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How it works
meltedinhex/hunting-credential-dumping-activityDFIR and threat hunting

hunting-credential-dumping-activity

⁨Hunts for credential dumping by detecting LSASS process access with suspicious access⁩

v1.0.03 installs+3 in 7 days24 StarsApache-2.0synced 10 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install meltedinhex/hunting-credential-dumping-activity

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
WShQM49yj3…lShpogCQ==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Packageee0b59fe…1c41ab58
ee0b59fee4fd…26621c41ab584 files · ⁦3.2 KB⁩
ScanMedium2 findings
  • Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/analyst.py
  • Links to outside domains
See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/tree/main/skills/hunting-credential-dumping-activity@da7600a

When to Use

  • You have Sysmon ProcessAccess (Event ID 10) and/or process-creation telemetry and want to detect attempts to read LSASS memory or dump credentials.
  • You are investigating post-exploitation credential theft.

Do not use this to dump credentials yourself — it analyzes telemetry of such activity. Legit security tools also touch LSASS; corroborate before alerting.

Prerequisites

  • Sysmon EID 10 events (with TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage) and/or EID 1 process events.

Workflow

Step 1: Hunt LSASS access and dumping patterns

bash
python scripts/analyst.py hunt events.csv

Flags EID 10 events where TargetImage is lsass.exe with high-risk GrantedAccess masks (0x1010, 0x1410, 0x143a, 0x1438), and process events showing comsvcs.dll,MiniDump, procdump ... lsass, rundll32 ... MiniDump, or known tool names.

Step 2: Reduce false positives

De-prioritize known security agents (EDR, AV) as the SourceImage; weight unsigned or unusual source processes.

Step 3: Confirm

Correlate with file writes of .dmp files and subsequent off-host transfer.

Step 4: Operationalize

Write a Sigma rule for LSASS access masks and comsvcs MiniDump.

Validation

  • LSASS access flags are based on access mask, not mere access by trusted tools.
  • comsvcs/procdump/rundll32 MiniDump patterns are detected from command lines.
  • Findings map to ATT&CK T1003.001/.002.

Pitfalls

  • Many legitimate tools open LSASS — access mask + source-image context is essential.
  • Attackers renaming tools; rely on behavior (mask, MiniDump export) not just names.
  • Direct-syscall dumpers that avoid the usual API and reduce telemetry.

References

  • See references/api-reference.md for the hunter.
  • ATT&CK T1003.001 and Sysmon EID 10 (linked in frontmatter).

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesNoNo
Runs shell commandsYesYes
Uses the networkYesYes
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

  1. MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/analyst.py
  2. InfoLink · Links to outside domains

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v1.0.0Nov 13, 2026da7600aee0b59feSigned–

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