# Web ו-bug bounty

> בדיקות אפליקציות web ועבודת bug bounty, מה-scope ועד הדוח.

תהליכי אימות, בקרת גישה ו-IDOR, סוגי injection, SSRF, request smuggling, cache poisoning, לוגיקה עסקית ו-race conditions, וגם חבילות ראיות ודוחות disclosure.

adaptixc2-dev: Build, review, debug, package, and activate AdaptixC2 v2 extenders and AxScript UI: agent payload builders, listeners, services, plugin calls, lifecycle, axtool specs, source-contract checks, and verification. Use for authorized extension development, not live C2 operation.

analyzing-infostealer-credential-theft: Analyzes infostealer samples by mapping the browser, credential store, wallet, and

analyzing-web-server-logs-for-intrusion: Parse Apache and Nginx access logs to detect SQL injection attempts,

automation-browser: Drive a real browser against an in-scope web app with Playwright / agent-browser: automated login, form and payload submission through the UI, scraping JS-rendered pages, request/response interception, and evidence screenshots. Load on "browser automation", "fill this form", "submit payload", "scree

automation-nuclei-templates: Write custom nuclei templates to codify a finding into a repeatable, mass-scannable check. Load on "write a nuclei template", turning a manual bug into automation, checking a CVE across many hosts, or regression-scanning. Signals: a reproducible request→match, YAML templates, nuclei.

browser-automation: 统一自动化入口。覆盖浏览器自动化（Playwright）和 Windows 桌面应用自动化（OpenReverse）。 浏览器场景：打开网页、点击、填表、爬取、截图、自动化登录、渗透页面交互。 桌面场景：操作 IDA/x64dbg 等 GUI 工具、Windows UI Automation、视觉驱动交互、桌面应用网络抓包。 触发关键词：浏览器自动化、桌面自动化、打开网页、填表、爬取、截图、自动化登录、Playwright、agent-browser、headless、OpenReverse、UIA、CUA、桌面操作、Windows 自动化。

burpsuite: Auth/lab ref: Burp Suite: integrated web application security testing platform with proxy, scanner, intruder, and repeater.

burpsuite-project-parser: Searches and explores Burp Suite project files (.burp) from the command line. Use when searching response headers or bodies with regex patterns, extracting security audit findings, dumping proxy history or site map data, or analyzing HTTP traffic captured in a Burp project.

code-audit: Use for authorized source-code security review and SAST workflows including Semgrep, CodeQL patterns, dangerous API hunting, and fix verification.

code-improver: Runs an autonomous review-and-fix improvement loop over any code target — a skill, plugin, module, or directory — using a reviewer the user names: any installed skill or agent. Keeps a cross-round findings ledger, escalates when fixes stop converging, and guards scope mechanically. Use when asked to

codeql: Scans a codebase for security vulnerabilities using CodeQL's interprocedural data flow and taint tracking analysis. Triggers on "run codeql", "codeql scan", "build codeql database", "SAST scan", "taint analysis", "dataflow analysis", or "find vulnerabilities in this repo". Covers Python, JavaScript/

code-review-cicd: Review CI/CD pipelines for security flaws — poisoned workflows, secret leakage, and injection. Load on GitHub Actions / GitLab CI / Jenkins config, ".github/workflows", pull_request_target, self-hosted runners, or "pipeline security". Signals: workflow YAML, secrets in CI, third-party actions.

code-review-cpp: Security review of C / C++ code — memory-safety and the classic unsafe-API sinks. Load when reviewing C/C++ source/PR, on .c/.cc/.cpp/.h in scope, or "review this C code". Signals: Makefile/CMakeLists, strcpy/sprintf/memcpy, malloc/free, raw pointers, format strings, parsers.

code-review-dangerous-sinks: Grep-ready dangerous function/sink catalog per language for fast code review. Load when reviewing source in PHP, Python, JavaScript/Node, Java, Ruby, Go, .NET/C# and you need the exact functions that cause RCE/SQLi/SSRF/traversal/deserialization. Signals: "dangerous functions", "sinks", grepping a c

code-review-dotnet: Security review of .NET / C# code — dangerous sinks and ASP.NET pitfalls. Load when reviewing a C#/.NET codebase/PR, on .cs source in scope, or "review this .NET app". Signals: .csproj/.sln, ASP.NET (Core/MVC/WebForms), BinaryFormatter, SqlCommand, Razor Html.Raw, XmlDocument.

code-review-go: Security review of Go code — dangerous sinks and web-framework pitfalls. Load when reviewing a Go codebase/PR, on .go source in scope, or "review this Go". Signals: go.mod, net/http, os/exec, text/template, database/sql, gin/echo/fiber.

code-review-java: Security review of Java code — dangerous sinks and Spring pitfalls. Load when reviewing a Java/ Spring codebase/PR, on .java source in scope, or "review this Java". Signals: pom.xml/build.gradle, Spring/Spring Boot, ObjectInputStream, XML parsers, Runtime.exec, JNDI/lookups.

code-review-methodology: Systematic manual source-code security review — how to find bugs by reading code. Load on "review this code/repo", a source-available target, whitebox testing, or auditing a PR/app for vulnerabilities. Signals: a codebase in scope, "SAST", "secure code review", a language repo.

