detecting-lateral-movement-with-zeek
Detect lateral movement in network traffic using Zeek (formerly Bro)
v1.03 installs+3 in 7 days36.3K StarsApache-2.0synced 12 hours ago
Install
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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install mukul975/detecting-lateral-movement-with-zeekWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Package7ad4a775…56c13725
7ad4a7750925…877c56c137258 files · 17.5 KBScanMedium3 findings
- Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/agent.py
- Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/process.py
- Links to outside domains
Sourcegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/detecting-lateral-movement-with-zeek@54a7988
On this page
Analyze Zeek network logs to identify lateral movement techniques including SMB admin share access, DCE/RPC remote service creation, NTLM account spray, Kerberos ticket anomalies, and large internal data transfers indicative of staging or exfiltration between hosts.
When to Use
- Hunting for lateral movement after an initial compromise indicator is found on one endpoint
- Investigating suspected NTLM account spray or Pass-the-Ticket attacks across the internal network
- Monitoring SMB traffic for unauthorized file transfers to admin shares (C$, ADMIN$, IPC$)
- Detecting remote service execution via DCE/RPC (PsExec, schtasks, WMI lateral patterns)
- Building alerting rules for internal network anomalies in a Zeek-based NSMP deployment
- Performing post-incident timeline reconstruction using Zeek logs as a network-level evidence source
Do not use as a standalone detection mechanism. Zeek sees network traffic only; combine with endpoint telemetry (Sysmon, EDR) for full visibility. Encrypted SMB3 traffic may limit Zeek's visibility into file-level details.
Prerequisites
- Zeek 6.0+ deployed on a network tap or SPAN port monitoring internal VLAN traffic
- Zeek SMB analyzer enabled (loaded by default:
@load base/protocols/smb) - Zeek DCE/RPC analyzer enabled (
@load base/protocols/dce-rpc) - Zeek Kerberos analyzer enabled (
@load base/protocols/krb) - Python 3.8+ (standard library only)
- Access to Zeek log directory (default:
/opt/zeek/logs/current/) - Familiarity with Zeek TSV log format (fields separated by
\t, header lines prefixed with#)
Workflow
Step 1: Verify Zeek Log Collection
Confirm that Zeek is producing the required log files for lateral movement detection:
# Check that all required analyzers are producing logs
ls -la /opt/zeek/logs/current/conn.log
ls -la /opt/zeek/logs/current/smb_mapping.log
ls -la /opt/zeek/logs/current/smb_files.log
ls -la /opt/zeek/logs/current/dce_rpc.log
ls -la /opt/zeek/logs/current/kerberos.log
ls -la /opt/zeek/logs/current/ntlm.log
# Quick field check on conn.log
zeek-cut id.orig_h id.resp_h id.resp_p proto service < /opt/zeek/logs/current/conn.log | head -20Step 2: Parse conn.log for Internal Lateral Patterns
Identify connections between internal hosts on lateral-movement-associated ports:
# Extract SMB connections (port 445) between internal hosts
zeek-cut ts id.orig_h id.orig_p id.resp_h id.resp_p proto service duration orig_bytes resp_bytes \
< /opt/zeek/logs/current/conn.log \
| awk '$5 == 445 && $7 == "smb"'
# Extract DCE/RPC connections (port 135)
zeek-cut ts id.orig_h id.resp_h id.resp_p service \
< /opt/zeek/logs/current/conn.log \
| awk '$4 == 135'
# Extract WinRM connections (port 5985/5986)
zeek-cut ts id.orig_h id.resp_h id.resp_p service \
< /opt/zeek/logs/current/conn.log \
| awk '$4 == 5985 || $4 == 5986'Step 3: Analyze SMB Admin Share Access
Detect access to administrative shares (C$, ADMIN$, IPC$) which is the primary vector for tools like PsExec:
# Check smb_mapping.log for admin share access
zeek-cut ts id.orig_h id.resp_h path share_type \
< /opt/zeek/logs/current/smb_mapping.log \
| grep -iE '(C\$|ADMIN\$|IPC\$)'
# Check smb_files.log for file writes to admin shares
zeek-cut ts id.orig_h id.resp_h action path name size \
< /opt/zeek/logs/current/smb_files.log \
| grep -i 'SMB::FILE_WRITE'Deploy the following Zeek script to generate notice.log alerts on admin share access:
