# Active Directory ו-Windows

> נתיבי תקיפה ב-AD, Kerberos ו-NTLM, Entra ID, GPOs והמנגנונים הפנימיים של Windows.

סקירת גרפים של BloodHound, הגדרות Kerberos ו-LDAP, מיפוי הרשאות, חקירת אירועי Windows, הרשאות שירותים, דרייברים, PowerShell וממצאי persistence.

abusing-dpapi-for-credential-access: Extract and decrypt Windows DPAPI-protected secrets (Credential Manager, browser logins/cookies, Wi-Fi credentials, KeePass keys) online or offline using SharpDPAPI, SharpChrome, Mimikatz, or Impacket's dpapi.py, including domain-wide decryption via the DPAPI backup key. Use during authorized red-te

active-directory-attack-paths: Enumerate and exploit common Active Directory misconfigurations such as Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, delegation abuse, and ACL attacks. Use during authorized internal network assessments.

active-directory-technique: Auth assessment: AD decision support; LDAP/SMB/Kerberos, BloodHound graph, ADCS, NTLM relay risk, ACL/trust paths, evidence-first routing.

ad-adcs: Attack Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) — ESC1–ESC8 template/CA misconfigurations to escalate to Domain Admin. Load with a domain foothold/creds where ADCS is present, on "certipy", "ESC1", "certificate template", or a CA server. Signals: Cert Publishers, pKIEnrollmentService, ports 443/

ad-dacl-abuse: Abuse Active Directory object ACLs/DACLs for lateral movement and escalation — GenericAll, WriteDACL, GenericWrite, WriteOwner, AddMember, ForceChangePassword, and DCSync rights. Load with domain creds + BloodHound showing an ACL edge, on "GenericAll", "WriteDACL", "DCSync", "abuse this edge".

ad-delegation-abuse: Abuse Kerberos delegation to impersonate users and take over hosts — unconstrained, constrained (S4U2Self/S4U2Proxy), and resource-based (RBCD), including the coercion → NTLM-relay-to-LDAP → RBCD chain. Load in an AD environment when BloodHound/enum shows delegation rights, a machine account you con

ad-kerberoasting: Kerberoasting & AS-REP roasting — request/crack Kerberos tickets to recover service/user passwords offline. Load with any domain foothold or valid domain creds, on "kerberoast", "AS-REP", SPNs, service accounts, ports 88/389. Signals: domain creds in hand, SPNs set, accounts with pre-auth disabled.

ad-pivot-arsenal: One line: Active Directory, pivoting/tunneling, and password-cracking arsenal for authorized engagements. Trigger signals: "Active Directory", "domain", "kerberos", "kerberoast", "AS-REP", "BloodHound", "DCSync", "AD/.local domain", holding domain creds or a foothold. Authorized, in-scope targets on

analyzing-active-directory-acl-abuse: Detect dangerous ACL misconfigurations in Active Directory using ldap3

analyzing-lnk-file-and-jump-list-artifacts: Analyze Windows LNK shortcut files and Jump List artifacts with LECmd,

analyzing-malicious-lnk-files: Analyzes weaponized Windows shortcut (.lnk) files: parsing the shell link structure

analyzing-powershell-empire-artifacts: Detect PowerShell Empire post-exploitation framework artifacts in Windows Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104) and Module Logging (Event ID 4103), including the default launcher string, Base64-encoded WebClient/FromBase64String payloads, known module invocations (Invoke-Mimikatz, Invoke-Kerberoast),

analyzing-powershell-script-block-logging: Parse Windows PowerShell Script Block Logs (Event ID 4104) from EVTX

analyzing-prefetch-files-for-execution-history: Parse Windows Prefetch files (versions 17, 23, 26, 30) with tools like PECmd, WinPrefetchView, or python-prefetch to determine program execution history, including run counts, execution timestamps, and referenced files/DLLs. Use when building a timeline of program execution on a Windows system, conf

analyzing-usb-device-connection-history: Correlate Windows registry keys (USBSTOR, MountedDevices), Event Logs,

analyzing-windows-amcache-artifacts: Parses the Windows Amcache.hve registry hive with Eric Zimmerman''s