code-review-nodejs: Security review of Node.js / JavaScript code — dangerous sinks and Express/framework pitfalls. Load when reviewing a Node/JS codebase/PR, on package.json + Express/Next/Nest, or "review this Node app". Signals: child_process, eval, Function, prototype pollution, JWT, Mongoose/Sequelize.

code-review-php: Security review of PHP code — dangerous sinks and framework pitfalls (Laravel/Symfony/WordPress). Load when reviewing a PHP codebase/PR, on .php source in scope, or "review this PHP". Signals: composer.json, index.php, Laravel/Symfony/WP, unserialize, include/require with variables, mysqli/PDO.

code-review-python: Security review of Python code — dangerous sinks and framework-specific pitfalls (Django/Flask/ FastAPI). Load when reviewing a Python codebase/PR, on .py source in scope, or "review this Python". Signals: requirements.txt/pyproject, Django/Flask/FastAPI, ORMs, pickle/yaml, subprocess.

code-review-ruby: Security review of Ruby code — dangerous sinks and Rails pitfalls. Load when reviewing a Ruby/Rails codebase/PR, on .rb source in scope, or "review this Rails app". Signals: Gemfile, config/routes.rb, ActiveRecord, ERB, YAML.load, send/constantize.

code-review-rust: Security review of Rust code — where a memory-safe language still has real bugs: `unsafe`, FFI, panics, and the usual injection/logic sinks. Load when reviewing Rust source/PR, on .rs / Cargo.toml in scope, or "review this Rust". Signals: Cargo.toml, unsafe blocks, extern "C", unwrap/expect, actix/a

code-review-secrets-detection: Find leaked secrets in code, git history, and CI. Load on "secrets", "leaked key", a repo/ git history in scope, exposed .git, CI config review, or public-repo OSINT. Signals: API keys, tokens, .env files, private keys, cloud creds, hardcoded passwords.

commix: Auth/lab ref: automated OS command injection detection and exploitation tool. For testing web parameters, cookies, or headers for command injection vulnerabilities and escalating to an interactive OS shell.

competition-browser-persistence: Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for browser cookies, localStorage, sessionStorage, IndexedDB, Cache Storage, service workers, offline caches, and client-side session persistence. Use when the user asks to inspect browser state, replay cached auth or sessi

competition-ssrf-metadata-pivot: Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for SSRF reachability, internal route probing, metadata-service access, credential pivoting, and token-to-accepted-privilege chains. Use when the user asks to trace SSRF sources, internal hosts, metadata endpoints, link-loc

competition-web-runtime: Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for CTF web, API, SSR, frontend, queue-backed app, and routing challenges. Use when the user asks to inspect a site or API, follow real browser requests, debug auth or session flow, trace uploads or workers, find hidden rou

conducting-full-scope-red-team-engagement: Plan and execute a comprehensive, MITRE ATT&CK-aligned red team engagement spanning threat modeling, reconnaissance, initial access, and post-exploitation to evaluate an organization's detection, prevention, and response against APT-style behavior. Use when scoping or running a full-scope, objective

conducting-spearphishing-simulation-campaign: Run a targeted spearphishing simulation for initial access by developing OSINT-derived pretexts, building payloads (HTML smuggling, macro docs, ISO/LNK, OneNote, QR codes), standing up look-alike-domain email infrastructure with SPF/DKIM/DMARC via GoPhish, and tracking results. Use in authorized eng

corsy: Auth/lab ref: Corsy CORS policy scanner; origin reflection, null origin, wildcard, regex/prefix edge cases, API evidence.

ctf-web: CTF web challenge playbook — the recurring shapes jeopardy web challenges take: source disclosure (.git, backups, flask debug), SSTI/SSRF in their CTF forms, PHP quirks (type juggling, wrappers, filters), cookie/JWT games, and chained primitives to read /flag. Load on any CTF challenge whose handout

dalfox: Auth/lab ref: Dalfox XSS scanning, parameter discovery, and DOM analysis.

database-security: Use for authorized database security assessment covering PostgreSQL/MySQL/MSSQL/Mongo/Redis exposure, authz, UDF/command paths, and misconfiguration review.

deobfuscating-malicious-javascript: Deobfuscates malicious JavaScript from droppers, web pages, and HTA/scriptlets:

designing-adversary-engagement-with-mitre-engage: Plan, run, and measure an adversary engagement operation using the MITRE Engage framework so that deployed deception is driven by strategy instead of deployed ad hoc. Covers the Engage Matrix (Prepare, Expose, Affect, Elicit, Understand), the 10-Step Operational Process, mapping engagement Activitie

detecting-broken-object-property-level-authorization: Detect and test for OWASP API3:2023 Broken Object Property Level Authorization

detecting-dependency-confusion: Detect and prevent dependency confusion (public-over-private package name resolution) in npm, PyPI, and Maven by enumerating claimable internal package names with tools like `confused` and OWASP `dep-scan`, then enforcing source restrictions via `.npmrc`, `pip.conf`/`pyproject.toml`, and Maven `sett

executing-red-team-engagement-planning: Build the foundational red team engagement plan - scope definition, Rules

exploiting-http-request-smuggling: Detects and exploits HTTP request smuggling caused by Content-Length/Transfer-Encoding parsing discrepancies between front-end and back-end servers, using Burp Suite Repeater (auto Content-Length disabled), the HTTP Request Smuggler extension, and smuggler.py. Use during authorized tests of multi-ti

exploiting-sql-injection-with-sqlmap: Detecting and exploiting SQL injection vulnerabilities using sqlmap to

extracting-browser-history-artifacts: Extracts and analyzes browser history, cookies, cache, downloads, and

eyewitness: Auth/lab ref: Web screenshotting and reporting tool that captures screenshots of web services and generates an HTML report.

