detecting-privilege-escalation-in-kubernetes-pods
Detects and prevents privilege escalation inside Kubernetes pods by combining admission control (OPA policies), runtime monitoring (Falco), and audit log analysis of security contexts, Linux capabilities, and syscall patterns. Use when investigating a pod running as root or privileged, hardening wor
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חתימהחתום, ed25519
חבילהc145526b…1c20355d
c145526b1081…1aed1c20355d8 קבצים · 10.7 KBסריקהבינוני3 ממצאים
- סקריפט הרצה שמגיע עם הסקילscripts/agent.py
- סקריפט הרצה שמגיע עם הסקילscripts/process.py
- קישורים לדומיינים חיצוניים
מקורgithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/detecting-privilege-escalation-in-kubernetes-pods@54a7988
הפריט הזה עדיין לא נכתב בעברית, ולכן הוא מוצג בשפה אחרת: English.
בעמוד הזה
Overview
Privilege escalation in Kubernetes occurs when a pod or container gains elevated permissions beyond its intended scope. This includes running as root, using privileged mode, mounting host filesystems, enabling dangerous Linux capabilities, or exploiting kernel vulnerabilities. Detection combines admission control (prevention), runtime monitoring (detection), and audit logging (investigation).
When to Use
- When investigating security incidents that require detecting privilege escalation in kubernetes pods
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
Prerequisites
- Kubernetes cluster v1.25+ (Pod Security Admission support)
- kubectl with cluster-admin access
- Falco or similar runtime security tool
- OPA Gatekeeper or Kyverno for admission policies
Privilege Escalation Vectors in Kubernetes
| Vector | Risk | Detection Method |
|---|---|---|
| privileged: true | Full host access | Admission control + audit |
| hostPID: true | Access host processes | Admission control |
| hostNetwork: true | Access host network stack | Admission control |
| hostPath volumes | Read/write host filesystem | Admission control |
| SYS_ADMIN capability | Near-privileged access | Admission + runtime |
| allowPrivilegeEscalation: true | setuid/setgid exploitation | Admission control |
| runAsUser: 0 | Container root | Admission control |
| automountServiceAccountToken | Token theft for API access | Admission control |
| Writable /proc or /sys | Kernel parameter manipulation | Runtime monitoring |
Detection with Admission Control
Pod Security Admission (Built-in)
# Enforce restricted policy on namespace
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: production
labels:
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce-version: latest
pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit: restricted
pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn: restrictedOPA Gatekeeper Policies
# Block dangerous capabilities
apiVersion: templates.gatekeeper.sh/v1
kind: ConstraintTemplate
metadata:
name: k8sdangerouspriv
spec:
crd:
spec:
names:
kind: K8sDangerousPriv
targets:
- target: admission.k8s.gatekeeper.sh
rego: |
package k8sdangerouspriv
dangerous_caps := {"SYS_ADMIN", "SYS_PTRACE", "SYS_MODULE", "DAC_OVERRIDE", "NET_ADMIN", "NET_RAW"}
violation[{"msg": msg}] {
container := input.review.object.spec.containers[_]
cap := container.securityContext.capabilities.add[_]
dangerous_caps[cap]
msg := sprintf("Container %v adds dangerous capability: %v", [container.name, cap])
}
violation[{"msg": msg}] {
container := input.review.object.spec.containers[_]
container.securityContext.privileged == true
msg := sprintf("Container %v runs in privileged mode", [container.name])
}
violation[{"msg": msg}] {
container := input.review.object.spec.containers[_]
container.securityContext.allowPrivilegeEscalation == true
msg := sprintf("Container %v allows privilege escalation", [container.name])
}
violation[{"msg": msg}] {
input.review.object.spec.hostPID == true
msg := "Pod uses host PID namespace"
}
violation[{"msg": msg}] {
input.review.object.spec.hostNetwork == true
msg := "Pod uses host network"
}Runtime Detection with Falco
# /etc/falco/rules.d/privesc-detection.yaml
- rule: Setuid Binary Execution in Container
desc: Detect execution of setuid/setgid binaries in a container
condition: >
spawned_process and container and
(proc.name in (su, sudo, newgrp, chsh, passwd) or
proc.is_exe_upper_layer=true)
output: >
Setuid/setgid binary executed in container
(user=%user.name container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository
command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname)
priority: WARNING
tags: [container, privilege-escalation, T1548]
- rule: Capability Gained in Container
desc: Detect when a process gains elevated capabilities
condition: >
evt.type = capset and container and
evt.arg.cap != ""
output: >
Process gained capabilities in container
(container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository
capabilities=%evt.arg.cap command=%proc.cmdline)
priority: WARNING
tags: [container, privilege-escalation, T1548.001]
- rule: Container with Dangerous Capabilities Started
desc: Detect container launched with dangerous capabilities