analyzing-windows-driver-malware: Analyzes malicious and vulnerable Windows kernel drivers (.sys) by parsing the PE for

analyzing-windows-lnk-files-for-artifacts: Parse Windows LNK shortcut files to extract target paths, MAC timestamps,

analyzing-windows-prefetch-with-python: Parse Windows Prefetch (.pf) files with the windowsprefetch Python

analyzing-windows-registry-for-artifacts: Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives with tools like RegRipper

analyzing-windows-shellbag-artifacts: Analyze Windows Shellbag (BagMRU) registry artifacts with SBECmd and

attacking-entra-id-with-roadtools: Enumerate Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) tenants with ROADrecon and

auditing-entra-id-with-aadinternals: Drive the AADInternals PowerShell toolkit to perform Microsoft Entra ID tenant reconnaissance, access-token acquisition across Microsoft APIs, and federation/AD FS backdoor testing (Golden SAML, T1606.002) for defensive validation. Use during an authorized Entra ID/Microsoft 365 red-team assessment

bloodhound: Auth/lab ref: Install BloodHound CE, import collector data, and analyze identity relationships and paths.

bloodyad: Auth/lab ref: Swiss army knife for Active Directory privilege escalation and object manipulation via LDAP/SAMR. Supports PTH, PTT, Cert auth.

building-red-team-c2-infrastructure-with-havoc: Deploy and configure the Havoc C2 framework (teamserver, HTTPS/HTTP/SMB

certipy: Auth/lab ref: Python-based AD Certificate Services testing tool.

coercer: Auth/lab ref: Coercer forces Windows servers to authenticate to a controlled host by abusing MS-RPRN, MS-EFSR, MS-DFSNM, and other RPC protocols, enabling NTLM relay or hash capture.

coercing-authentication-with-coercer-petitpotam: Trigger machine account authentication with PetitPotam (MS-EFSR) and Coercer (MS-RPRN, MS-DFSNM, MS-FSRVP, MS-EVEN) via Coercer's scan/coerce/fuzz modes, feeding the coerced NTLM auth into a relay against AD CS Web Enrollment (ESC8), LDAP (RBCD), or SMB. Use in authorized engagements to complete a c

competition-identity-windows: Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for Active Directory, Kerberos, LDAP, OAuth, enterprise messaging, Windows host forensics, credential material, and lateral-movement challenges. Use when the user asks to trace tickets or tokens, inspect mailbox rules, anal

competition-kerberos-delegation: Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for Kerberos delegation, SPN trust edges, S4U abuse, RBCD, constrained or unconstrained delegation, and service-ticket acceptance. Use when the user asks about constrained delegation, unconstrained delegation, RBCD, S4U, SP

competition-windows-pivot: Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for Kerberos, WinRM, SMB, RDP, Windows credential material, replayable tickets, delegation edges, and host-to-host pivot chains. Use when the user asks to replay Kerberos material, trace a WinRM, SMB, or RDP pivot, understa

conducting-domain-persistence-with-dcsync: Perform DCSync attacks by abusing MS-DRSR replication rights (DS-Replication-Get-Changes/-All) to impersonate a Domain Controller and extract KRBTGT, Domain Admin, and service account hashes for Golden Ticket forging, typically with Mimikatz. Use in authorized engagements after finding principals wi

conducting-internal-reconnaissance-with-bloodhound-ce: Conduct internal Active Directory reconnaissance using BloodHound Community Edition's graph database with the SharpHound (AD) and AzureHound (Entra ID) collectors, mapping ACLs, sessions, and group memberships into attack paths from a low-privileged foothold to Domain Admin. Use after an initial AD

configuring-active-directory-tiered-model: Implement Microsoft's Enhanced Security Admin Environment (ESAE) tiered

configuring-ldap-security-hardening: Hardens LDAP directory services against credential harvesting, LDAP

configuring-windows-defender-advanced-settings: Configures Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) advanced protection

configuring-windows-event-logging-for-detection: Configures Windows Event Logging with advanced audit policies to generate

defense-ad-defense: Detect and harden against Active Directory attacks — Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, DCSync, ADCS abuse, and delegation/relay. Load for "detect kerberoasting", "harden AD", "AD monitoring", "did someone DCSync us", or defending a domain. The defensive counterpart to the ad-* offensive skills.