ffuf: Auth/lab ref: High-speed HTTP fuzzing engine for endpoint discovery and input mutation on web/API targets.

gitleaks: Auth/lab ref: Gitleaks secret scanning; repo/directory/stdin checks, regex+entropy rules, pre-commit/CI evidence, remediation workflow.

hakrawler: Auth/lab ref: Fast Go web crawler for discovering URLs, endpoints, and JavaScript files. For crawling web applications to build a URL inventory before fuzzing or during OSINT on web infrastructure.

httpx: Auth/lab ref: Fast HTTP probing tool for bulk URL processing, status codes, title extraction, tech detection, and web fingerprinting.

implementing-browser-isolation-for-zero-trust: Deploys remote browser isolation (RBI) as a core component of a Zero

implementing-hashicorp-vault-dynamic-secrets: Configures HashiCorp Vault dynamic secrets engines for database credentials,

implementing-pam-for-database-access: Deploy privileged access management for database systems including Oracle,

implementing-web-application-logging-with-modsecurity: Configure ModSecurity WAF with the OWASP Core Rule Set (CRS) for web

integrating-dast-with-owasp-zap-in-pipeline: Integrates OWASP ZAP (Zed Attack Proxy) into GitHub Actions and GitLab CI pipelines, covering baseline, full, and API scan configuration against running applications, ZAP finding interpretation, scan policy tuning, and DAST quality gates. Use when testing running web apps or REST/GraphQL APIs for XS

liffy: Auth/lab ref: Liffy LFI/path traversal validation; wrappers, /proc, log artifacts, file-read evidence, WAF-aware replay notes.

nuclei: Auth/lab ref: Template-based vulnerability and exposure scanner from ProjectDiscovery.

offensive-advanced-redteam: Comprehensive red team operations methodology covering full engagement lifecycle from planning through reporting. Addresses engagement scoping and rules of engagement negotiation, multi-tier C2 infrastructure design with redirectors and domain fronting, malleable traffic profiles and beacon tradecra

offensive-business-logic: Business logic vulnerability testing for web/mobile/API engagements. Covers workflow bypass, state machine violations, multi-step process abuse, price/quantity/discount manipulation, currency confusion, coupon stacking, refund/chargeback abuse, race conditions on logic boundaries, parameter tamperin

offensive-file-upload:

offensive-idor:

offensive-open-redirect:

offensive-parameter-pollution:

offensive-race-condition:

offensive-rce:

offensive-request-smuggling:

offensive-sqli: SQL injection testing skill for offensive security assessments and bug bounty hunting. Covers error-based, UNION-based, boolean/time-based blind, out-of-band, second-order, NoSQL, GraphQL, WebSocket, and JSON-operator SQLi. Includes WAF bypass techniques, database-specific exploitation (MySQL, MSSQL

offensive-ssrf:

offensive-ssti: Dense description covering Server-Side Template Injection across Jinja2, Twig, Freemarker, Velocity, Pebble, Smarty, Mako, Handlebars, ERB, Thymeleaf, EJS, Pug. Engine fingerprinting, filter bypass, blind exploitation, WAF evasion, SSTI-to-RCE chains. Tools: tplmap. CWE-1336. MITRE T1190. Use when t

offensive-xss:

offensive-xxe:

operating-havoc-c2: Deploy a Havoc C2 team server with Yaotl malleable profiles, generate evasive Demon agents using indirect syscalls and sleep obfuscation, and run post-exploitation and pivoting operations. Use during authorized, rules-of-engagement-bound red-team engagements for adversary emulation requiring a full

operating-sliver-c2: Stand up a Sliver C2 server and mTLS listeners, generate cross-platform implants and beacons, and run post-exploitation, pivoting, and BOF/.NET tooling via the Armory for adversary emulation. Use during authorized, rules-of-engagement-bound red-team engagements that need a full open-source C2 lifecy

owasp-top10-analysis: Systematically review a web application against the OWASP Top 10 vulnerability classes with concrete test cases per category. Use for web app assessments and security gate reviews.

