# APIs, SaaS and identity

> REST, gRPC and GraphQL APIs, multi-tenant SaaS, SSO and the identity layer.

Tenant isolation, RBAC and ABAC, OAuth and OIDC tokens, SAML and SCIM, payment and webhook flows, rate limits and secrets handling in business applications.

analyzing-api-call-traces: Analyzes API call traces from a sandbox or API monitor (JSON) to group calls by

analyzing-api-gateway-access-logs: Parses API Gateway access logs (AWS API Gateway, Kong, Nginx) to detect

api-auth-attacks: Break API authentication: token handling, key leakage, weak session/JWT, and no-auth endpoints. Load on REST/GraphQL APIs using API keys, Bearer tokens, HMAC signing, or basic auth. Signals: `Authorization` headers, api_key params, tokens in URLs, /v1 vs /v2 auth drift.

api-bola: Broken Object/Function Level Authorization in REST/JSON APIs (the #1 API risk). Load on any REST API with object ids in paths/bodies (/api/v1/users/123, /orders/{id}), Bearer auth, mobile-app backends, or admin vs user function separation. Signals: predictable ids, verbs that skip re-authorization,

api-fuzzing: Discover and fuzz API endpoints, methods, params, and versions systematically. Load when you have an API base but not its full surface, an OpenAPI/Swagger/Postman spec, or "map/fuzz the API". Signals: /api, /v1, swagger.json, GraphQL, mobile backend, undocumented routes.

api-graphql: Attack GraphQL APIs. Load on /graphql, /graphiql, /v1/graphql, a POST with {"query":"..."}, Apollo/Hasura/graphene stacks, or "query/mutation" language. Signals: introspection enabled, batched queries, deeply nested fields, __schema, aliases.

api-grpc: Test gRPC / Protocol Buffers APIs — reflection, method enumeration, authz, and injection. Load on gRPC services (HTTP/2, content-type application/grpc, .proto files, ports like 50051), grpc-web, or "protobuf". Signals: grpc, protobuf, reflection service, ServerReflection.

api-mass-assignment: Mass assignment / auto-binding privilege escalation. Load when an API binds JSON directly to a model (Rails, Spring, Django REST, Node/Mongoose), on signup/profile-update/create endpoints, or when responses expose fields you didn't send (role, isAdmin, balance, verified). Signals: ORM object binding

api-mongo-agg-facet-bypass: Bypass a MongoDB aggregation-pipeline stage allowlist by nesting disallowed read stages inside $facet, then $unionWith/$lookup sibling collections to exfiltrate secrets (invite tokens, creds, hashes). Load when: an endpoint accepts a user-supplied `pipeline` (or errors like "operator-form queries no

api-security: Use for authorized security assessment of REST, GraphQL, WebSocket, or SOAP APIs, including discovery, authentication, authorization, rate-limit, and CI/CD testing.

api-testing-checklist: A fast, ordered methodology for assessing an API end to end — REST/GraphQL/gRPC/SOAP — so nothing gets skipped. Load when the target is an API (or recon found one), on "test this API", "checklist", methodology triage, or to confirm coverage before reporting. Signals: /api, swagger/openapi.json, Grap

api-versioning: Find and attack old/shadow API versions that missed a fix — improper inventory management. Load when the API is versioned (/v1, /v2, /api/2021-01), on "old API", or after mapping the surface. Signals: version in path/header/subdomain, deprecated docs, mobile app using an older version.

attacking-oauth-with-device-code-phishing: Run OAuth 2.0 device-code and illicit-consent phishing attacks against

building-identity-federation-with-saml-azure-ad: Configure SAML 2.0 identity federation between on-premises Active Directory (via AD FS or a third-party IdP) and Microsoft Entra ID, covering federation models (AD FS, password hash sync, pass-through auth, third-party IdP) and the SAML authentication flow. Use when extending on-premises authenticat

building-identity-governance-lifecycle-process: Design identity governance and lifecycle (IGA) programs on platforms like SailPoint, Saviynt, or Entra ID Governance, covering joiner-mover-leaver (JML) automation, role mining, access requests, periodic recertification, and orphaned-account remediation sourced from an HR feed. Use when automating c

claude-agents-creator: Create or revise Claude Code subagents or Claude Managed Agents, including definitions, delegation, permissions, and API sessions.