deploying-active-directory-honeytokens: Deploys deception-based honeytokens in Active Directory including fake

detecting-credential-dumping-techniques: Detect LSASS credential dumping, SAM database extraction, and NTDS.dit theft (e.g. via Mimikatz) using Sysmon Event ID 10 process-access logging, Windows Security logs, and SIEM correlation rules. Use when hunting for credential-theft activity on Windows/Active Directory hosts or triaging EDR alerts

detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory: Detect DCSync attacks (MITRE T1003.006) where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes, by auditing Event ID 4662 for the DS-Replication-Get-Changes GUIDs and flagging non-domain-controller accounts issuing DsGetNCChanges RPC calls. Use when hunting for cr

detecting-golden-ticket-forgery: Detect Kerberos Golden Ticket forgery (e.g. Mimikatz-forged tickets) by analyzing

detecting-kerberoasting-attacks: Detect Kerberoasting attacks by monitoring for anomalous Kerberos TGS

detecting-mimikatz-execution-patterns: Detect Mimikatz credential-dumping activity via command-line pattern matching, LSASS access signatures, binary/hash indicators, and in-memory detection of known Mimikatz modules. Use when threat hunting for T1003 credential access, triaging EDR/SIEM alerts on LSASS access, scoping compromise during

detecting-ntlm-relay-with-event-correlation: Detect NTLM relay attacks (T1557.001) by correlating Windows Event 4624 LogonType 3 for IP-to-hostname mismatches, identifying Responder/LLMNR poisoning artifacts, auditing SMB/LDAP signing, and flagging NTLMv2-to-NTLMv1 downgrades. Use for hunting credential relay in NTLM-enabled AD, investigating

detecting-pass-the-hash-attacks: Detect Pass-the-Hash (T1550.002) attacks by analyzing NTLM authentication patterns, flagging Type 3 logons using NTLM where Kerberos would be expected, and correlating with credential-dumping indicators. Use when threat hunting for lateral movement via stolen NTLM hashes, triaging EDR/SIEM alerts on

detecting-pass-the-ticket-attacks: Detect Kerberos Pass-the-Ticket (PtT) attacks by analyzing Windows Event IDs 4768, 4769, and 4771 for anomalous ticket usage patterns, with detection queries for Splunk and Elastic SIEM. Use when investigating incidents involving stolen or replayed Kerberos tickets, building detection rules or threa

detecting-rdp-brute-force-attacks: Detect RDP brute force attacks by parsing Windows Security Event Logs

detecting-t1548-abuse-elevation-control-mechanism: Detect abuse of elevation control mechanisms (T1548), including Windows UAC

donpapi: Review DonPAPI version compatibility and collected DPAPI/application artifacts; interpret coverage, errors, and exported evidence.

enum4linux-ng: Use enum4linux-ng for scoped SMB and Samba enumeration of shares, users, groups, password policy, and host details.

evil-winrm: Interactive WinRM shell: Handles domain routing, non-interactive execution constraints, Pass-the-Hash, and path resolutions for Agent execution.

executing-active-directory-attack-simulation: Executes authorized attack simulations against Active Directory environments

exploiting-active-directory-with-bloodhound: BloodHound is a graph-based Active Directory reconnaissance tool that

extracting-windows-event-logs-artifacts: Extract, parse, and analyze Windows Event Logs (EVTX) using Chainsaw,

find-OnServerVoiceData_IsPlayingDemo_Callee: Generate the Windows-only OnServerVoiceData_IsPlayingDemo_Callee patch YAML from IVEngineClient2_IsPlayingDemo.windows.yaml using a deterministic preprocessor script. Use when locating the IVEngineClient2::IsPlayingDemo indirect call inside C_ServerVoiceHandler::OnServerVoiceData without LLM decompi

godpotato: Assess GodPotato build compatibility and interpret existing local privilege-escalation test results without assuming universal Windows support.