payloads-file-transfers: Move files on/off a target when there's no shared drive — upload tools (linpeas, nc, exploits), pull loot back, and do it through a pivot or when wget/curl are missing. Load when you need to get a file to or from an authorized host. Signals: "transfer a file", "upload linpeas", "no wget/curl", "get

payloads-reverse-shells: Get a reliable reverse (or bind) shell and upgrade it to a real interactive TTY. Load the moment you have code execution and need a shell back — RCE confirmed, a command-injection sink, an upload that runs, a webshell, a cron/service you control. Signals: "reverse shell", "get a shell", "nc listener

payloads-xss-polyglots: Context-breaking XSS polyglots and per-context payloads that fire across HTML/attribute/JS/ URL sinks in one shot. Load when confirming XSS fast, unsure of the injection context, or a single test payload should cover many contexts. Signals: reflected input, XSS triage, "polyglot".

pentest-engagement-methodology: Execute an authorized penetration test end-to-end, from scoping and rules of engagement through reconnaissance, exploitation, post-exploitation, and reporting. Use when planning or running an offensive security engagement.

pentest-tools: 主动渗透测试工具链。覆盖信息收集、端口扫描、漏洞扫描、Web 渗透、SQL 注入、目录爆破、密码破解等场景。 通过 MCP server（pentestMCP / mcp-security-hub）将 20+ 安全工具暴露给 AI agent。 触发关键词：渗透测试、端口扫描、Nmap、漏洞扫描、Nuclei、SQL 注入、SQLMap、目录爆破、FFUF、密码破解、Hashcat、信息收集、子域名、Web 渗透、ZAP、Burp。

performing-csrf-attack-simulation: Testing web applications for Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerabilities

performing-dark-web-monitoring-for-threats: Dark web monitoring involves systematically scanning Tor hidden services,

performing-directory-traversal-testing: Test web applications for path traversal and Local/Remote File Inclusion

performing-http-parameter-pollution-attack: Executes HTTP Parameter Pollution attacks that inject duplicate request

performing-second-order-sql-injection: Detect and exploit second-order SQL injection vulnerabilities where malicious

performing-soap-web-service-security-testing: Performs security testing of SOAP web services by analyzing WSDL definitions

performing-ssrf-vulnerability-exploitation: Tests web application URL parameters for Server-Side Request Forgery by probing cloud metadata endpoints (AWS/GCP/Azure at 169.254.169.254), internal network services, and protocol handlers (file://, gopher://, dict://) using a Python script, including IP-encoding bypass and DNS rebinding checks. Us

performing-threat-modeling-with-owasp-threat-dragon: Uses OWASP Threat Dragon (web or desktop) to build data flow diagrams, identify threats with STRIDE, LINDDUN, CIA, DIE, or PLOT4ai methodologies via its auto-generation rule engine, and produce PDF threat model reports. Use during secure design review of an application architecture to build a formal

performing-web-application-penetration-test: Performs systematic security testing of web applications following the

performing-web-application-scanning-with-nikto: Runs Nikto, an open-source web server and web application scanner,

performing-web-cache-deception-attack: Executes web cache deception attacks by exploiting path normalization

performing-web-cache-poisoning-attack: Exploiting web cache mechanisms to serve malicious content to other users

revshells: Auth/lab ref: callback-shell lab one-liner generator (web UI and CLI) supporting 50+ shells.

sarif-parsing: Parses and processes SARIF files from static analysis tools like CodeQL, Semgrep, or other scanners. Triggers on "parse sarif", "read scan results", "aggregate findings", "deduplicate alerts", or "process sarif output". Handles filtering, deduplication, format conversion, and CI/CD integration of SA

second-opinion: Gets independent code reviews from Codex or Antigravity for uncommitted changes, branch diffs, and commits. Use when the user requests an external review, a second opinion on code, a codex review, a gemini review, an antigravity review, or /second-opinion.

secure-code-review: Perform a security-focused code review — map trust boundaries, audit input paths and auth flows, and use vulnerability-class-driven checklists instead of line-by-line skimming. Use on any PR or codebase with security implications.

semgrep: Runs a Semgrep security scan over a codebase: detects languages, selects rulesets, presents the plan for explicit approval, then runs every approved ruleset through scripts/run-scans.sh, which batches the semgrep processes and writes scans.json, and merges the output to SARIF. Supports two scan mode

semgrep-rule-creator: Creates custom Semgrep rules for detecting security vulnerabilities, bug patterns, and code patterns. Use when writing Semgrep rules or building custom static analysis detections.

semgrep-rule-variant-creator: Creates language variants of existing Semgrep rules. Use when porting a Semgrep rule to specified target languages. Takes an existing rule and target languages as input, produces independent rule+test directories for each language.

skill-improver: Runs an autonomous review-and-fix improvement loop over a Claude Code skill until a review comes back clean, with a cross-round findings ledger, escalation when fixes stop converging, and a mechanical scope guard. Reviews are performed by the plugin-dev skill-reviewer agent. Use to fix skill quality

smuggler: Auth/lab ref: HTTP/1.1 request smuggling and desync detection tool testing CL.TE, TE.CL, and TE.TE variants.

source-review-technique: Hybrid AI/Deterministic SAST methodology for discovering zero-day vulnerabilities in source code. Orchestrates structural search with AI-driven data flow and sink validation.

sqlmap: Auth/lab ref: automated SQL injection detection and exploitation tool. For testing web applications for SQLi vulnerabilities to enumerate databases, extract data, read/write files, or escalate to OS shell.

