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aeondave/rop-development-devהנדסה לאחור ו-fuzzing

rop-development-dev

⁨Auth/lab dev: ROP chain research; gadget quality, calling conventions, pivots, leak-first ASLR labs, NX/DEP modeling, reliability.⁩

v2026.11.13-21cd5683 התקנות⁦+3⁩ ב-7 ימים39 כוכביםMITסונכרן לפני 11 שעות

התקנה

עדיין אין לכם את ה-CLI של NotHoly? התקינו אותו קודם.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install aeondave/rop-development-dev

נכתב אל ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ אחרי בדיקת החתימה וה-SHA-256.

חתימהחתום, ed25519
Q8HVrAtdyx…wUgsfQCQ==ה-CLI בודק את ה-SHA-256 ואת החתימה לפני שהוא כותב קובץ כלשהו.
חבילה0d8b07ef…fe6aff2e
0d8b07efa9b1…9b02fe6aff2e4 קבצים · ⁦6.1 KB⁩
סריקהנמוךאין ממצאים
הסריקה לא מצאה בגרסה הזו שום דבר שצריך לסמן.לסריקה המלאה
מקורgithub.com/AeonDave/malskill/tree/main/offensive-coding/rop-development-dev@21cd568

הפריט הזה עדיין לא נכתב בעברית, ולכן הוא מוצג בשפה אחרת: English.

Goal: produce reliable, reproducible chains — not one-shot lucky payloads. Build from ABI facts, memory disclosures, and deterministic gadget policies.

When to activate

  • You need a chain for ret2libc, ret2syscall, ret2csu, SROP, or Windows API-call ROP (VirtualProtect, NtProtectVirtualMemory)
  • Exploit crashes exist but NX/DEP + ASLR/PIE prevent direct shellcode
  • Gadget discovery returns too many noisy candidates and chain stability is poor
  • A working chain breaks across OS versions or minor binary rebuilds
  • You must reason about CET/Shadow Stack / CFG feasibility before investing in ROP

Core operating model

  1. Establish control primitive: RIP control + controllable stack window.
  2. Choose objective:
    • Leak addresses (stage 1) for ASLR/PIE
    • Invoke function/syscall with controlled arguments (stage 2)
    • Change memory perms (RW->RX) or pivot to existing executable pages
  3. Collect gadgets deterministically (Ropper/ROPgadget/pwntools), score, then freeze selection.
  4. Assemble chain using exact ABI (register args, stack alignment, shadow space on Windows x64).
  5. Validate under debugger and rerun multiple times against same binary + randomized layouts.
  6. Generalize by replacing hardcoded addresses with leak-derived bases and symbol offsets.
  1. Survey pass: protections, ABI, candidate primitives, chain budget (input length / bad chars).
  2. Hypothesis: pick the shortest viable route (e.g., ret2libc vs ret2csu vs ret2dlresolve vs SROP).
  3. Prototype: build the smallest chain that proves one objective (single leak or single call).
  4. Instrument: log gadget addresses, leak bytes, parsed base, and alignment state (rsp % 16).
  5. Replan: if a gate fails (canary, full RELRO, CET/CFG), switch route early rather than extending a broken chain.
  6. Stabilize: replay locally with randomization, then with remote-like libc/loader parity.

Chain patterns that actually survive

Leak-first (preferred)

  • Stage 1: call a known print/write primitive (puts@plt, write, etc.) on GOT/IAT pointer.
  • Compute module base from leak.
  • Stage 2: build final chain from base + offsets.

Use this by default on ASLR/PIE targets instead of guessing static offsets.

ret2libc / ret2syscall (Linux)

  • pop rdi; ret -> /bin/sh -> system, or
  • syscall chain: set rax=59, rdi=/bin/sh, rsi=0, rdx=0, then syscall; ret.

ret2csu (ELF with limited gadgets)

Use __libc_csu_init sequences to load multiple registers when clean pop gadgets are missing.

Windows API-call ROP

  • Build register/stack state for VirtualProtect or NtProtectVirtualMemory.
  • Respect x64 calling convention and stack alignment.
  • Prefer module-backed return sites/gadgets for better call-stack plausibility.

Mitigation-aware decisions

  • NX/DEP on, no leak yet: prioritize infoleak stage.
  • PIE + full ASLR: absolute gadget addresses are disposable; keep only relative offsets.
  • Full RELRO: avoid GOT overwrite plans; use call-oriented chains/leaks instead.
  • No/Partial RELRO: ret2dlresolve can be a strong option when direct libc resolution/leaks are constrained.
  • CET Shadow Stack: classic RET-chain often non-viable without a compatible bypass primitive.
  • CFG (Windows): indirect call targets must pass CFG checks; prefer allowed call edges or syscall-oriented paths.

If CET/CFG blocks your intended path, pivot early to alternate technique (JOP/SROP/data-only).

Gadget quality rules

  • Prefer shortest side-effect-free gadgets.
  • Reject gadgets that clobber required registers unless immediately restored.
  • Avoid random candidate picking: sort + score + choose deterministically.
  • Preserve a strict fallback cascade (module A -> B -> C) when ideal gadget not found.
  • Re-verify every selected gadget after binary/toolchain updates.

Reliability checklist

  • Stack 16-byte aligned at each call boundary.
  • Bad bytes filtered at payload generation time.
  • Chain survives repeated runs (at least 20 local iterations).
  • Leak parsing robust to partial output / newline differences.
  • All hardcoded bases removed before finalization.
  • Local environment mirrors target runtime (libc/loader parity) before remote claims.
  • Ifunc-sensitive offsets (mem*, str* families) validated at runtime when relevant.

Debug loop

  1. Build minimal chain (single call objective).
  2. Break before first gadget; inspect stack and registers.
  3. Single-step gadget transitions; confirm intended side effects only.
  4. Expand chain one block at a time.
  5. Record failure class: bad pivot, alignment, clobber, wrong base, mitigations.

Anti-patterns

  • Treating ROP as static addresses under ASLR/PIE.
  • Overlong chains when a shorter call-oriented path exists.
  • Mixing conventions (SysV vs Windows x64) in cross-platform exploits.
  • Ignoring tool disagreement (Ropper vs ROPgadget) without byte-level verification.
  • Shipping chains not tested under randomized layouts.

Resources

  • references/tooling-and-workflow.md — Load when selecting gadget tooling, debugger flow, and leak/chain instrumentation.
  • references/reliability-patterns.md — Load when chains work once but fail across runs, libc variants, or layout changes.
  • references/examples-and-resources.md — Load for compact chain templates and common failure fixes such as alignment, IFUNC, CET, CFG, and leak instability.
  • Upstream methodology: offensive-techniques/binary-exploitation-technique (when to choose ROP vs data-only, chain staging) and offensive-ctf/pwn-ctf/references/rop.md (concrete chain recipes).

הקבצים בגרסה הזו

הרשאות

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ממצאי הסריקה

נבדק ב-13 בנוב׳ 2026

הסריקה לא מצאה בגרסה הזו שום דבר שצריך לסמן.

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גרסהפורסמהCommitSHA-256חתימהשינוי בהרשאות
v2026.11.13-21cd56813 בנוב׳ 202621cd5680d8b07efחתומה–

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