ics-ctf
Lab/CTF: ICS/OT protocol challenges; Modbus, DNP3, BACnet, S7, OPC UA, MQTT, PLC/HMI data, registers/coils, safe read-only reasoning.
v2026.11.13-21cd5683 installs+3 in 7 days39 StarsMITsynced 11 hours ago
Install
No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install aeondave/ics-ctfWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Package77fc93ba…b33032f2
77fc93ba19ba…a443b33032f29 files · 49.2 KBScanMedium2 findings
- command.destructivereferences/incidents.md:85
- Links to outside domains
Sourcegithub.com/AeonDave/malskill/tree/main/offensive-ctf/ics-ctf@21cd568
On this page
Solve industrial-control and OT protocol lab tasks by treating traffic and process state as evidence first, then selecting the smallest safe action that proves the objective.
When this skill applies
- PCAPs, logs, register dumps, historian exports, or remote services involving PLC, HMI, RTU, engineering workstation, SCADA, or process-control wording.
- Protocol cues: Modbus/TCP, DNP3, BACnet, S7comm, EtherNet/IP/CIP, OPC UA, MQTT, Profinet, CAN, CANopen, serial fieldbus, coils, holding registers, function codes, setpoints, or actuator state.
- Tasks requiring traffic baselining, protocol-state reconstruction, register decoding, anomaly identification, or cautious interaction with an isolated lab service.
Operating model
- Preserve and identify the artifact: hash files, list ports, extract timestamps, and record protocol guesses with evidence.
- Separate roles before payloads: identify HMI, PLC, RTU, historian, engineering workstation, gateway, broker, and attacker-like clients.
- Baseline normal behavior: polling interval, read/write ratio, function codes, register ranges, topics, tags, and repeated process cycles.
- Decode semantics: map coils/registers/tags to values, infer endian/scaling, correlate writes with observed physical or process changes.
- Prefer read-only validation. Only write or send commands when the target is clearly an isolated lab and the success oracle requires it.
- Prove the result with a minimal, replayable signal: decoded secret, anomalous write, state transition, topic payload, register value, or process timeline.
Technique integration
Load these as decision engines when their domain appears:
network-techniquefor PCAP, protocol, and service exposure analysis.forensic-techniquefor evidence handling, timelines, and artifact preservation.wireless-techniquefor RF, serial-over-radio, or fieldbus captures crossing into wireless analysis.reversing-techniquefor PLC program blocks, firmware, protocol clients, or custom encoders.python-patternsfor parsers, register decoders, and safe replay harnesses.
Tool routing
Use tool families based on the evidence, not habit:
wireshark,tcpdump,tshark, andzeekfor protocol carving, conversations, timing, display filters (modbus.func_code,s7comm,dnp3,bacapp,cip,opcua,mqtt), and CSV/JSON field export.pymodbus,modbus-cli,mbtget,QModMaster, andModbusPalfor Modbus read/write, function-code abuse (FC 1–6, 15, 16, 8, 43), coil/register sweeps, and lab simulation.python-snap7,snap7-server,plcscan, ands7scanfor Siemens S7 enumeration (rack/slot, SZL, DB reads) and lab targets.opcua-asyncio,FreeOpcUa, andOPCUaScannerfor OPC UA endpoint enumeration, anonymous-policy detection, node browse, and read/write.mosquitto_pub/mosquitto_sub,mqtt-pwn,mosquitto-clients,MQTT Explorer/MQTTX, Scapy MQTT layer, MQTTSA, and the Wiresharkmqtt+sparkplugdissectors for topic enumeration (#,$SYS/#), retained-message inspection, Sparkplug B (Eclipse Tahu /pysparkplug) decoding, broker fingerprinting (Mosquitto/EMQX/HiveMQ/VerneMQ/NanoMQ) and auth probing. Always pair with the adjacent dashboard port (EMQX 18083, HiveMQ 8080, Node-RED 1880, OpenPLC 8080, Home Assistant 8123) — it is usually the real entry point.can-utils(candump,cansniffer,cansend,cangen) for CAN bus capture, periodic-frame analysis, and replay against virtualvcaninterfaces.- CyberChef,
jq,pandas, and Python scripts for endian, scaling, timestamp, register-table transformations, and CSV-from-pcap decoding pipelines. nmapOT NSE scripts (modbus-discover,s7-info,enip-info,bacnet-info,mqtt-subscribe,opcua-info) only against authorized isolated labs; passive PCAP analysis is preferred when artifacts are enough.binwalk,ghidra,radare2, andstringswhen the task includes PLC firmware, engineering-project exports, or custom protocol binaries.saleae-logic-2when a capture includes serial, CAN, or fieldbus waveforms rather than decoded network traffic.- Known lab engineering-software (OpenPLC runtime/editor, Codesys, ScadaBR, Node-RED, ConPot honeypot, MiniCPS, ICSsim) often expose web panels and scripting hooks that pair with protocol access; treat them as separate pivot targets when ports such as 1880, 8080, 8443, 11502, or vendor-specific HTTP appear.