src-hunter: 实战 SRC / 众测 / Bug bounty 漏洞挖掘工作流 skill。包含：5 阶段方法论（intake → recon → enum → hunt → report）、19 个攻击类 playbook（SQLi/XSS/RCE/SSRF/IDOR/CSRF/Path Traversal/File Upload/SSTI/XXE/Race/HTTP Smuggling/OAuth/JWT/SAML/GraphQL/Mobile/LLM/DoS）、305 个结构化 payload、263 个 WAF/EDR 绕过变体、2887 份 HackerOne 真实 High/Critical 已

ssrf-hunting: Find and exploit Server-Side Request Forgery across URL-fetching features, including cloud metadata bypasses and blind SSRF techniques. Use during web assessments and bug bounty hunting.

ssrfmap: Auth/lab ref: automated SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) exploitation tool using Burp-style request files.

taint-trace: Improves taint-analysis coverage and precision by using Trailmark graphs to repair native source, sink, sanitizer, propagation, and type models, then runs an existing taint analyzer. Use when analysis misses flows, cannot resolve framework bindings, or produces false positives from imprecise models.

testing-cors-misconfiguration: Identifying and exploiting Cross-Origin Resource Sharing misconfigurations

testing-for-email-header-injection: Tests web application email functionality (contact forms, password reset,

testing-for-host-header-injection: Test web applications for HTTP Host header injection vulnerabilities

testing-for-xml-injection-vulnerabilities: Test web applications for XML injection vulnerabilities including XXE,

testing-for-xss-vulnerabilities: Tests web applications for reflected, stored, and DOM-based Cross-Site

ton-vulnerability-scanner: Scans TON (The Open Network) smart contracts for 3 critical vulnerabilities including integer-as-boolean misuse, fake Jetton contracts, and forward TON without gas checks. Use when auditing FunC contracts.

tools-arsenal: Cross-domain pentest tool selection — which tool for which job, and which Security Skills skill to load for it. Load at engagement start or whenever a new surface appears and you need the right scanner/framework/wordlist. Signals: "which tool for", tool selection, arsenal, SecLists, PayloadsAllTheTh

tools-burp-suite: Drive Burp Suite for web/API testing — proxy history triage, Repeater, Intruder enumeration, Collaborator OOB, active scanning — manually or agent-driven through a Burp MCP extension on 127.0.0.1:9876. Load for any HTTP-target deep testing: "burp", proxy history analysis, repeater replay, intruder b

tools-curl: Use curl as the ground-truth HTTP client during recon and verification — browser-impersonation headers for CDN/WAF 403s, --globoff for bracket params, Windows curl.exe quirks, SPA false-200 traps. Load when bare tooling gets 403/blocked at a CDN edge, an API needs precise hand-crafted requests, or s

tools-ffuf: Fuzz web targets with ffuf for content, parameter, and vhost discovery — FUZZ keyword placement in paths, query strings, POST bodies and Host headers, matcher/filter calibration (-mc/-fs/-ac), recursion, and when to switch to feroxbuster/gobuster/dirsearch. Load when a web target needs hidden paths,

tools-nuclei: Operate nuclei for template-based vulnerability scanning at scale — severity/tag selection, bulk targets, rate limiting, proxying, JSON output, and safe custom templates. Load when you have live hosts from recon and need known-CVE/misconfig/exposure sweeps, or when scanner hits need validation. Sign

tools-sqlmap: Operate sqlmap to confirm and exploit SQL injection — target selection from Burp requests, level/risk tuning, tamper scripts for WAF evasion, DB enumeration, and safe dump discipline. Load after a manual SQLi probe shows promise, or when automating confirmation across parameters. Signals: sqlmap, --

tradecraft-attack-scenarios: Turn a goal + a scope into a concrete, ordered attack scenario across multiple skills — not one technique in isolation. Load at the START of an engagement, on "where do I even begin", when a target has many surfaces, or to plan an objective-driven path (e.g. "reach domain admin", "prove data exfil")

tradecraft-bugbounty-platforms: Understand how the major bug-bounty platforms differ — scope rules, disclosure, triage, and reputation — so you play each correctly. Load when working a program on HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack, or Immunefi, on "platform rules", "safe harbor", "VDP vs paid", or before submitting. Signals

tradecraft-complex-engagements: Structure and discipline for complex, multi-stage targets — where the path is a chain of several bugs across multiple hosts, needs source review / custom exploit work, and spans sessions. Load when a foothold needs chaining, work spans multiple hosts, you're deep in dead-ends, or "stuck", "chain", "

tradecraft-duplicate-avoidance: Avoid burning time on bugs that will be closed as duplicates. Load during bug-bounty work when deciding what to report or where to dig, on "will this be a dup", "is this already known", maximizing unique findings. Signals: a mature/popular program, a common vuln on an obvious asset, a recently expan

tradecraft-scope-roe: Establish and enforce the authorization envelope before any testing — the scope rule that governs everything. Load FIRST on every engagement, on "start", a new target, a program handle, or any ambiguity about what is allowed. Signals: a domain/IP to test, a bug-bounty program handle, a pentest state

