddings, generations) carry information about the model and its data. Enough targeted queries reconstruct a functional copy, reveal whether a record was in training, or regurgitate memorized secrets.

Method

  1. Model stealing: query systematically (esp. if confidence scores/logits are returned) to train a surrogate that mimics the target — proves the model can be cloned via the API.
  2. Membership inference: compare model behaviour (confidence, loss) on candidate records to infer whether a specific record was in the training set (privacy impact).
  3. Training-data / secret extraction (LLM): prompt for memorized data — PII, keys, or the system prompt/hidden context (overlaps ai-prompt-injection); look for verbatim regurgitation.
  4. Embedding inversion: if an embeddings API is exposed, reconstruct approximate input text from vectors.
  5. Cost/DoS angle: unbounded/unthrottled querying is itself a finding (LLM10).

Gotchas

  • Tie it to impact: a stolen surrogate, a confirmed membership leak, or verbatim secret output — not "it answered a lot".
  • Respect scope/RoE — extraction requires many queries; get authorization and mind rate/cost limits.
  • Defenders: rate-limit, strip logits, add output filtering, and monitor query patterns.

Verify success

Demonstrated leakage: a working surrogate, a reliable membership inference, or verbatim training-data/secret extraction.

References

OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025); "Stealing ML models via prediction APIs" (Tramèr et al.); membership-inference literature.

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesNoNo
Runs shell commandsNoNo
Uses the networkNoNo
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

The scan found nothing to flag in this version.

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5Nov 13, 2026ee0e0c5546da050Signed–

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