mobile-technique
Auth assessment: mobile app security; Android/iOS static, storage, Frida/runtime, traffic, pinning, platform, API and crypto checks.
v2026.11.13-21cd5683 התקנות+3 ב-7 ימים39 כוכביםMITסונכרן לפני 10 שעות
התקנה
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חתימהחתום, ed25519
חבילהd51f64aa…394dd1fd
d51f64aa33fd…1334394dd1fdשני קבצים · 10.6 KBסריקהבינוני3 ממצאים
- injection.no_confirmationreferences/android-ipc-attack-surface.md:30
- injection.no_confirmationreferences/android-ipc-attack-surface.md:65
- קישורים לדומיינים חיצוניים
מקורgithub.com/AeonDave/malskill/tree/main/offensive-techniques/mobile-technique@21cd568
הפריט הזה עדיין לא נכתב בעברית, ולכן הוא מוצג בשפה אחרת: English.
בעמוד הזה
Goal: systematically identify security weaknesses in Android and iOS applications following OWASP MASTG/MASVS.
When this technique applies
- Mobile application (Android or iOS) in scope for pentest or bug bounty.
- Need to test authentication, storage, network, or platform-specific controls.
- Reverse engineering mobile app logic or extracting secrets.
Boundary
- CTF mobile tasks: flag-extraction from APK/IPA/backup →
mobile-ctf(faster, CTF-specific patterns including .ab, Unity/IL2CPP, asset stego). - Input from
web-exploit-technique: API-level findings from mobile app traffic. - Deep binary analysis:
reversing-techniquefor obfuscated native libraries and IL2CPP binaries. - Flutter/Dart AOT or React Native/Hermes: load mobile framework artifact notes for framework cues and tool-version limits; use only the relevant reversing guidance outside CTF work.
- Tool skills:
offensive-tools/rev/jadx/,offensive-tools/rev/apktool/,offensive-tools/rev/dex2jar/,offensive-tools/rev/androguard/,offensive-tools/rev/frida/.
Initial triage
Before decompiling or hooking broadly, classify the app, the platform, and the control family most likely to fail first.
- Starting state: are you testing Android or iOS, do you have only the package or also a device/emulator, and is the priority storage, auth, transport, local trust, or backend API behavior?
- First questions: what protections are present (pinning, root/jailbreak checks, obfuscation, native code), what app paths matter most, and what can be validated statically before runtime work?
- Immediate actions: extract package metadata, map exposed components and trust boundaries, then choose the first lane: static review, traffic interception, dynamic instrumentation, or backend/API analysis.
- Tool-family direction: use decompilation skills (
jadx,apktool,androguard,dex2jar) first for structure and secrets, then instrumentation (frida) and proxy skills after you know what runtime behavior must be observed or bypassed. - Escalation rule: do not jump to native reversing or bypass scripts until the simpler Java/Kotlin/ObjC/Swift and network paths are exhausted.
Agent operating model
Per mobile application:
1. Static analysis — decompile, inspect manifest, search secrets.
2. Dynamic analysis — instrument with Frida, bypass SSL pinning.
3. Traffic interception — proxy through Burp/mitmproxy.
4. Storage analysis — inspect SharedPreferences, SQLite, KeyStore.
5. Authentication testing — test local auth, biometrics, session handling.
6. API testing — apply web-exploit-technique to backend APIs.Android testing
Static analysis
# Quick win: strings on the raw APK first (zip container: unzip -p for embedded files)
strings target.apk | grep -iE "api[_-]?key|secret|password|token|bearer|firebaseio\.com|s3\.amazonaws"
# Decompile
jadx -d output_dir target.apk
apktool d target.apk -o output_dir # smali + decoded manifest + resources
# Manifest analysis: exported components, debuggable, allowBackup, permissions
aapt2 dump badging target.apk # aapt is deprecated; aapt2 in modern SDK build-tools
# Hardcoded crypto (SecretKeySpec, Cipher.getInstance — common leak point)
grep -r "SecretKeySpec\|Cipher\|AES\|DES\|encrypt\|decrypt\|base64" output_dir/ | grep -v "^Binary"
