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mukul975/detecting-golden-ticket-forgeryActive Directory and Windows

detecting-golden-ticket-forgery

⁨Detect Kerberos Golden Ticket forgery (e.g. Mimikatz-forged tickets) by analyzing⁩

v1.03 installs+3 in 7 days36.3K StarsApache-2.0synced 12 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install mukul975/detecting-golden-ticket-forgery

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
Vqvk20IrSt…7OHx3bDw==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Package05d46ed7…2311d458
05d46ed70746…5d582311d4584 files · ⁦8.1 KB⁩
ScanMedium2 findings
  • Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/agent.py
  • Links to outside domains
See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/detecting-golden-ticket-forgery@54a7988

Overview

A Golden Ticket attack (MITRE ATT&CK T1558.001) involves forging a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) using the krbtgt account NTLM hash, granting unrestricted access to any service in the Active Directory domain. This skill detects Golden Ticket usage by analyzing Event ID 4769 for RC4 encryption type (0x17) in environments enforcing AES, identifying tickets with abnormal lifetimes exceeding domain policy, correlating TGS requests with missing corresponding TGT requests (Event ID 4768), and detecting krbtgt password age anomalies.

When to Use

  • When investigating security incidents that require detecting golden ticket forgery
  • When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
  • When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
  • When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques

Prerequisites

  • Windows Domain Controller with Kerberos audit logging enabled
  • Splunk or Elastic SIEM ingesting Windows Security event logs
  • Python 3.8+ for offline event log analysis
  • Knowledge of domain Kerberos encryption policy (AES vs RC4)

Steps

  1. Audit domain Kerberos encryption policy to establish AES-only baseline
  2. Forward Event IDs 4768 and 4769 to SIEM platform
  3. Detect RC4 (0x17) encryption in TGS requests where AES is enforced
  4. Identify TGS requests without corresponding TGT requests (forged ticket indicator)
  5. Alert on ticket lifetimes exceeding MaxTicketAge domain policy
  6. Monitor krbtgt account password age and last reset date
  7. Correlate findings with host/user context for risk scoring

Expected Output

JSON report with Golden Ticket indicators including RC4 downgrades, orphaned TGS requests, abnormal ticket lifetimes, and risk-scored alerts with MITRE ATT&CK technique mapping.

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesNoNo
Runs shell commandsYesYes
Uses the networkYesYes
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

  1. MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/agent.py
  2. InfoLink · Links to outside domains

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v1.0Nov 13, 202654a798805d46ed7Signed–

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