hunting-for-registry-run-key-persistence
Detect MITRE ATT&CK T1547.001 registry Run key persistence by analyzing
v1.03 installs+3 in 7 days36.3K StarsApache-2.0synced 12 hours ago
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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install mukul975/hunting-for-registry-run-key-persistenceWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Packagef517594c…60371a22
f517594ca5e2…d34f60371a224 files · 8.9 KBScanMedium3 findings
- Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/agent.py
- command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:91
- Links to outside domains
Sourcegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/hunting-for-registry-run-key-persistence@54a7988
On this page
Overview
Registry Run keys (T1547.001) are one of the most commonly used persistence mechanisms by adversaries. When a program is added to a Run key in the Windows registry, it executes automatically when a user logs in. Attackers abuse keys under HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and their RunOnce counterparts to maintain persistence. Sysmon Event ID 13 (RegistryEvent - Value Set) captures registry value modifications including the target object path, the process that made the change, and the new value. Detection involves monitoring these events for suspicious executables in temp directories, encoded PowerShell commands, LOLBin paths, and processes that do not normally create Run key entries. Chaining Event 13 with Event 1 (Process Creation) and Event 11 (FileCreate) strengthens detection by confirming payload creation and execution.
When to Use
- When investigating security incidents that require hunting for registry run key persistence
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
Prerequisites
- Windows systems with Sysmon installed and configured to log Event ID 13
- Sysmon config with RegistryEvent rules for Run/RunOnce keys
- Python 3.9+ with
json,xml.etree.ElementTree,remodules - SIEM or log aggregator collecting Sysmon logs (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)
- Knowledge of legitimate auto-start programs for baseline comparison
Steps
- Collect Sysmon Event ID 13 logs filtered for Run/RunOnce key paths
- Parse event XML/JSON for TargetObject, Details (value written), Image (modifying process)
- Flag entries where the value points to temp directories, AppData, or ProgramData
- Detect encoded PowerShell commands or script interpreters in registry values
- Identify LOLBin abuse (mshta.exe, rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, wscript.exe)
- Compare against known-good baseline of legitimate auto-start entries
- Check if the modifying process (Image) is unusual (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, python.exe)
- Chain with Event ID 1 to verify if the registered binary was recently created
- Generate detection report with MITRE ATT&CK mapping and severity scores
- Produce Sigma/Splunk detection rules from findings
Expected Output
A JSON report listing suspicious Run key entries with the registry path, value written, modifying process, timestamp, MITRE technique mapping, severity rating, and recommended Sigma detection rules.
Files in this version
references/13.1 KB
- api-reference.md3.1 KB
scripts/19.1 KB
- agent.py9.1 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md3.3 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | No | No |
| Writes files | No | No |
| Runs shell commands | Yes | Yes |
| Uses the network | Yes | Yes |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
- MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/agent.py
- MediumCommand · command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:91
- InfoLink · Links to outside domains
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0 | Nov 13, 2026 | 54a7988 | f517594c | Signed | – |
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