condition: >
container_started and container and
(container.image.repository != "registry.k8s.io/pause") and
(container.cap_effective contains SYS_ADMIN or
container.cap_effective contains SYS_PTRACE or
container.cap_effective contains SYS_MODULE)
output: >
Container with dangerous capabilities
(container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository
caps=%container.cap_effective)
priority: CRITICAL
tags: [container, privilege-escalation, T1068]
- rule: Write to /etc/passwd in Container
desc: Detect writes to /etc/passwd inside container
condition: >
open_write and container and fd.name = /etc/passwd
output: >
Write to /etc/passwd in container
(container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository
command=%proc.cmdline user=%user.name)
priority: CRITICAL
tags: [container, privilege-escalation, T1136]Kubernetes Audit Log Detection
# audit-policy.yaml - Capture privilege escalation events
apiVersion: audit.k8s.io/v1
kind: Policy
rules:
# Log pod creation with security context details
- level: RequestResponse
resources:
- group: ""
resources: ["pods"]
verbs: ["create", "update", "patch"]
# Log privilege escalation attempts
- level: RequestResponse
resources:
- group: "rbac.authorization.k8s.io"
resources: ["clusterroles", "clusterrolebindings", "roles", "rolebindings"]
verbs: ["create", "update", "patch", "bind", "escalate"]
# Log service account token requests
- level: Metadata
resources:
- group: ""
resources: ["serviceaccounts/token"]
verbs: ["create"]Query Audit Logs for Privilege Escalation
# Find pods created with privileged security context
kubectl logs -n kube-system kube-apiserver-* | \
jq 'select(.verb == "create" and .objectRef.resource == "pods") |
select(.requestObject.spec.containers[].securityContext.privileged == true)'
# Find RBAC escalation attempts
kubectl logs -n kube-system kube-apiserver-* | \
jq 'select(.objectRef.resource == "clusterrolebindings" and .verb == "create")'Investigation Playbook
# Check pod security context
kubectl get pod <pod-name> -n <ns> -o jsonpath='{.spec.containers[*].securityContext}'
# Check effective capabilities
kubectl exec <pod-name> -n <ns> -- cat /proc/1/status | grep -i cap
# List pods running as root
kubectl get pods --all-namespaces -o json | \
jq '.items[] | select(.spec.containers[].securityContext.runAsUser == 0 or .spec.containers[].securityContext.privileged == true) | {name: .metadata.name, ns: .metadata.namespace}'
# Check for hostPath volumes
kubectl get pods --all-namespaces -o json | \
jq '.items[] | select(.spec.volumes[]?.hostPath != null) | {name: .metadata.name, ns: .metadata.namespace, paths: [.spec.volumes[].hostPath.path]}'Best Practices
- Enable Pod Security Admission at
restrictedlevel for production namespaces - Drop ALL capabilities and add back only what is needed
- Set allowPrivilegeEscalation: false on all containers
- Run as non-root (runAsNonRoot: true, runAsUser > 0)
- Disable automountServiceAccountToken unless API access is needed
- Monitor with Falco for runtime privilege escalation attempts
- Audit RBAC changes with Kubernetes audit logging
- Use seccomp profiles to restrict syscalls
הקבצים בגרסה הזו
assets/11.0 KB
- template.md1.0 KB
references/33.4 KB
- api-reference.md1.2 KB
- standards.md1.0 KB
- workflows.md1.2 KB
scripts/29.5 KB
- agent.py4.2 KB
- process.py5.3 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md9.2 KB
הרשאות
| הרשאה | הוצהר | נמצא בסריקה |
|---|---|---|
| קורא קבצים | כן | כן |
| כותב קבצים | כן | כן |
| מריץ פקודות shell | כן | כן |
| משתמש ברשת | כן | כן |
| משתמש במחברים | לא | לא |
| שולט בדפדפן | לא | לא |
ממצאי הסריקה
נבדק ב-13 בנוב׳ 2026
- בינוניתקובץ · סקריפט הרצה שמגיע עם הסקילscripts/agent.py
- בינוניתקובץ · סקריפט הרצה שמגיע עם הסקילscripts/process.py
- מידעקישור · קישורים לדומיינים חיצוניים
סריקה נקייה מורידה את הסיכון, אבל לא מוכיחה שהחבילה בטוחה. כדאי לקרוא מה מתקינים.
| גרסה | פורסמה | Commit | SHA-256 | חתימה | שינוי בהרשאות |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0 | 13 בנוב׳ 2026 | 54a7988 | c145526b | חתומה | – |
עוד מ-mukul975
הכול מהמפרסם הזה- testing-for-xml-injection-vulnerabilitiesmukul975/testing-for-xml-injection-vulnerabilities5
- testing-for-sensitive-data-exposuremukul975/testing-for-sensitive-data-exposure5
- performing-jwt-none-algorithm-attackmukul975/performing-jwt-none-algorithm-attack5
- detecting-aws-credential-exposure-with-trufflehogmukul975/detecting-aws-credential-exposure-with-trufflehog5
עוד בקטגוריה Linux, ענן וקונטיינרים
לקטגוריה- cloud-gcpnoorqureshi/cloud-gcp4
- container-image-hardeningsecurityskills/container-image-hardening3
- performing-cloud-incident-containment-proceduresmukul975/performing-cloud-incident-containment-procedures3
- implementing-taxii-server-with-opentaxiimukul975/implementing-taxii-server-with-opentaxii3
- detecting-cryptomining-in-cloudmukul975/detecting-cryptomining-in-cloud3
- detecting-azure-service-principal-abusemukul975/detecting-azure-service-principal-abuse3
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