Safety and scope gates
- Treat real-world ICS/OT writes as unsafe by default. In lab tasks, document why the environment is isolated before any write.
- Never reset, stop, upload firmware, or mass-write registers unless the prompt explicitly defines an isolated target and the objective requires that exact action.
- Keep a pivot ledger: protocol hypothesis, field evidence, decoded meaning, validation signal, and next safest step.
- If traffic looks malformed, first test endian, scaling, segmentation, custom function codes, or encapsulation before assuming exploitation.
- Report uncertainty: process semantics are inferred unless confirmed by labels, HMI screens, historian tags, or repeated cause-effect evidence.
Quick pivots
- Modbus: map unit IDs, function codes (FC 1/2 read coils/discrete, FC 3/4 read holding/input, FC 5/6 single write, FC 15/16 multi write, FC 8 diagnostics, FC 43 device ID), coil/register ranges, write events, byte order, and byte-vs-word counts. Wireshark filter:
modbus.func_code == 16for write-multiple-registers events. Check BOTH register/reference number AND register value fields — flag-style data is often hidden in the address, transaction ID, or unit ID instead of the value. - DNP3: inspect objects, variations, unsolicited responses, control relay outputs (group 12), and outstation/master roles. Filter:
dnp3. - BACnet: enumerate devices, objects, properties, write-property events, and broadcast discovery (
Who-Is/I-Am). Filter:bacappplus service choice. - S7comm: identify rack/slot, SZL reads, data block accesses, and program/block transfer indicators. Filter:
s7commpluss7comm.param.func. Pair withplcscan/s7scanfor lab enumeration andpython-snap7for DB reads. - EtherNet/IP/CIP: decode sessions, class/instance/attribute paths, tag names, and explicit messaging. Filter:
enipandcip. - OPC UA: walk endpoint discovery, security policies (note
Nonepolicy = anonymous), node IDs, and Browse/Read/Write services. Filter:opcua. - MQTT: reconstruct topics/nodes, retained messages, client IDs, will payloads, and process-state deltas. Filter:
mqtt. Try wildcard subscriptions#and$SYS/#when broker access is authorized; grab$SYS/broker/version+clients/total+retained messages/countfirst. - Sparkplug B / MQTT-bridge pivot: topic prefix
spBv1.0/<group>/<NBIRTH|NDATA|NCMD|DBIRTH|DDATA|DCMD>/<edge>[/<device>]with Protobuf payload signals an Ignition / Cirrus Link / EMQX Neuron / Node-RED bridge. Capture an NBIRTH/DBIRTH first to resolve alias→tag, then treat DCMD writes as actuator writes (Modbus FC 5/6 equivalent). Bridges (Cirrus Link, EMQX Neuron, Node-RED, OpenPLC MQTT, Advantech/Moxa/HMS gateways) round-trip MQTT writes into Modbus/S7/OPC-UA — confirm with state-topic lag (~1 s) before assuming raw broker access reaches the PLC. - Mosquitto pivot: pull
mosquitto.confandpasswd_fileif a host is in scope (auth_plugin,bridge_*,acl_file,allow_anonymous); hashes crack withhashcat(PBKDF2-SHA512 mode for 2.x, legacy SHA512+salt for 1.x). Pin findings to$SYS/broker/versionand check vendor advisories (Mosquitto CVE-2017-7650 ACL pattern bypass, CVE-2024-3935 TLS DoS; EMQX/HiveMQ/VerneMQ banners similarly). - CAN/CANopen: infer arbitration IDs, periodic frames, PDO/SDO patterns, endian, counters, and checksum bytes; use
candump/cansnifferfor live data. - Historian/log exports: normalize timestamps, recover tag/value/unit columns, identify sparse writes, and correlate alarm rows with process deltas.