@load base/protocols/smb
@load base/frameworks/notice
redef enum Notice::Type += {
Admin_Share_Access
};
event smb1_tree_connect_andx_request(c: connection, hdr: SMB1::Header, path: string, service: string) {
if ( /\$/ in path )
NOTICE([$note=Admin_Share_Access,
$msg=fmt("Admin share access: %s -> %s (%s)", c$id$orig_h, c$id$resp_h, path),
$conn=c]);
}Step 4: Detect DCE/RPC Remote Service Operations
Monitor for remote service creation and scheduled task registration via DCE/RPC:
# Look for service control manager operations (PsExec pattern)
zeek-cut ts id.orig_h id.resp_h endpoint operation \
< /opt/zeek/logs/current/dce_rpc.log \
| grep -iE '(svcctl|atsvc|ITaskSchedulerService)'Step 5: Detect NTLM Account Spray
Analyze ntlm.log for authentication anomalies indicating credential reuse. Zeek's ntlm.log does not expose password hashes, so this detection identifies a single account authenticating to many hosts in a short window — the network signature of credential spraying tools like CrackMapExec:
# Extract NTLM authentications
zeek-cut ts id.orig_h id.resp_h username domainname server_nb_computer_name success \
< /opt/zeek/logs/current/ntlm.log
# Failed NTLM authentications (brute force or credential testing)
zeek-cut ts id.orig_h id.resp_h username success \
< /opt/zeek/logs/current/ntlm.log \
| awk '$5 == "F"'
# Sort by timestamp for timeline analysis
zeek-cut ts id.orig_h id.resp_h username success \
< /opt/zeek/logs/current/ntlm.log \
| sort -k1,1Deploy the following Zeek script to generate notice.log alerts when a single
account touches more hosts than the threshold in a rolling window:
@load base/protocols/ntlm
@load base/frameworks/notice
redef enum Notice::Type += {
NTLM_Account_Spray
};
global ntlm_tracker: table[string] of set[addr] &create_expire=5min;
const spray_threshold = 3 &redef;
event ntlm_log(rec: NTLM::Info) {
if ( ! rec?$username || rec$username == "-" )
return;
if ( rec$username !in ntlm_tracker )
ntlm_tracker[rec$username] = set();
add ntlm_tracker[rec$username][rec$id$resp_h];
if ( |ntlm_tracker[rec$username]| >= spray_threshold )
NOTICE([$note=NTLM_Account_Spray,
$msg=fmt("NTLM account spray: %s -> %d hosts", rec$username, |ntlm_tracker[rec$username]|),
$sub=rec$username,
$conn=rec$id]);
}Step 6: Run the Automated Analysis Agent
Use the provided agent.py for comprehensive lateral movement detection:
python3 agent.py /opt/zeek/logs/current/
python3 agent.py /opt/zeek/logs/2026-03-18/ # Analyze a specific dateVerification
- Confirm conn.log captures internal SMB (port 445) and DCE/RPC (port 135) connections with correct field parsing
- Verify smb_mapping.log correctly logs admin share paths (C$, ADMIN$, IPC$)
- Test with a known PsExec execution in a lab: expect to see SMB FILE_WRITE of the service binary followed by DCE/RPC svcctl CreateService
- Validate NTLM log parsing by performing a test authentication and confirming username, domain, and success fields are captured; verify the NTLM Account Spray Zeek script generates a
notice.logentry when the spray threshold is exceeded - Cross-reference Zeek alerts with Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Creation) on the target host to confirm end-to-end detection
- Verify the agent correctly handles both TSV and JSON Zeek log formats
Files in this version
assets/14.3 KB
- template.md4.3 KB
references/39.9 KB
- api-reference.md4.4 KB
- standards.md818 B
- workflows.md4.7 KB
scripts/224.5 KB
- agent.py19.0 KB
- process.py5.5 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md7.5 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | Yes | Yes |
| Writes files | Yes | Yes |
| Runs shell commands | Yes | Yes |
| Uses the network | Yes | Yes |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
- MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/agent.py
- MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/process.py
- InfoLink · Links to outside domains
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0 | Nov 13, 2026 | 54a7988 | 7ad4a775 | Signed | – |
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