# Look for the hardcoded key argument passed to SecretKeySpec(key, "AES")
# Firebase and remote config leaks
cat output_dir/res/values/google-services.json 2>/dev/null
cat output_dir/assets/google-services.json 2>/dev/null
# Certificate analysis
apksigner verify --print-certs target.apk
# Asset inspection (images, data files bundled with APK)
find output_dir/assets/ -type f | xargs file
# Large images → potential steganography (zsteg, steghide, visual inspection)Dynamic analysis
# Frida — SSL pinning bypass (spawn+resume is default since frida-tools 12+; do not pass --no-pause)
frida -U -f com.target.app -l ssl_pinning_bypass.js
# Objection — rapid assessment
objection -g com.target.app explore
# android sslpinning disable # OkHttp3, TrustManagerImpl, SSLContext, Conscrypt, etc.
# android root disable
# android hooking list activities
# Drozer (community fork WithSecureLabs/drozer) — exposed components
dz> run app.package.attacksurface com.target.app
dz> run app.provider.query content://com.target.app.provider/Traffic interception
- Configure device/emulator proxy to Burp Suite.
- Install CA certificate (user store for Android 7+; system store requires root).
- SSL pinning bypass: Frida universal scripts (httptoolkit/frida-interception-and-unpinning) > Objection > LSPosed module (TrustMeAlready, JustTrustMe) > smali patching + repackage + resign.
Storage analysis
adb shell cat /data/data/com.target.app/shared_prefs/*.xml
adb pull /data/data/com.target.app/databases/
adb shell ls /data/data/com.target.app/files/Android backup (.ab) analysis
.ab is a legacy channel. adb backup is restricted since Android 12 and requires android:debuggable=true for most apps; on Android 13+ most stock apps refuse it outright. Still useful for older/debuggable builds and forensic images.
# Header: "ANDROID BACKUP\n<ver>\n<compressed>\n<encryption>\n" (variable length — do NOT hardcode skip=)
python3 - <<'PY'
import zlib, pathlib
raw = pathlib.Path('backup.ab').read_bytes()
# Skip 4 newline-terminated header fields, then decompress the zlib stream that follows.
p = 0
for _ in range(4):
p = raw.index(b'\n', p) + 1
pathlib.Path('backup.tar').write_bytes(zlib.decompress(raw[p:]))
PY
tar xf backup.tar -C extracted/
# Triage extracted content
grep -rE "password|token|secret|api[_-]?key|bearer" extracted/ 2>/dev/null
find extracted/ -name "*.db" -exec sqlite3 {} ".tables" \; 2>/dev/nullUnity / IL2CPP APK
Unity games compile C# to native ARM via IL2CPP. jadx shows only stubs — reverse libil2cpp.so with metadata.
# Verify IL2CPP
ls apk_unzip/lib/arm64-v8a/ # → libil2cpp.so, libmain.so, libunity.so
# Il2CppDumper: recovers full class/method/field names from binary + metadata
# https://github.com/Perfare/Il2CppDumper
# Input: libil2cpp.so + assets/global-metadata.dat
# Output: dump.cs (all C# stubs with offsets), script.py (Ghidra import)
grep -i "flag\|key\|secret\|password\|cheat\|unlock" dump.cs
strings libil2cpp.so | grep -i "flag{"
# Load into Ghidra with Il2CppDumper's script.py for guided reversingiOS testing
Static analysis
- Decrypt App Store IPA (jailbroken device required on iOS 15+):
frida-ios-dump,bagbak, oripadecrypt.bfinjectis dead (iOS 11 Electra-era); Needle is archived (Reversec Labs, May 2025) — do not use. - Off-device sideload for testing on stock iOS: TrollStore (iOS 14.0–17.0 unpatched) or a paid developer profile for re-signing.
- Decompile with Hopper, Ghidra, or Binary Ninja; entitlements via
ldid -e,codesign -d --entitlements :-. - Inspect
Info.plistfor URL schemes, ATS exceptions,UIBackgroundModes, associated domains, and entitlements (keychain access groups, app groups). - Search for hardcoded secrets in Mach-O binaries and bundled resources (
strings -a,rabin2 -zzz).
Dynamic analysis
- Frida:
frida -U -f com.target.app -l script.js(frida-tools spawns and auto-resumes; do not pass--no-pause). - Objection:
objection -g com.target.app explore—ios sslpinning disable,ios jailbreak disable,ios cookies get,ios ui dump. - r2frida (in-process r2 session):
r2 frida://spawn/usb//com.target.appfor interactive dump/hook without a separate Frida script. - App Attest / DeviceCheck: modern iOS apps bind API calls to a hardware attestation key; server-side rejection of forged attestations is common — validate via traffic replay, not just Frida hook success.