competition-graphql-rpc-drift: Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for GraphQL schemas, persisted queries, RPC manifests, generated clients, OpenAPI drift, hidden operations, and contract-to-handler mismatches. Use when the user asks to inspect GraphQL or RPC requests, compare client contr

competition-jwt-claim-confusion: Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for JWT, JWS, and JWE validation paths, header parsing, key selection, claim acceptance, audience and issuer checks, role derivation, and token-to-identity confusion bugs. Use when the user asks to inspect JWT headers or cl

competition-oauth-oidc-chain: Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for OAuth, OIDC, redirect flows, state or nonce handling, PKCE, token exchange, refresh logic, claim mapping, and accepted login paths. Use when the user asks to trace redirects, callback parameters, scopes, state, nonce, P

conducting-api-security-testing: Conducts security testing of REST, GraphQL, and gRPC APIs to identify

configuring-identity-aware-proxy-with-google-iap: Configures Google Cloud Identity-Aware Proxy (IAP) via gcloud to enforce

configuring-oauth2-authorization-flow: Configures secure OAuth 2.0 authorization flows, including Authorization

cpp-patterns: Modern C++ patterns and best practices for readable, safe, maintainable C++ code: RAII, ownership, error handling, API design, concurrency basics, and build/tooling hygiene. Use when writing or reviewing C++ (C++20+) code.

defeating-string-and-api-obfuscation: Recovers obfuscated strings and resolves dynamically loaded APIs in malware:

detecting-api-enumeration-attacks: Detect API enumeration attacks (BOLA/IDOR, OWASP API1:2023) by writing SIEM

detecting-email-account-compromise: Detect compromised O365 and Google Workspace email accounts by analyzing Unified Audit Logs and Azure AD sign-in logs for impossible travel, inbox rule creation/deletion (Set-InboxRule, New-InboxRule), external mail forwarding rules, and unusual Microsoft Graph API access or OAuth token use. Use whe

detecting-oauth-token-theft: Detect and respond to OAuth token theft and replay in Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD), covering access token theft, refresh token replay, Primary Refresh Token (PRT) abuse, pass-the-cookie attacks, and Token Protection conditional access policies. Use for impossible-travel or anomalous token-usage ale

detecting-shadow-api-endpoints: Discover and inventory shadow API endpoints that operate outside

detecting-suspicious-oauth-application-consent: Detect risky OAuth application consent grants in Azure AD / Microsoft

exploiting-excessive-data-exposure-in-api: Tests APIs for excessive data exposure (OWASP API3:2023) by intercepting raw API responses and comparing them against what the UI actually renders, looking for leaked PII, internal identifiers, debug data, or business-sensitive fields the frontend filters but the API still transmits. Use when auditi

find-api: Discover, document, and map all API endpoints of an Android application

golang-patterns: Idiomatic Go patterns, best practices, and conventions for building robust, readable, and maintainable Go code. Use when writing, reviewing, or refactoring Go (APIs, packages, errors, interfaces, concurrency, code style), choosing a dispatch or plugin mechanism, or building low-level/offensive Go wi

hunting-saas-sso-token-abuse: Hunts for stolen-session and OAuth/PRT token replay (T1550.001) by correlating Microsoft Entra ID SigninLogs SessionId/UniqueTokenIdentifier fields and Okta System Log sso/session events to spot impossible travel, refresh-token reuse, and token use from anomalous ASNs. Use when hunting MFA-bypass vi

hydra: Auth/lab ref: Online brute-force and password spraying tool supporting 50+ protocols (SSH, HTTP, FTP, SMB, RDP, WinRM, and more).