graph-evolution: Compares Trailmark code graphs at two source code snapshots (git commits, tags, or directories) to surface security-relevant structural changes. Detects new attack paths, complexity shifts, blast radius growth, taint propagation changes, and privilege boundary modifications that text diffs miss. Use

hardening-windows-endpoint-with-cis-benchmark: Hardens Windows endpoints using CIS (Center for Internet Security) Benchmark

hunting-for-ntlm-relay-attacks: Detects NTLM relay attacks (MITRE T1557.001) by analyzing Windows Event

hunting-for-persistence-mechanisms-in-windows: Systematically hunts for adversary persistence mechanisms across Windows

hunting-lateral-movement-over-smb-and-wmi: Hunts for lateral movement via remote service creation, admin share writes, and

hunting-lolbin-abuse-on-windows: Hunts for living-off-the-land binary (LOLBin) abuse in Windows process-creation

hunting-persistence-mechanisms-on-windows: Hunts for Windows persistence across autostart locations: Run keys, services,

impacket: Auth/lab ref: Python toolkit for SMB/Kerberos/NTLM/LDAP protocol testing in Active Directory.

implementing-application-whitelisting-with-applocker: Implements application whitelisting using Windows AppLocker to restrict

implementing-attack-path-analysis-with-xm-cyber: Deploys XM Cyber's continuous exposure management platform to build

implementing-azure-ad-privileged-identity-management: Configure Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management (PIM) to convert

implementing-conditional-access-policies-azure-ad: Configures Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) Conditional Access policies for

implementing-disk-encryption-with-bitlocker: Implements full disk encryption using Microsoft BitLocker on Windows

implementing-passwordless-auth-with-microsoft-entra: Implements passwordless authentication using Microsoft Entra ID with

indirect-syscall-dev: Auth/lab dev: Windows syscall-dispatch research; SSN resolution, indirect gates, ntdll stubs, gadget scanning, stack-spoof integration.

inveigh: Auth/lab ref: Inveigh Windows name-resolution assessment; LLMNR/NBT-NS/mDNS/DNS exposure, NTLM evidence, relay-risk notes.

kerbrute: Auth/lab ref: Kerberos-based user enumeration and password spraying tool for Active Directory.

krbrelayup: Assess KrbRelayUp prerequisites and interpret existing Kerberos-relay test results, separating individual stages and directory-policy findings.

lazagne: Assess LaZagne module compatibility and interpret local application secret-exposure results, including incomplete or unsupported recovery.

ldaprelayscan: Assess effective LDAP signing and LDAPS channel-binding enforcement with LdapRelayScan; interpret per-controller results and inconclusive tests.

mapping-attack-paths-with-bloodhound-ce: Collect Active Directory data with SharpHound and Entra ID data with AzureHound, ingest into BloodHound Community Edition, and analyze on-prem, cloud, and hybrid attack paths using built-in queries and custom Cypher. Use during authorized red-team or penetration-test engagements to map privilege-esc

mimikatz: Auth/lab ref: Mimikatz secret-exposure audit; LSASS, DPAPI, Kerberos tickets/keys, token/ticket artifacts, Windows lab validation.

moving-laterally-with-netexec: Use NetExec (nxc) to validate credentials, enumerate SMB shares/users/policy, password-spray safely across lockout thresholds, execute commands, and dump SAM/LSA/NTDS credentials across SMB, WinRM, LDAP, MSSQL, SSH, and other protocol modules. Use during authorized internal penetration tests to find

nanodump: Auth/lab ref: NanoDump LSASS acquisition research; handle, fork, minidump, BOF/DLL formats, Windows lab validation and detection evidence.

netexec: Use NetExec to assess SMB, WinRM, LDAP, MSSQL, SSH, or RDP services with known credentials in an authorized environment.