- Project exports/firmware: extract symbols, comments, ladder/ST strings, tag databases, constants, network configuration, and custom encoders before dynamic interaction.
- Serial/fieldbus captures: identify baud/framing, address fields, checksums, counters, and periodic control loops before replaying frames.
- Engineering-software pivot: when an OpenPLC/Codesys/ScadaBR/Node-RED web panel sits next to the PLC port, check default credentials, scripting hooks (OpenPLC PSM module, Node-RED function nodes), and known CVEs for that specific runtime before scripting writes against the protocol.
- Process-state pivot: pressure/temperature/level registers near safety thresholds, coils tied to pumps/valves/cooling, and setpoint registers driving alarms are common objectives; correlate writes to expected physical effect and verify by read-back or HMI state, not by assumption.
- Purdue-model pivot: map each host to L0 (sensors/actuators), L1 (PLC/RTU), L2 (HMI/SCADA), L3 (historian, engineering workstation, MES) before choosing a target; the shortest path to objective is often an L2/L3 host (HMI web, RDP, historian DB, project files) rather than direct L1 protocol abuse.
- Engineering-workstation pivot: project files on the engineering workstation (
.acd/.l5xRSLogix/Studio 5000,.ap14/.zap14TIA Portal,.pro/.projectarchiveCodesys,.s7p/.ap13Step7) carry ladder/ST source, tag names, network configuration, and sometimes credentials — grab them before native protocol attacks when the workstation is in scope. - Race-condition / False Data Injection (FDI) pivot: when a master polls a PLC on a fixed cycle (e.g. every 1–3 s), writes inside the cycle window can flip coils/registers between the PLC update and the next master read; build the write loop tighter than the poll interval and verify the master observes the desynced state.
- L2/MITM pivot in flat OT networks: ARP poisoning between HMI and PLC (or between two PLCs on a Device-Level Ring) lets you rewrite Modbus/EtherNet/IP/S7 in flight with
ettercap/bettercap+NetfilterQueue+ Scapy filters — useful when direct write is logged but rewrite-in-transit is not. - HMI-side pivot: HMI panels often expose VNC (5900) without auth, vendor web UIs with default credentials, or shared SMB folders containing PLC project archives, recipe files, and screenshots that label tag meanings.
- Historian pivot: PI Server, FactoryTalk Historian, WinCC, and Wonderware historians (MSSQL/proprietary on 1433, 5450, 5460) carry long timeseries of every tag and often default/weak SQL credentials — they are an alternative to live PLC read for proving a process anomaly.
- Scan-cycle awareness: writes to the output image (
%Q/coils) are overwritten next PLC scan; setpoint writes (%M/holding registers consumed by ladder) persist. Forces override both regardless of ladder. Mode transitions (STOP/RUN/PROG/FAULT) are high-signal events — search PCAPs for them before chasing register writes. - Signal decoding pivot: raw register ≠ engineering value. Guess byte/word order (
ABCD/CDAB/BADC/DCBA) by checking which order yields a plausible temperature/pressure/level, then solveEU = raw*scale + offsetfrom two known HMI/historian points. Status registers pack 16 alarm bits — map each bit before claiming meaning. - Test-cycle discipline: every write goes through baseline (3+ snapshots, diff to identify live vs static registers) → minimal write (one bit/register, smallest FC) → read-back → side-channel verification (HMI/historian/oracle, not just read-back) → hold for ≥ N polling cycles → restore. Read-back alone is insufficient evidence.
- IT→OT chain pivot: realistic OT compromise starts in IT (Responder/SMB-relay, AS-REP/Kerberoast, ADCS ESC1) → DA → OT-DMZ jump (backup script creds, KeePass dump CVE-2023-32784, reused local-admin) → engineering workstation (vendor IDE + project files + saved PLC creds) → PLC setpoint/logic. PLC default passwords often arrive via photos and panel stickers on file shares, not live enumeration. Budget ~60 % IT/AD, ~25 % DMZ pivot, ~15 % PLC interaction; never touch SIS (Triconex/HIMA/GuardLogix).
- Priority frame: OT inverts CIA into Safety > Availability > Integrity > Confidentiality; reject findings/recommendations that raise confidentiality at the cost of safety or availability, and frame impact in operator-visible terms (alarm row, HMI banner, historian sample) rather than CVE wording.