tradecraft-target-selection: Choose where to spend effort for the best return — which program, which asset, which surface. Load at the start of bug-bounty work or when a scope is broad and time is limited, on "which program", "where should I hunt", "prioritize these targets". Signals: a big scope list, many in-scope domains, a

trailmark-review-gate: Runs a Trailmark structural review gate over a branch, pull request, fix commit, release diff, or git ref range to detect new entrypoints, new tainted paths, removed validation or authorization calls, privilege-boundary drift, blast-radius growth, complexity growth, and newly reachable sensitive sin

trailmark-structural: Runs full Trailmark structural analysis by building a graph, running `preanalysis()`, and reporting hotspots, taint, blast radius, privilege boundaries, attack surface, and version-gated Trailmark 0.4+/0.5+ data such as proxy counts, subgraph edges, type/reference summaries, and entrypoint attribute

trailmark-variant-neighborhood: Expands one confirmed or suspected vulnerability into a Trailmark graph neighborhood of variant candidates by finding sibling functions, shared callers and callees, common sensitive sinks, common entrypoint paths, interface implementations, override relationships, type/reference neighbors, and struc

variant-analysis: Hunts for the other instances of a bug already found — the variants of one root cause across a codebase. Use immediately after a vulnerability, logic bug, or bad pattern turns up in a specific file and the question becomes where else it occurs, including the bare conversational form ("are there othe

wafw00f: Auth/lab ref: WAF detection tool. Fingerprints Web Application Firewalls by analyzing HTTP responses to crafted requests.

waymore: Collect historical URLs and archived response bodies for authorized web surface discovery with waymore.

web-account-takeover: Systematic account-takeover hunting — password reset, email change, session, and linking flaws that seize another user's account. Load on "ATO", password-reset/forgot flows, email-change, OTP/2FA, "login as", session handling. Signals: reset tokens, email-change without re-auth, OTP, magic links.

web-arsenal: One line: web enumeration + exploitation tool arsenal for authorized engagements. Trigger signals: port 80/443/8080/8443 open, "web", a URL to a lab target, an HTTP service surfaced by recon. Authorized, in-scope targets only.

web-auth-jwt: Attack JWT/session authentication. Load when auth uses a JWT (three base64url parts, header.payload.signature), Authorization: Bearer, or you see alg/kid/jku fields. Signals: eyJ... tokens, "alg":"none"/"HS256"/"RS256", kid header, JWKS endpoints, role/admin claims.

web-auth-session-handling: Legitimately acquire and KEEP an authenticated session (through MFA/OTP) so you can test the post-auth attack surface, and hand that session to your tools without leaking secrets. Load when the high-value classes (IDOR/BOLA, mass assignment, injection on real data APIs) are blocked behind login/SMS-

web-business-logic: Find business-logic flaws — abusing intended functionality in unintended ways. Load on workflows with money/quantity/state/limits: checkout, coupons, refunds, transfers, quotas, multi-step flows, role/tenant boundaries. Signals: price/qty params, discount codes, step skipping, negative/overflow valu

web-cache-deception: Trick a CDN/cache into storing a victim's authenticated response at a public URL, then read it. Load on "web cache deception", when a CDN/cache sits in front of an app that serves per-user content, or to test whether private pages can be cached. Signals: `X-Cache`/`CF-Cache-Status` headers, caching

web-cache-poisoning: Web cache poisoning & deception — get a shared cache to serve attacker content to other users, or trick it into caching victims' private pages. Load behind a CDN/cache (Cloudflare, Varnish, Fastly, Akamai), on unkeyed headers, `X-Forwarded-Host`, cache headers, or static-looking URLs. Signals: `Age`

web-clickjacking: Clickjacking / UI redress — frame a target so a victim's clicks hit hidden actions. Load when a page allows framing (no X-Frame-Options / frame-ancestors), on state-changing one-click actions, or "clickjacking". Signals: missing framebusting headers, sensitive buttons, OAuth consent, account setting

web-client-side-signing-bypass: Reverse client-side request signing / obfuscated JS so you can replay and fuzz a protected API outside the browser. Load when requests carry a computed guard you must reproduce: an X-Signature / X-Sign / sign / hmac / _s / token header or body field, a nonce+timestamp, a "signature invalid" 401, enc

web-command-injection: Turn user input that reaches a shell into arbitrary OS command execution. Load when a parameter feeds a system call — ping/nslookup/host tools, file conversion (ImageMagick, ffmpeg), archive/ export, PDF/thumbnail generation, filename handling, or any "network tools" feature. Signals: output that lo

web-cors: Exploit CORS misconfiguration to read cross-origin responses (data theft). Load when an API reflects Origin into Access-Control-Allow-Origin, allows credentials cross-origin, or trusts null/subdomains. Signals: ACAO reflects your Origin, ACAC: true, `Origin`-dependent responses.

web-csp-bypass: Get script to run despite a Content-Security-Policy — the step after finding an injection that CSP is blocking. Load when you have HTML/JS injection but the payload won't execute, on "CSP is blocking my XSS", or when auditing a CSP for weakness. Signals: a Content-Security-Policy header, a blocked-s

web-csrf: Cross-Site Request Forgery — force a victim's browser to perform state-changing actions. Load on state-changing requests (POST/PUT/DELETE) that rely only on cookies, missing/weak CSRF tokens, `SameSite=None`, or forms/JSON without anti-CSRF. Signals: cookie-only auth, no token, token not validated.