network-ntlm-relay: Coerce and relay NTLM authentication for lateral movement and privilege escalation (relay to SMB, LDAP, ADCS). Load in an AD network with a foothold, on "NTLM relay", "responder", "coerce", no/absent SMB signing, or PetitPotam/PrinterBug. Signals: LLMNR/NBT-NS traffic, SMB signing off, MS-RPRN/EFSRP

offensive-active-directory: Active Directory attack methodology for internal network red team engagements. Covers reconnaissance (BloodHound, PowerView, ADExplorer), credential abuse (Kerberoasting, ASREProasting, NTLM relay, LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning), privilege escalation (ACL abuse, GPO abuse, unconstrained/constrained delegat

offensive-netexec: Use this skill whenever the user asks about NetExec (nxc) — a network exploitation and post-exploitation tool for Active Directory environments. Triggers include: any mention of 'nxc', 'netexec', 'crackmapexec' successor questions, AD enumeration, SMB/LDAP/WinRM/MSSQL/SSH/RDP/VNC/WMI/FTP/NFS protoco

offensive-windows-boundaries:

offensive-windows-mitigations:

performing-active-directory-bloodhound-analysis: Use BloodHound and SharpHound (or AzureHound) to enumerate Active Directory

performing-active-directory-compromise-investigation: Investigate Active Directory compromise by analyzing authentication logs,

performing-active-directory-forest-trust-attack: Enumerate and audit Active Directory forest trust relationships using

performing-active-directory-penetration-test: Conduct a focused Active Directory penetration test using BloodHound,

performing-lateral-movement-with-wmiexec: Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote

performing-privilege-escalation-assessment: Performs privilege escalation assessments on compromised Linux and Windows

performing-service-account-credential-rotation: Automates credential rotation for service accounts across Active Directory,

performing-windows-artifact-analysis-with-eric-zimmerman-tools: Performs comprehensive Windows forensic artifact analysis using Eric

powerview: Use PowerView's PowerShell functions for AD object, group, trust, and ACL inspection. Resolve command-version differences before querying.

privesccheck: Auth/lab ref: PrivescCheck Windows privilege review; services, tasks, registry policy, DLL/COM paths, stored-secret indicators.

privesc-windows-tokens: Windows privilege escalation via token impersonation privileges — SeImpersonate/SeAssignPrimaryToken (the Potato family) and related token abuse to SYSTEM. Load with a Windows shell as a service/web account, on "SeImpersonate", "whoami /priv", IIS/MSSQL service context, or "got a shell on Windows".

psexec: Auth/lab ref: Impacket psexec for remote SYSTEM-level shell execution on Windows hosts via SMB.

relaying-ntlm-for-adcs-esc8: Uses Impacket's ntlmrelayx.py with a coercion tool (PetitPotam, Coercer,

rubeus: Auth/lab ref: Kerberos testing toolkit for TGT/TGS requests, AS-REP roasting, Kerberoasting, pass-the-ticket, overpass-the-hash, and S4U delegation misuse.

sharphound: Auth/lab ref: Collect Active Directory data with SharpHound CE for import into BloodHound CE.

snaffler: Audit accessible Windows shares and file exposure with Snaffler; choose discovery boundaries, rule configuration, and structured evidence output.

stack-spoofing-dev: Auth/lab dev: Windows call-stack research; unwind metadata, synthetic frames, NtContinue, thread-pool traces, gadget constraints.

tradecraft-attack-path-mapping: Model the target as an attack graph — nodes (assets, identities, trust) and edges (a technique that gets you from one to the next) — and find the shortest path to the objective. Load when many findings need to be assembled into a route, on "how do these bugs connect", AD/cloud lateral- movement plan

trevorspray: Review TREVORspray's installed CLI, module compatibility, and authentication-test results; distinguish failures, lockouts, and inconclusive responses.

triaging-windows-with-kape: Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted

watson: Interpret Watson's legacy Windows missing-patch checks for reproducible older-build labs. Use current patch inventories for newer systems.

windows-ad: Use for authorized Active Directory and Windows identity attacks including Kerberos, AD CS, BloodHound paths, NTLM relay, and domain privilege escalation research.

windows-internals-dev: Auth/lab dev: Windows internals; PE loading and CRT startup, PEB/TEB, PE/COFF, syscalls, unwinding, memory/heap, tokens, kernel objects, ETW/AMSI telemetry.

winpeas: Auth/lab ref: Windows privilege escalation enumeration tool that identifies misconfigurations, weak permissions, unpatched services, and privilege escalation paths.

Canonical: https://notholy.com/he/skills/category/active-directory-windows