- TIA Portal project pivot: when given a
.zap1x/.ap1x/.s7parchive, treat it like source code. Match TIA Portal major version + HSP to the CPU firmware, dump PLC + HMI tag tables to CSV, reverse OB1 networks in order, then load into PLCSim Advanced to drive inputs and watch DB/M evolution offline. The DB area is the cleanest write surface (setpoint changes leave no Q-image footprint); HMI buttons are usually thin proxies onto M bits. Basic/Comfort panels archive analog tags to internal SD and to the back-USB stick — pull both when you have physical access. - Real-world archetype pivot: map the artifact to a known OT chain before improvising. Use references/incidents.md for vendor/CVE landing pads and pattern cards such as FrostyGoop-style setpoint flips, BAUXITE/Unitronics defaults, Volt/Sylvanite IT→OT pivots, MQTT-to-gauge IOCONTROL footprints, and Static Tundra-style destructive chains.
Resources
- references/ot-protocol-workflow.md — protocol triage, field extraction, anomaly workflow, and validation cues.
- references/plc-interaction-recipes.md — read-only-first interaction recipes for Modbus, S7, OPC UA, MQTT, and CAN against authorized lab targets, plus engineering-software pivot patterns.
- references/attack-patterns.md — Purdue-model mapping, engineering-workstation pivots, project-file formats, race-condition / FDI writes, L2 MITM in flat OT segments, HMI/historian pivots, and operational-impact reasoning.
- references/signal-decoding-and-testing.md — PLC scan cycle and memory areas, Modbus/CIP/S7/DNP3/BACnet decoding cues, integer/float/BCD/string/time encodings, byte-and-word order resolution, CAN signal decoding, the baseline → write → verify → restore test cycle, and a final validation checklist.
- references/fundamentals-and-it-to-ot-chain.md — OT priority model, asset taxonomy, Purdue recap, and a realistic IT→OT pivot chain for scoping and target selection.
- references/tia-portal-and-plc-fundamentals.md — Siemens S7-1500 / TIA Portal toolchain (project archives, HSP versioning, PLCSim Advanced offline simulation), OB/FB/FC/DB block taxonomy, S7-1500 memory areas (I/Q/M/DB/L), HMI tag binding, PROFINET DCP cell layout, and a step-by-step workflow for analyzing a seized project archive.
- references/incidents.md — OT incident pattern cards, vendor/CVE landing pads, and attack-path templates useful for recognizing or modeling realistic ICS-style tasks.
- references/mqtt-iot-ics-bridges.md — MQTT broker triage (
$SYSfingerprinting, anonymous/retained/LWT/ACL probing), Sparkplug B topic + payload model (Eclipse Tahu), Mosquitto/EMQX/HiveMQ/VerneMQ/NanoMQ specifics with CVE references, MQTT-to-PLC bridge stacks (Cirrus Link Ignition modules, EMQX Neuron, Node-RED, OpenPLC, Advantech/Moxa/HMS gateways), tool chain (mqtt-pwn,mosquitto-clients, MQTT Explorer/MQTTX, MQTTSA, Scapy, Cotopaxi), recurring broker-challenge and home-automation attack patterns, and vendor/research case material (Akamai, Trend Micro, HiveMQ, Claroty Team82, CISA ICS advisories).
Files in this version
references/8103.2 KB
- attack-patterns.md9.3 KB
- fundamentals-and-it-to-ot-chain.md9.7 KB
- incidents.md30.0 KB
- mqtt-iot-ics-bridges.md15.3 KB
- ot-protocol-workflow.md8.6 KB
- plc-interaction-recipes.md8.4 KB
- signal-decoding-and-testing.md12.9 KB
- tia-portal-and-plc-fundamentals.md9.0 KB
- SKILL.md16.0 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | No | No |
| Writes files | Yes | Yes |
| Runs shell commands | Yes | Yes |
| Uses the network | Yes | Yes |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
- MediumCommand · command.destructivereferences/incidents.md:85
- InfoLink · Links to outside domains
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.11.13-21cd568 | Nov 13, 2026 | 21cd568 | 77fc93ba | Signed | – |
More from AeonDave
All from this publisherMore in Reverse engineering and fuzzing
See the categoryAsk anything your scope allows.
Create an account, add credits and ask the first question in the chat or the terminal.
- 1/3
Create the account
Individual or company. You can switch to a company later without losing balance or keys.
IndividualCompany - 2/3
Add credits
By card. Pay per token, no subscription.
$5.00minimum deposit - 3/3
Ask
In the chat, or install the CLI and run notholy login in your terminal.
$ notholy login