web-ctf: Lab/CTF: web challenges; HTTP apps, APIs, browser clients, auth, uploads, SSRF, XSS, SQLi, SSTI, XXE, deserialization, smuggling.

web-cypher-injection: Inject into Neo4j Cypher queries to bypass auth, exfiltrate graph data, and reach SSRF/RCE. Load when user input reaches a Cypher query (Neo4j-backed app, GraphQL/REST over a graph DB) — a login, search, or filter that builds `MATCH (n {prop:'<input>'})`. Signals: Neo4j/Bolt (7687), `MATCH`/ `RETURN

web-dependency-confusion: Dependency confusion / substitution — publish a malicious public package matching an internal name so build systems pull yours. Load on leaked internal package names (npm/PyPI/RubyGems/Maven), package.json/requirements with unknown deps, or private-registry setups. Signals: @scope/internal packages,

web-deserialization: Insecure deserialization → RCE via gadget chains. Load when the app deserializes attacker data: Java (rO0/AC ED base64), PHP `unserialize` (O:), Python pickle, .NET BinaryFormatter/ViewState, Ruby Marshal/YAML. Signals: serialized blobs in cookies/params, `__VIEWSTATE`, `rO0AB`, `O:8:`.

web-dom-clobbering: Overwrite a page's JavaScript variables using only injected HTML — no script needed. Load when a sanitizer allows tags/attributes but strips script, and the app reads config/state from the DOM or globals. Signals: HTML injection behind DOMPurify/an allowlist, client code using `window.X`, `document.

web-exploit-technique: Auth assessment: web impact-validation; SQLi, SSTI, XXE, command injection, SSRF, XSS, uploads, deserialization, smuggling, WAF/parser checks.

web-extension-reverse: Reverse engineer browser extensions (Chrome/Edge MV2/MV3, Firefox) for an authorized review: unpack .crx/.xpi, assess the permission surface, trace background/service-worker and content-script logic, and recover credential, signing, or traffic-handling behavior. Load on "analyze this extension", ext

web-file-upload: Turn a file upload into RCE or stored XSS/SSRF. Load on any upload: avatars, attachments, import CSV/XML, profile images, document processors, "upload your resume". Signals: multipart/form-data, filename in response, an uploads/ path, image thumbnailing, PDF/office parsing.

web-host-header: Host header injection — abuse a trusted Host/X-Forwarded-Host to poison password-reset links, routing, and caches. Load when the app builds absolute URLs from the request host, on password-reset flows, or behind a proxy/CDN. Signals: reset emails with links, X-Forwarded-Host reflected, virtual hosti

web-http-parameter-pollution: Send the same parameter more than once so the WAF/validator and the backend disagree on which value wins — bypassing filters, access control, or business logic. Load on "HPP", when a value is validated at one layer but used at another, or when a WAF blocks a payload you need to slip past. Signals: p

web-idor: Insecure Direct Object Reference / broken access control on web objects. Load when a request references an object by id you can change: /account/1234, ?invoice=987, UUIDs in URLs/bodies, "download", "view", "edit" endpoints, numeric or guessable identifiers, or multi-tenant apps. Signals: sequential

web-jdbc-attacks: Turn an attacker-controllable database connection string / JDBC URL into RCE via the driver itself. Load when an app lets you set a DB host/URL/driver: a "test connection" form, a data-source config, an ETL/reporting/integration tool, or a processor that takes a JDBC URL. Signals: a jdbc: URL field,

web-lfi-path-traversal: Local File Inclusion / path traversal → read files, sometimes RCE. Load when a param names a file/path/template/page: ?file=, ?page=, ?template=, ?download=, ?lang=, or path segments. Signals: filenames in params, "include", download endpoints, `../` filtered, `.php?page=`.

web-mfa-bypass: Defeat a second authentication factor — OTP/TOTP, SMS, push, or backup codes. Load when login has a 2FA/MFA step and you want to reach the account without the factor, on "2FA bypass", "OTP brute", "MFA", or during account-takeover work. Signals: an OTP/verification screen after password, a "verify y

web-open-graph-ssrf: SSRF through link-preview / URL-unfurl / oEmbed features. Load when the app generates a preview card for a user-supplied URL: chat/forum/comment link unfurling, "add a link" in posts or profiles, oEmbed endpoints, rich-text editors that auto-embed, bookmark/save-for-later tools, or any UI that shows

web-open-redirect: Open redirect — abuse a redirect param to send users to attacker sites, and chain it (OAuth token theft, SSRF filter bypass, phishing). Load on params like redirect=, next=, url=, return=, callback=, dest=, or a 30x Location built from input. Signals: `?returnUrl=`, login redirects, OAuth `redirect_

web-postmessage: Exploit insecure cross-window messaging (`window.postMessage`) — handlers that trust `event.data` without checking `event.origin`, leading to XSS, token theft, or state change. Load when the app uses iframes/popups/SSO widgets, on "postMessage", or when JS registers a `message` listener. Signals: `a

