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meltedinhex/hunting-wmi-event-subscription-persistenceDFIR and threat hunting

hunting-wmi-event-subscription-persistence

⁨Hunts for malicious WMI permanent event subscription persistence by correlating⁩

v1.0.03 installs+3 in 7 days24 StarsApache-2.0synced 10 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install meltedinhex/hunting-wmi-event-subscription-persistence

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
OdgeNT/FSj…vBpOibCQ==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Packagee2444037…ce38bf79
e24440378eaa…64acce38bf794 files · ⁦3.0 KB⁩
ScanMedium2 findings
  • Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/analyst.py
  • Links to outside domains
See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/tree/main/skills/hunting-wmi-event-subscription-persistence@da7600a

When to Use

  • You have Sysmon WMI telemetry (Event ID 19 filter, 20 consumer, 21 binding) or a WMI repository export and want to find malicious permanent event subscriptions.
  • You are investigating fileless persistence that survives reboots via WMI.

Do not use this for transient WMI process calls (T1047 execution) — this targets persistent __EventFilter/__EventConsumer subscriptions specifically.

Prerequisites

  • Sysmon EID 19/20/21 events (CSV/JSON) or an exported subscription listing.

Workflow

Step 1: Parse and correlate triad records

bash
python scripts/analyst.py hunt wmi_events.csv

Groups filters, consumers, and bindings, and flags consumers whose payload is suspicious (CommandLineEventConsumer running scripts/encoded commands, ActiveScriptEventConsumer with inline VBScript/JScript).

Step 2: Assess the trigger

Inspect the __EventFilter query — common malicious triggers fire on logon, time intervals (__InstanceModificationEvent within), or process start.

Step 3: Confirm maliciousness

Legitimate management subscriptions exist; weight inline scripts, encoded commands, and unusual consumer names.

Step 4: Operationalize

Write a Sigma/EDR rule for new ActiveScript/CommandLine consumers.

Validation

  • Filter, consumer, and binding are correlated into a complete subscription where possible.
  • Suspicious consumers are flagged by payload content, not consumer existence alone.
  • Findings map to ATT&CK T1546.003.

Pitfalls

  • Legitimate monitoring tools (SCCM, antivirus) create subscriptions — corroborate.
  • Missing the binding that links an otherwise-benign-looking filter and consumer.
  • Encoded PowerShell inside a consumer obscuring intent.

References

  • See references/api-reference.md for the hunter.
  • ATT&CK T1546.003 and Sysmon WMI events (linked in frontmatter).

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesNoNo
Runs shell commandsYesYes
Uses the networkYesYes
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

  1. MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/analyst.py
  2. InfoLink · Links to outside domains

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v1.0.0Nov 13, 2026da7600ae2444037Signed–

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