detecting-t1548-abuse-elevation-control-mechanism
Detect abuse of elevation control mechanisms (T1548), including Windows UAC
v1.03 installs+3 in 7 days36.3K StarsApache-2.0synced 12 hours ago
Install
No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install mukul975/detecting-t1548-abuse-elevation-control-mechanismWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Package81b94c85…be361b35
81b94c85da52…fa2fbe361b358 files · 11.3 KBScanMedium3 findings
- Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/agent.py
- Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/process.py
- Links to outside domains
Sourcegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/detecting-t1548-abuse-elevation-control-mechanism@54a7988
On this page
When to Use
- When hunting for privilege escalation via UAC bypass in Windows environments
- After threat intelligence indicates use of UAC bypass exploits by active threat groups
- When investigating how attackers achieved administrative access without triggering UAC prompts
- During security assessments to validate UAC bypass detection coverage
- When monitoring for setuid/setgid abuse on Linux systems
Prerequisites
- Sysmon Event ID 1 with command-line and parent process logging
- Windows Security Event ID 4688 with process tracking
- Registry auditing for UAC-related keys (HKCU\Software\Classes)
- Sysmon Event ID 12/13 (Registry key/value modification)
- EDR with elevation monitoring capabilities
Workflow
- Monitor UAC Registry Modifications: Many UAC bypasses modify registry keys under
HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\commandorHKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command. Track Sysmon Events 12/13 for these changes. - Detect Auto-Elevating Process Abuse: Certain Windows binaries auto-elevate without UAC prompts (fodhelper.exe, computerdefaults.exe, eventvwr.exe). Hunt for these being launched by non-standard parent processes.
- Track Process Integrity Level Changes: Monitor for processes escalating from medium to high integrity level without corresponding UAC consent events.
- Hunt for Elevated Process Spawning: Detect when auto-elevating processes spawn unexpected children (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) -- indicating UAC bypass exploitation.
- Monitor Linux Elevation Abuse: Track sudo misconfiguration exploitation, setuid binary abuse, and capability manipulation.
- Correlate with Privilege Escalation Chain: Map elevation abuse to the broader attack chain, identifying what was done with escalated privileges.
Key Concepts
| Concept | Description |
|---|---|
| T1548.002 | Bypass User Account Control |
| T1548.001 | Setuid and Setgid (Linux) |
| T1548.003 | Sudo and Sudo Caching |
| T1548.004 | Elevated Execution with Prompt (macOS) |
| UAC Auto-Elevation | Windows binaries that elevate without prompt |
| fodhelper.exe | Common UAC bypass vector via registry hijack |
| eventvwr.exe | MSC file handler UAC bypass |
| Integrity Level | Windows process trust level (Low/Medium/High/System) |
Detection Queries
Splunk -- UAC Bypass via Registry Modification
index=sysmon (EventCode=12 OR EventCode=13)
| where match(TargetObject, "(?i)HKCU\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\(ms-settings|mscfile|exefile|Folder)\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command")
| table _time Computer User EventCode TargetObject Details ImageSplunk -- Auto-Elevating Process Abuse
index=sysmon EventCode=1
| where match(Image, "(?i)(fodhelper|computerdefaults|eventvwr|sdclt|slui|cmstp)\.exe$")
| where NOT match(ParentImage, "(?i)(explorer|svchost|services)\.exe$")
| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLineKQL -- UAC Bypass Detection
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RegistryKey has_any ("ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command", "mscfile\\shell\\open\\command")
| where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueData, InitiatingProcessFileNameSigma Rule
title: UAC Bypass via Registry Modification
status: stable
logsource:
product: windows
category: registry_set
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|contains:
- '\ms-settings\shell\open\command'
- '\mscfile\shell\open\command'
- '\exefile\shell\open\command'
condition: selection
level: high
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1548.002Common Scenarios
- fodhelper.exe Registry Hijack: Attacker sets
HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\commandto a malicious executable, then launches fodhelper.exe which auto-elevates and executes the hijacked command. - eventvwr.exe MSC Bypass: Modifying
HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\commandto intercept Event Viewer's auto-elevation behavior. - sdclt.exe Bypass: Leveraging the Windows Backup utility's auto-elevation to execute arbitrary commands.
- CMSTP.exe INF Bypass: Using Connection Manager Profile Installer with a malicious INF file to bypass UAC via
/s /niflags. - DLL Hijacking in Auto-Elevate: Placing malicious DLLs in search paths of auto-elevating executables.
Output Format
Hunt ID: TH-UAC-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Host: [Hostname]
Bypass Method: [Registry hijack/DLL hijack/Token manipulation]
Auto-Elevate Binary: [fodhelper.exe/eventvwr.exe/etc.]
Registry Key Modified: [Full registry path]
Payload Executed: [Command or binary path]
User Context: [Account]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium]
ATT&CK Technique: [T1548.00x]Files in this version
assets/11.0 KB
- template.md1.0 KB
references/36.3 KB
- api-reference.md2.5 KB
- standards.md2.0 KB
- workflows.md1.8 KB
scripts/211.4 KB
- agent.py6.7 KB
- process.py4.7 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md5.7 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | Yes | Yes |
| Writes files | No | No |
| Runs shell commands | Yes | Yes |
| Uses the network | Yes | Yes |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
- MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/agent.py
- MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/process.py
- InfoLink · Links to outside domains
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0 | Nov 13, 2026 | 54a7988 | 81b94c85 | Signed | – |
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