web-prototype-pollution: JavaScript prototype pollution (client & server) → XSS, auth bypass, RCE via gadgets. Load on Node.js/JS apps that merge user objects: query/JSON parsing, `Object.assign`/deep-merge, lodash/jQuery.extend, config merges. Signals: __proto__, constructor.prototype in params, Node backend, client-side s

web-python-sandbox-escape: Escape a Python sandbox / eval jail to reach code execution — defeat keyword blocklists and restricted eval/exec by reaching objects through the class hierarchy. Load when user input hits eval/exec/a "safe" expression evaluator, a Python REPL/calculator feature, a template that runs Python, or a fil

web-race-conditions: Exploit race conditions / TOCTOU — fire concurrent requests to break single-use limits. Load on "limit-once" actions: coupon/gift-card redemption, withdrawals, votes, invites, MFA/OTP attempts, balance changes. Signals: check-then-act on shared state, per-user quotas, "already used".

web-rate-limit-bypass: Bypass rate limits and anti-automation to enable brute force, OTP guessing, coupon abuse, and enumeration. Load when an endpoint is throttled (429/"too many attempts"), on login/OTP/reset, or "rate limit". Signals: 429 responses, lockout messages, per-account throttling, OTP/2FA.

web-request-smuggling: HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE/TE.CL/TE.TE/CL.0) — desync front-end and back-end to poison other users' requests. Load behind a proxy/CDN/load-balancer, on "smuggling/desync", or when Content-Length vs Transfer-Encoding handling differs. Signals: front-end + back-end chain, timing anomalies, HTTP/1.1

web-sqli: Detect and exploit SQL injection (error-based, UNION, boolean/time blind, stacked). Load when a param feeds a query, you see DB errors, numeric/string params change result sets, login forms, search, sort/order-by, or ORM raw queries. Signals: "id=", 500 on a quote, "You have an error in your SQL syn

web-ssrf: Discover and escalate Server-Side Request Forgery. Load when the app fetches a URL you influence: webhooks, "import from URL", link/image preview, PDF/HTML render, avatar-by-URL, URL health-checks, XML/SVG parsers. Signals: params like url=, uri=, dest=, callback=, image=, feed=, or a request that r

web-ssrf-gopher-redis-rce: Turn a server-side request (SSRF) into RCE by speaking the Redis protocol over gopher:// to an internal, unauthenticated Redis — write a cron job, an SSH key, or a webshell. Load when: SSRF is confirmed (URL fetch, webhook, PDF/URL preview, image proxy) AND an internal Redis/6379 (or similar line-pr

web-ssti: Server-Side Template Injection → RCE. Load when user input is rendered by a template engine: profile names in emails, custom reports, "hello {}", error pages echoing math, Jinja2/Twig/Freemarker/Velocity/ERB/Handlebars. Signals: {{7*7}} returns 49, ${...} or #{...} evaluated, framework stack t

web-subdomain-takeover: Claim a dangling DNS record pointing to a deprovisioned service (subdomain takeover). Load after subdomain enum, on CNAMEs to cloud services, "NoSuchBucket"/"404 there isn't a GitHub Pages site here", or dangling A/CNAME. Signals: CNAME → S3/GitHub/Heroku/Azure/Fastly with a fingerprint error page.

web-testing-checklist: A fast, ordered checklist for testing a web application end to end — so nothing gets skipped. Load when starting on a web target, "checklist", "what should I test", methodology triage, or to confirm coverage before reporting. Signals: a new web app in scope, "am I missing anything".

web-webauthn-software-authenticator: Register and authenticate against a WebAuthn/FIDO2 relying party using a self-built SOFTWARE authenticator (no hardware key) when the RP requests attestation "none" (or otherwise doesn't verify attestation trust). Load when: a login is "WebAuthn/passkey/ FIDO2", endpoints like /webauthn/register|aut

web-websocket: Attack WebSocket endpoints — CSWSH (cross-site hijacking), message tampering, and auth gaps. Load on ws:// or wss:// connections, Socket.IO, real-time chat/notifications/trading, or "websocket". Signals: Upgrade: websocket, ws handshake, JSON messages over a socket, token in the handshake.

web-xss: Find and prove Cross-Site Scripting (reflected, stored, DOM). Load when input is echoed into HTML/JS/attributes, a search/comment/profile field renders your text, a URL param appears in the response, or a sink like innerHTML/document.write is in client JS. Signals: "search=", reflected values, error

web-xxe: XML External Entity injection → file read, SSRF, sometimes RCE. Load when the app parses XML you supply: SOAP, SAML, XML APIs, SVG/DOCX/XLSX upload, RSS import, `Content-Type: application/xml`. Signals: XML request bodies, "<?xml", SAML responses, file parsers.

xsstrike: Auth/lab ref: XSStrike XSS validation; context analysis, DOM checks, crawler, blind callback workflow, WAF-aware evidence.

zap: Auth/lab ref: OWASP ZAP: free open-source web application scanner and intercepting proxy.

Canonical: https://notholy.com/he/skills/category/web-bug-bounty