identity-federation: Use for authorized assessment of federated identity systems including SAML, OIDC, OAuth2 flows, SSO misconfiguration, and token confusion issues.

implementing-api-abuse-detection-with-rate-limiting: Implements API abuse detection using token bucket, sliding window, and

implementing-api-gateway-security-controls: Configures API gateways such as Kong, AWS API Gateway, Azure APIM,

implementing-api-key-security-controls: Implements secure API key generation with sufficient entropy, server-side

implementing-api-rate-limiting-and-throttling: Implements API rate limiting and throttling with token bucket, sliding

implementing-api-schema-validation-security: Implements API schema validation using OpenAPI Specification and JSON

implementing-api-security-posture-management: Implements API Security Posture Management (API-SPM) to continuously

implementing-api-security-testing-with-42crunch: Implements API security testing on the 42Crunch platform, combining

implementing-api-threat-protection-with-apigee: Implements API threat protection using Google Apigee reverse-proxy

implementing-deception-based-detection-with-canarytoken: Deploys and monitors Canary Tokens via the Thinkst Canary REST API for

implementing-endpoint-detection-with-wazuh: Deploys and configures Wazuh SIEM/XDR for endpoint detection, covering agent authentication and management, custom decoder and rule XML creation, alert querying via the Wazuh REST API, rule testing with wazuh-logtest, and automated active-response actions. Use when setting up endpoint detection and

implementing-google-workspace-admin-security: Hardens a Google Workspace tenant via Admin Console configuration:

implementing-google-workspace-sso-configuration: Configures SAML 2.0 single sign-on for Google Workspace against a third-party

implementing-identity-governance-with-sailpoint: Deploys SailPoint IdentityNow or IdentityIQ for identity governance and

implementing-identity-verification-for-zero-trust: Implements continuous, risk-adaptive identity verification for zero trust

implementing-jwt-signing-and-verification: Implements secure JWT (RFC 7519) signing and verification using HMAC-SHA256, RSA-PSS, ES256, and EdDSA, including token expiration, claims validation, and defenses against algorithm-confusion, none-algorithm, and key-injection attacks. Use when adding or hardening JWT-based authentication/authorizat

implementing-saml-sso-with-okta: Implement SAML 2.0 Single Sign-On using Okta as the Identity Provider,

implementing-zero-trust-for-saas-applications: Secures SaaS apps (Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, Salesforce, Slack) via CASB/SSPM deployment, conditional access policies, OAuth app governance, and session-level DLP controls enforcing identity verification and device compliance. Use when adding MFA/device-compliance conditional access, discover

jwt-security-review: Audit JSON Web Token implementations for algorithm confusion, weak secrets, missing validation, and token lifecycle flaws. Use when a codebase or API uses JWTs for auth.

jwt-tool: Auth/lab ref: broad JWT testing and exploitation toolkit.

offensive-api-abuse: Advanced API exploitation methodology focused on business logic abuse and sophisticated attack patterns that bypass traditional security controls. Covers business logic bypass through API call chaining and workflow manipulation. Addresses GraphQL-specific attacks including batching for credential br

offensive-api-security: Comprehensive API security testing methodology covering REST, gRPC, and WebSocket attack surfaces. Addresses the full OWASP API Security Top 10 2023 including BOLA/IDOR, broken authentication, excessive data exposure, rate limiting bypass, BFLA, mass assignment, SSRF, and security misconfiguration.

offensive-graphql: Offensive methodology for attacking GraphQL APIs during penetration tests and bug bounty engagements. Covers the full attack lifecycle: endpoint discovery, introspection abuse and blind schema reconstruction when introspection is disabled, authentication and authorization bypass through Relay node I

offensive-jwt: JWT attack methodology for penetration testers. Covers algorithm confusion (alg:none, RS256→HS256), weak HMAC secret brute force, kid parameter injection (SQLi, path traversal), jku/x5u/jwk header injection, JWKS cache poisoning, JWS/JWE confusion, timing attacks, and mobile JWT storage extraction.