Keychain and storage
# Objection keychain dump
ios keychain dump
# NSUserDefaults
ios nsuserdefaults get
# SQLite databases
ls /var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/<UUID>/Library/OWASP MASVS mapping
| MASVS Category | Key tests |
|---|---|
| MASVS-STORAGE | SharedPreferences, SQLite, Keychain, logs, screenshots |
| MASVS-CRYPTO | Hardcoded keys, weak algorithms, custom crypto |
| MASVS-AUTH | Local auth, biometrics, session handling |
| MASVS-NETWORK | SSL pinning, certificate validation, proxy detection |
| MASVS-PLATFORM | Exported components, intent handling, WebView |
| MASVS-CODE | Code tampering, debugging, root/jailbreak detection |
Hybrid Android triage cue
Keep this layer at routing depth. When a sample shows both loader and native signs, treat it as a hybrid app and pivot to offensive-coding skills for implementation-level work.
- Managed entry:
classes*.dexJava/Kotlin orchestration - Native boundary:
System.loadLibrary,JNI_OnLoad,.sochecks/unpackers - Runtime payload:
DexClassLoader/InMemoryDexClassLoadersecond-stage code - Instrumentation bridge: Frida hooks Java + native loader points
Deep-dive and patch path:
smali-dex-patching/references/dynamic-dex-and-native-loaders.mdandroid-jni-ndkfrida
Modern platform gotchas
Android:
- Play Integrity API replaced SafetyNet Attestation (fully retired 2025-01-31). Server verdicts (
MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY,MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY,MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY) are backed by hardware key attestation on Android 13+; Magiskzygisk-assistant/PlayIntegrityFixbypass basic, not strong. - Explicit
android:exportedrequired on Android 12+ (targetSdk ≥ 31) for any activity/service/receiver with an<intent-filter>; missing attribute = install failure. Old "exported by intent-filter" implicit exports are gone — re-check attack surface. - Runtime broadcast receivers on Android 14+ (targetSdk ≥ 34) must pass
RECEIVER_EXPORTEDorRECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTEDtoregisterReceiver— grep for these flags to map dynamic IPC exposure. adb backuprestricted since Android 12; requiresandroid:debuggable=true. Most production apps yield an empty archive — pivot to root+tarof/data/data/<pkg>/or Frida file dump.- Xposed original is dead; use LSPosed (Zygisk module) on Android 8.1–15 for system-wide hooking modules.
- Full IPC attack surface — Intent redirection,
PendingIntenthijacking, exported ContentProvider (SQLi, path traversal inopenFile), Service caller-UID/signature bypass,onNewIntentstate pollution, WebViewaddJavascriptInterfacegadgets → references/android-ipc-attack-surface.md.
iOS:
- TrustCache + CoreTrust enforce signed-binary allow-lists in the kernel; unsigned/adhoc binaries need a jailbreak or a TrollStore-style CoreTrust bypass (patched in iOS 17.0). No
bfinject/Needleera techniques apply. - App Attest (
DCAppAttestService) binds requests to a Secure Enclave key; server rejects forged attestations even with a working Frida hook — always validate bypass end-to-end against the backend, not just on-device. - Universal SSL pinning bypass landscape: httptoolkit/frida-interception-and-unpinning covers OkHttp/Conscrypt/BoringSSL/NSURLSession/CFNetwork; fall back to per-library hooks (
SSL_CTX_set_custom_verify,SecTrustEvaluateWithError) when custom pinners are used.
הקבצים בגרסה הזו
references/114.3 KB
- android-ipc-attack-surface.md14.3 KB
- SKILL.md11.7 KB
הרשאות
| הרשאה | הוצהר | נמצא בסריקה |
|---|---|---|
| קורא קבצים | כן | כן |
| כותב קבצים | לא | לא |
| מריץ פקודות shell | כן | כן |
| משתמש ברשת | כן | כן |
| משתמש במחברים | לא | לא |
| שולט בדפדפן | לא | לא |
ממצאי הסריקה
נבדק ב-13 בנוב׳ 2026
- בינוניתPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationreferences/android-ipc-attack-surface.md:30
- בינוניתPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationreferences/android-ipc-attack-surface.md:65
- מידעקישור · קישורים לדומיינים חיצוניים
סריקה נקייה מורידה את הסיכון, אבל לא מוכיחה שהחבילה בטוחה. כדאי לקרוא מה מתקינים.
| גרסה | פורסמה | Commit | SHA-256 | חתימה | שינוי בהרשאות |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.11.13-21cd568 | 13 בנוב׳ 2026 | 21cd568 | d51f64aa | חתומה | – |
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