Skip to content
New

DeepSeek V4.1 Flash free for 7 days: 10M tokens a day after a top-up of $10 or more. Until Nov 30.

How it works
mukul975/performing-active-directory-compromise-investigationActive Directory and Windows

performing-active-directory-compromise-investigation

⁨Investigate Active Directory compromise by analyzing authentication logs,⁩

v1.03 installs+3 in 7 days36.3K StarsApache-2.0synced 12 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install mukul975/performing-active-directory-compromise-investigation

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
D5h08If292…sHTBf1Aw==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Package0a89fda5…e3ad37e8
0a89fda5ff84…3f99e3ad37e88 files · ⁦17.5 KB⁩
ScanMedium3 findings
  • Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/agent.py
  • Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/process.py
  • Links to outside domains
See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/performing-active-directory-compromise-investigation@54a7988

Overview

Active Directory (AD) compromise investigation is a critical incident response capability that focuses on identifying how attackers gained access to domain services, what persistence mechanisms they established, and the scope of credential compromise. Since 88% of breaches involve compromised credentials (Verizon 2025 DBIR), AD is the primary target for enterprise-wide attacks. Investigators must analyze NTDS.dit database integrity, Kerberos ticket-granting activity, Group Policy modifications, replication metadata, and privileged group membership changes to reconstruct the attack chain and determine full compromise scope.

When to Use

  • When conducting security assessments that involve performing active directory compromise investigation
  • When following incident response procedures for related security events
  • When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
  • When validating security controls through hands-on testing

Prerequisites

  • Familiarity with incident response concepts and tools
  • Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution
  • Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed
  • Appropriate authorization for any testing activities

Key Investigation Areas

1. NTDS.dit Database Analysis

The NTDS.dit file is the core Active Directory credential database containing all password hashes for domain accounts. Attackers commonly exfiltrate this file using tools like ntdsutil, secretsdump.py, or DCSync attacks via Mimikatz.

Detection indicators:

  • Event ID 4662: Access to directory service objects with replication permissions
  • Event ID 4742: Computer account modifications on domain controllers
  • Volume Shadow Copy creation on domain controllers (Event ID 8222)
  • Unusual ntdsutil.exe or vssadmin.exe execution
  • Replication traffic from non-DC sources (DCSync detection)

2. Kerberos Attack Detection

Golden Ticket indicators:

  • TGT tickets with abnormally long lifetimes (default is 10 hours)
  • Event ID 4769 with encryption type 0x17 (RC4) instead of AES
  • TGT issued without corresponding Event ID 4768 (AS-REQ)
  • Kerberos tickets referencing non-existent or disabled accounts

Silver Ticket indicators:

  • Service tickets without corresponding TGT requests
  • Event ID 4769 with unusual service names
  • Tickets with forged PAC data

Kerberoasting indicators:

  • High volume of Event ID 4769 for service accounts
  • RC4 encryption requests for accounts that support AES
  • Requests from workstations not normally accessing those services

3. Group Policy Abuse

  • GPO modifications granting new privileges (Event ID 5136)
  • Scheduled task deployment via GPO
  • Software installation policies added to domain
  • Login script modifications
  • Registry-based policy changes for persistence

4. Privileged Group Enumeration

Track modifications to these critical groups:

  • Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins
  • Account Operators, Backup Operators
  • DnsAdmins (can execute arbitrary DLLs on DCs)
  • Group Policy Creator Owners
  • Protected Users group membership changes

5. Trust Relationship Analysis

  • New forest/domain trusts created (Event ID 4706)
  • SID History injection for privilege escalation
  • Trust ticket forgery indicators
  • Cross-domain authentication anomalies

Investigation Methodology

Phase 1: Scoping and Evidence Collection

text
1. Identify potentially compromised domain controllers
2. Collect Security, System, Directory Service event logs
3. Extract AD replication metadata using repadmin
4. Capture ntdsutil snapshots for offline analysis
5. Collect DNS server logs and zone transfer records
6. Export Group Policy Object configurations
7. Document current privileged group memberships

Phase 2: Authentication Log Analysis

text
1. Parse Event ID 4624/4625 for logon patterns
2. Identify pass-the-hash indicators (Event ID 4624 Type 3 with NTLM)
3. Analyze Event ID 4768/4769/4771 for Kerberos anomalies
4. Review Event ID 4776 for NTLM authentication failures
5. Cross-reference logon events with known compromised accounts
6. Map lateral movement paths through authentication chains

Phase 3: Persistence and Backdoor Detection

text
1. Enumerate AdminSDHolder ACL modifications
2. Check for SID History abuse on accounts
3. Verify krbtgt account password age
4. Audit DSRM password configuration
5. Check for skeleton key malware indicators
6. Review AD Certificate Services for rogue certificates
7. Validate DNS records for poisoning

Phase 4: Remediation Planning

text
1. Double-rotate krbtgt password (wait replication between rotations)
2. Reset all compromised account passwords
3. Remove unauthorized privileged group members
4. Revoke rogue certificates if AD CS compromised
5. Rebuild domain controllers from clean media if needed
6. Implement tiered administration model
7. Enable Protected Users group for privileged accounts

Critical Event IDs for AD Investigation

Event ID Source Description
4624 Security Successful logon
4625 Security Failed logon
4648 Security Explicit credential logon
4662 Security Operation on AD object
4768 Security Kerberos TGT requested
4769 Security Kerberos service ticket requested
4771 Security Kerberos pre-authentication failed
4776 Security NTLM credential validation
5136 Security Directory object modified
5137 Security Directory object created
4706 Security Trust created
4707 Security Trust removed
4742 Security Computer account changed
8222 System Shadow copy created

Tools for AD Investigation

Tool Purpose
BloodHound Attack path mapping and privilege escalation analysis
Pingcastle AD security assessment and risk scoring
Purple Knight AD vulnerability scanning by Semperis
ADRecon Active Directory data gathering
Mimikatz Credential extraction and Kerberos analysis
Impacket DCSync detection and NTLM relay analysis
Velociraptor Remote forensic artifact collection
Timeline Explorer Event log timeline analysis

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technique ID Relevance
DCSync T1003.006 NTDS.dit credential extraction
Golden Ticket T1558.001 Kerberos TGT forgery
Silver Ticket T1558.002 Service ticket forgery
Kerberoasting T1558.003 Service account hash extraction
Pass-the-Hash T1550.002 NTLM hash reuse
Group Policy Modification T1484.001 Persistence via GPO
Account Manipulation T1098 Privileged group changes
SID-History Injection T1134.005 Privilege escalation

References

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesYesYes
Runs shell commandsYesYes
Uses the networkYesYes
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

  1. MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/agent.py
  2. MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/process.py
  3. InfoLink · Links to outside domains

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v1.0Nov 13, 202654a79880a89fda5Signed–

Ask anything your scope allows.

Create an account, add credits and ask the first question in the chat or the terminal.

  1. 1/3

    Create the account

    Individual or company. You can switch to a company later without losing balance or keys.

    IndividualCompany
  2. 2/3

    Add credits

    By card. Pay per token, no subscription.

    $5.00minimum deposit
  3. 3/3

    Ask

    In the chat, or install the CLI and run notholy login in your terminal.

    $ notholy login