offensive-oauth:

performing-api-inventory-and-discovery: Performs API inventory and discovery to identify all API endpoints in

performing-api-rate-limiting-bypass: Tests API rate limiting for bypass vulnerabilities using Python (requests/aiohttp)

performing-api-security-testing-with-postman: Uses Postman to build structured API security test collections covering

performing-graphql-depth-limit-attack: Execute and test GraphQL depth limit attacks using deeply nested recursive

performing-graphql-introspection-attack: Performs GraphQL introspection attacks that extract the full API schema

performing-graphql-security-assessment: Assessing GraphQL API endpoints for introspection leaks, injection attacks,

performing-jwt-none-algorithm-attack: Execute and test the JWT none algorithm attack, crafting tokens with

performing-oauth-scope-minimization-review: Performs OAuth 2.0 scope minimization review to identify over-permissioned

python-patterns: Pythonic patterns for readable, robust Python: typing, error handling, data modeling, iteration, resource management, threading/process/subinterpreter primitives, project layout, and tooling. Use when writing or reviewing Python code and APIs. For measurement/GIL/JIT use python-performance; for asyn

python-performance: Python performance workflow: measure with profilers, then cut allocations, pick the right parallelism (threads vs processes vs subinterpreters vs free-threading), and only then touch experimental JIT/runtime knobs. Use after you have evidence CPython is the bottleneck — not for style or API design.

resolving-dynamic-api-hashing: Resolves dynamically hashed Windows API names by brute-forcing observed hash constants

rust-patterns: Idiomatic Rust patterns and best practices for readable, safe, maintainable Rust: ownership, borrowing, API design, enums/traits, error handling, iterators, concurrency, dynamic dispatch/plugins, and low-level/offensive patterns. Use when writing or reviewing `.rs` code, refactoring crates, porting

schemathesis: Auth/lab ref: OpenAPI/GraphQL property-based API fuzzer. Use to auto-generate API tests, catch schema violations, triage failures systematically, and run high-coverage stateful campaigns in REST/GraphQL services.

sharp-edges: Identifies error-prone APIs, dangerous configurations, and footgun designs that enable security mistakes. Use when reviewing API designs, configuration schemas, cryptographic library ergonomics, or evaluating whether code follows 'secure by default' and 'pit of success' principles. Triggers: footgun

testing-api-authentication-weaknesses: Tests API authentication mechanisms for weaknesses including broken

testing-api-for-broken-object-level-authorization: Tests REST and GraphQL APIs for Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA/IDOR,

testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability: Tests APIs for mass assignment (auto-binding), OWASP API3:2023, by identifying

testing-api-security-with-owasp-top-10: Systematically assesses REST, GraphQL, and gRPC API endpoints against the OWASP

testing-for-broken-access-control: Systematically tests web applications and APIs for broken access control

testing-for-sensitive-data-exposure: Identifying sensitive data exposure vulnerabilities including API key

testing-jwt-token-security: Assessing JSON Web Token implementations for cryptographic weaknesses,

testing-oauth2-implementation-flaws: Tests OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect implementations for authorization code

testing-websocket-api-security: Tests WebSocket API implementations for missing upgrade-handshake authentication,

web-oauth: Attack OAuth 2.0 / OIDC / SSO flows for account takeover. Load on "Login with Google/GitHub", /authorize, /callback, redirect_uri, state, code/token params, SAML/OIDC SSO. Signals: OAuth endpoints, redirect_uri handling, missing state, implicit flow, pre-account-linking.

web-saml: Attack SAML SSO — signature exclusion/wrapping (XSW), unsigned assertions, and comment/XXE tricks to forge authentication. Load on SAML SSO (SAMLResponse, ACS URL, IdP/SP), enterprise login, or "SAML". Signals: SAMLResponse base64 in POST, /saml/acs, <saml:Assertion>, Shibboleth/ADFS/Okta SSO.

Canonical: https://notholy.com/en/skills/category/api-identity
